INDIA has harboured hegemonic and Great Power ambitions in South Asia.
Whereas Pakistan treats India as a sovereign equal and demands the execution of United Nations Security Council resolutions in a judicious manner to permit the Kashmiris to exercise their right of self-determination. The Indian leadership has sought to outpace Pakistan in escalation dominance to establish the Indira Doctrine in South Asia, a replica of the United States’ 1823 Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere.
Although the Modi government has been frustrated by its tangible lack of military progress in subjugating Pakistan in the May 2025 four-day skirmishes, it is determined to establish escalation dominance by transforming its nuclear posture and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. Escalation dominance is “a condition in which a combatant can escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return, either because it has no escalation option or because the available options would not improve the adversary’s situation.” To achieve escalation dominance, New Delhi has endeavored to build counterforce capabilities. The pertinent question arises: how does Pakistan respond to India’s drive for escalation domination?
Islamabad opted for a restraint or conflict management approach during a few crises since the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan, especially in the 2016 Uri attack. The Modi government claimed that it conducted a surgical strike against Pakistan, but Islamabad did not retaliate. It has given false confidence to the Indian leadership about India’s military preeminence. Ironically, the restraint approach had strengthened the Modi government’s hawkish attitude towards Pakistan, leading to a surgical strike strategy (India’s 2017 Joint Forces Doctrine) against the neighboring states.
The Indian strategic pundits advocated for swapping the No First Use (NFU) nuclear policy and massive retaliation doctrine with a doctrine of flexible response to acquire multiple offensive nuclear options. They argued that a flexible response posture would provide India with many options to address the range of contingencies that might arise and enable it to escalate its dominance. Consequently, there is a shift in India’s strategic posture from a counter-value to a counterforce orientation, as evidenced by its weaponry (Agni-P canisterized missile, BrahMos cruise missile, hypersonic Shaurya missile, BMD systems, ASAT weapon, robust ISR network, etc), and officials signaling a swap from NFU to First Use (FU) nuclear policy.
India has strived to acquire the ability and capability to destroy the Pakistan military to wage war, especially nuclear war. A few American scholars opined that India adopted the logic of limited nuclear options, including counterforce, to change the deterrence equation with Pakistan and assert escalation dominance. It chalked out a nuclear strategy to acquire a “credible ability to disarm Pakistan of its long-range nuclear systems to implement a strategy of escalation dominance, where India can threaten credibly to escalate and defeat Pakistan at every potential level of violence.”
India’s resolve to achieve escalation dominance has manifested in its evolving strategic behavior in both the nuclear and conventional domains. India deployed its nuclear assets during the 2019 Pulwama military standoff. The then Defense Minister Rajnath Singh explicitly stated that India’s commitment to NFU “depends on the circumstances.” India has adopted a preemptive counterforce posture grounded in escalation dominance. It marked a shift in the Indian nuclear doctrine and the death knell of so-called credible minimum deterrence. The main problem with the counterforce posture lay in its inevitable association with a preemptive first strike. A first strike aimed at an opponent’s military facilities and weapons systems could effectively disarm the enemy. Thus, the counterforce is associated with an offensive rather than a defensive doctrine.
The Pakistani scholarship on deterrence theory and practice seems ossified, despite the fact that the security environment has changed significantly since India’s farce surgical strike claim in September 2016. The shift in Indian military doctrine requires a radically expanded debate that includes academic, military, and political leaders. They need to revisit Pakistan’s current credible minimum full-spectrum nuclear deterrence to restructure it into a flexible, tailored deterrence. With a full toolbox of conventional, cyber, space, missile defense shield (against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks), and a range of nuclear capabilities (varying yields and delivery systems), from low-yield, limited options (counterforce) to large-scale (countervalue) attack options.
So that Pakistani defense policymakers will be better positioned to deter India’s aggression, address crises, and, if necessary, manage escalation before and during conflict, and above all, prevent the adversary’s escalation dominance. Besides, make it obvious to India that a nuclear strike is possible, even in response to a non-nuclear, strategic attack. Although it requires modernizing the current forces, including nonstrategic battlefield or theater nuclear forces, entailing expanding the arsenal, it is imperative for a credible defence. To conclude, a resilient, flexible, tailored deterrent posture, capable of deterring hostile India’s efforts to achieve escalation dominance, remains the most effective safeguard and a prerequisite for sustaining Pakistan’s sovereign defence.
—The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
