ENVIRONMENTAL protection has become one of the most urgent responsibilities of modern states. The survival of the planet depends on the preservation of forests, wildlife, water, air, biodiversity and natural ecosystems. Environmental laws are enacted to protect these re-sources, prevent their misuse and restrain those who exploit nature for power, profit or privilege. When such laws are ignored or weakened, the damage is not limited to one species or one region; it affects public health, future generations and the shared interests of humanity.
In Pakistan, this issue has special importance. Environmental degradation is already visible through floods, heatwaves, air pollution, water scarcity, deforestation and loss of biodiversity. Wildlife protection, therefore, is not a minor or sentimental concern. It is part of the State’s larger duty to protect life, dignity, public interest and the environment. Internationally, the issue is equally significant because many species, including the Houbara Bustard, are migratory and cannot be protected by one country alone. Their survival depends on cooperation between states and the meaningful enforcement of international environmental treaties.
It is in this wider context that the Houbara Bustard judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakis-tan, reported as 2016 SCMR 48, assumes great importance. Authored by Justice Qazi Faez Isa, the judgment stands as one of Pakistan’s landmark environmental law decisions. The case was not merely about the hunting of one bird. It raised fundamental questions about environmental governance, executive discretion, international obligations, elite privilege and the rule of law. Justice Isa’s reasoning reminded the State that environmental laws are not decorative promises or saleable commodities. They are legal safeguards meant to protect nature, restrain arbitrary power and preserve the planet for present and future generations.
The case arose after the Government of Sindh issued a notification removing the Houbara Bustard’s protected status and allowing its hunting through special permits. These permits were supported by letters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had allocated hunting areas in Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab to foreign dignitaries from Gulf states. The Supreme Court dismissed Sindh’s appeal, allowed the public interest petition, struck down the Sindh notification and held that neither the Federation nor any Province could issue licences or permits to hunt the Houbara Bustard.
The central question before the Court was whether federal and provincial authorities could use their statutory and diplomatic powers to permit the hunting of a protected or vulnerable species. The governments argued that wildlife classification fell within provincial discretion, that the Foreign Ministry’s allocation of hunting areas was a federal matter, and that foreign dignitaries brought development benefits to local communities. The Court rejected these arguments. It held that the power to alter wildlife schedules was not unlimited. Such power had to be exercised for the purpose of wildlife laws themselves: the preservation, conservation and management of wildlife. A species could not be removed from protection without sound ecological reasons, proper population assessment and evidence showing that it no longer required protection.
This administrative-law reasoning is one of the strongest features of the judgment. The Court did not base its decision merely on sympathy for wildlife or moral objection to hunting. It grounded the decision in the principle that public power must be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for the purpose for which it was given. Sindh’s notification failed that test. It did not refer to any scientific study showing that the Houbara Bustard’s population had recovered. On the contrary, the Court noted that the bird’s numbers had deteriorated and that experts regarded it as vulnerable and threatened. The decision therefore appeared to serve diplomatic and political objectives rather than conservation.
The judgment also exposed serious inconsistency within Pakistan’s wildlife governance. Different provinces treated the same bird differently. Sindh attempted to convert it from a protected animal into a game animal. Punjab treated it as game. Balochistan’s law was internally contradictory: it protected the bird, yet also allowed dignitaries to hunt up to 100 birds on payment of a fee. This was especially troubling because the Houbara Bustard is migratory. Its protection cannot sensibly depend on the province in which it happens to land. The Court therefore treated the matter as a national environmental governance issue, not merely a provincial licensing dispute.
Another important dimension of the judgment was Pakistan’s international environmental obligations. The Court referred to CITES and the Convention on Migratory Species, noting that the Houbara Bustard was protected under both regimes and that Pakistan’s domestic laws recognized these obligations. The judgment gave international conservation commitments practical force within domestic decision-making and made it clear that treaty obligations cannot be ignored for diplomatic convenience.
The Court also treated the case as public interest litigation. The petitioner was a citizen-lawyer seeking to prevent the decimation of the Houbara Bustard. It held that in such cases, especially where governments are alleged to be violating the law, strict rules of standing should not bar constitutional review. This broadened access to environmental justice and affirmed citizens’ right to challenge state actions threatening ecological interests. The judgment further linked environmental protection with the rights to life, dignity and religion under Articles 9, 14 and 20 of the Constitution. Justice Isa also invoked Islamic ethics, framing humans as khalifah, or stewards of the earth.
The practical impact of the judgment was later limited. In January 2016, a five-member Supreme Court bench, by a 4–1 majority, set aside the complete hunting ban in review proceedings, while Justice Qazi Faez Isa dissented. Therefore, the judgment should be understood as a landmark environmental decision, though not the final operative legal position after review. Despite this reversal, its enduring value lies in its principles: environmental discretion must be science-based, conservation-oriented and legally accountable. It rejects elite exemptions from wildlife law and links biodiversity protection with constitutional rights, Islamic stewardship and intergenerational justice, affirming that nature is a protected trust.
—The writer is Barrister, Solicitor & Notary Public, Usman Law Professional Corporation, based in Canada.
