PAST experience shows that India has shown less than logical regard for its international obligations, particularly those concerning its neighbours. This is particularly evident in its disregard of Pakistan’s concerns regarding its share of water resources, despite international commitments. The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was a solemn agreement signed by India and Pakistan. It was intended to ensure that – while affording India its full rights – Pakistan’s legitimate share of water as a lower riparian would not be adversely affected. The World Bank had provided its auspices for the concluding of this crucial Treaty even though it stopped short of assuming the formal role of guarantor for its implementation in letter and in spirit. India has over the years adopted the policy of gnawing at the terms of the Treaty bit by bit.
Slow reaction or procrastination by Pakistan has emboldened India to go ahead with projects that violate the provisions of the Treaty both in letter and in spirit. The dispute over Baglihar Project – in which Pakistan had invoked the relevant clause of the Indus Waters Treaty to little or no consequence – is a case in point. Pakistan, it would appear, has been fighting a losing battle in its quest to protect its water rights. Whatever efforts were made in the past can be classed as too little and too late. This is just not on in an area that is fast becoming water deficient. When the Quaid-i-Azam had called Kashmir as the ‘jugular vein’ of Pakistan, it was not a mere rhetoric statement. A hardcore realistic that he was, he was pointedly referring to the flow of precious waters from the state into Pakistan. The dip last year in the flow of water in river Chenab as a result of the operationalizing of the Baglihar Project – and that not once but twice in a crucial period for our agriculture – had once again brought the issue into sharp focus. It will be recalled that, after Pakistan had evoked the relevant clause in the Indus Basin Waters Treaty, the World Bank had appointed a Neutral Expert to give his findings. The Neutral Expert had, in effect, produced a fine cut gem that gave out a different glow, depending on which facet one was looking at. This naturally led each side to claim that its standpoint had been upheld.
Nonetheless, the two sides appeared to be willing to accept the results of the findings of the ‘Neutral Expert”. What appeared ominous, though, at the time was the realisation that both India and Pakistan continued to cling to the hackneyed practice of trying to score debating points at the expense of the other. And now, look at the way things have turned out. Now to the basics! How and why did the water-squabbles start in the first place? With the benefit of hindsight, one can safely surmise that sometime down the line India’s establishment took the conscious decision to begin to gnaw bit by bit at the Indus Waters Treaty. Water projects of a certain magnitude are permitted under the Treaty that lays down strict parameters for the design of such projects. The trouble started when India started work first on the Wullar barrage and subsequently on the Baglihar and Kishanganga projects without bothering either to have prior consultations with Pakistan or to ensure that the designs of the projects were in strict conformity with the permissible limits laid down in the Treaty. In many ways authorities in Pakistan were amiss in the aforementioned instances. By the time Pakistan had formulated its response, the projects were already in a fairly advanced stage. Pakistan’s pleas of freezing the construction work pending a mutually acceptable settlement were brushed aside by the Indian side. The Indian intentions were evident. As with several other issues, e.g. Siachin, they wished to present the world with a fait accompli and at the same time to test the resolve of the Pakistan government. The statement of the then government that Pakistan expects India to abide by international agreements on water sharing of the Indus system was most welcome. The assertion that the Indian move would only damage the bilateral ties that the two countries had built over the years and that “India should not trade off important regional objectives for short term domestic goals” was pertinent. But since then little follow-up action appears to have been taken.
What remains to be seen is how things will shape up in the months to come. The matter of the Indus Basin Waters is not one that could be conveniently consigned to the dustbin of the ‘composite’ dialogue. It is a matter of life and death for the people of this blessed land that can neither be subjected to procrastination nor indeed swept under the proverbial rug. The authorities concerned should be well aware of the consequences of failure. Ever since the so-called composite dialogue started, Pakistan has given less than optimum attention to the question of water apportionment with India. In fact, one of the first CBMs should have been related to the strict observance of the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. That no one gave a thought to this issue of extreme importance can only be regretted. Even now it may not be too late to make amends. It may be relevant to mention here that the question of apportionment of waters has raised its ominous head in many regions of the world. The international community would do well to tackle this issue betimes, before it becomes the cause of future wars.
— The writer is a former ambassador and former assistant secretary general of OIC.
