Syeda Duaa Zahra
EUROPE’S semiconductor industry has become the newest frontier in the race for technological self-sufficiency.
Yet its pursuit of “strategic autonomy” has exposed tensions between economic cooperation and national security. The freezing of assets belonging to Nexperia — a Dutch subsidiary of China’s Wingtech Technology — illustrates this growing divide between open markets and protectionist impulses in the name of industrial sovereignty. In late September, Dutch authorities, citing national security concerns, froze Nexperia’s assets worth around 14.7 billion Yuan and removed Chinese shareholder control through judicial proceedings. The action, coming days after a major EU declaration on semiconductor collaboration, drew global attention. For some, it reflects Europe’s ambition to consolidate control over critical technologies; for others, it signals a worrying precedent where political motivations override commercial norms.
Europe’s Chip Ambitions: The European Union’s semiconductor strategy stems from the European Chips Act of 2022, which aims to double Europe’s share of global chip production to 20% by 2030. Yet progress has been slow. Projects such as Intel’s planned megafab in Germany face delays, while others remain mired in funding and regulatory hurdles. Projections now suggest Europe’s share could rise only slightly — from 9.8% in 2022 to about 11.7% by the decade’s end. To address these gaps, the Netherlands led the creation of the European Semiconductor Alliance in March 2025, joined by Germany, France, Italy and others. The coalition seeks to strengthen R&D, cross-border production and investment partnerships to revive Europe’s manufacturing base. On September 29, all 27 EU states signed a declaration reaffirming their commitment to a resilient semiconductor ecosystem — described by Dutch Economic Affairs Minister Vincent Karremans as “a milestone toward Europe’s strategic autonomy.”
This renewed focus reflects Europe’s determination to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers amid global technological decoupling. Chips, once invisible components of modern life, have become the backbone of economic security — essential for everything from smartphones and electric vehicles to defence and artificial intelligence. The Nexperia Controversy: Within this context, the Dutch government’s intervention in Nexperia’s operations has sparked international debate. The firm, operating in the Netherlands since its acquisition by China’s Wingtech Technology, has long served as a bridge between European innovation and Asian manufacturing strength.
Critics argue that the Dutch decision aligns too closely with Europe’s ambition to consolidate semiconductor assets under EU control. The timing — just one day after the EU’s semiconductor declaration — reinforces perceptions that it was more strategic than security-driven. Many see this as part of a trend where governments invoke “national security” to justify interventionist industrial policies. Such actions, while politically appealing, risk undermining investor confidence and long-standing principles of open trade. From China’s perspective, the move may trigger responses under its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (2021), which allows countermeasures against discriminatory actions violating international trade norms. In Beijing’s view, the Nexperia case is not just a corporate dispute but a test of how China will protect its overseas assets amid tightening Western scrutiny.
Europe’s challenge now lies in balancing industrial ambition with its commitment to open markets. The drive for autonomy is understandable — the pandemic and geopolitical rivalries exposed supply chain vulnerabilities — but protectionism risks eroding the EU’s credibility as a defender of fair trade and legal certainty. The Netherlands, traditionally a champion of global commerce, must tread carefully: safeguarding national interests while preserving regulatory predictability. For Europe to realize its semiconductor vision, it must build trust, not barriers. Self-reliance cannot come through exclusion but through partnerships, transparency and consistent policy. Collaboration — especially with economies like China, deeply integrated into the semiconductor value chain — remains essential for progress at scale. Even the European Semiconductor Alliance acknowledges this. Its objectives include fostering international cooperation and encouraging joint ventures in research, design and production. Yet the Nexperia episode risks creating a perception of selective openness — where partnerships are promoted in words but restricted in practice.
An Industry Demanding Global Cooperation: Semiconductors epitomize global interdependence. No single country — not the US, China or the EU — can achieve full self-sufficiency in this capital-intensive industry. Production depends on thousands of interconnected suppliers: materials from Japan, design software from the US, lithography tools from the Netherlands and fabrication plants across Asia. In this web, unilateral actions justified by “security” can fragment the networks that make innovation possible. As major economies pursue chip self-reliance, overlapping subsidies, redundant capacity and rising costs risk slowing innovation. China remains central as both a key consumer and emerging producer, investing heavily in next-generation chips and AI hardware. Collaborative ventures like Nexperia’s have fostered jobs, innovation and supply chain resilience. For Europe, constructive engagement with China and other global players is vital to achieving its technological goals. The semiconductor industry’s future depends not on isolation but on mutual trust, reciprocal access and adherence to international norms. With its tradition of diplomacy and innovation, Europe can demonstrate that strategic autonomy and global collaboration can effectively coexist.
—The writer specializes in geopolitics, European and South Asian affairs and cybersecurity.
