The twin crises of the US–Israel war on Iran and the Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict have converged into a single destabilizing arc of insecurity with Pakistan uncomfortably positioned at its geopolitical hinge.
Together, these conflicts magnify strategic, economic and internal security risks for Pakistan while shrinking the space for diplomacy, regional cooperation and long-term peace. Already grappling with economic fragility and political turbulence, the simultaneity of these crises creates not merely a challenging environment, but a potential inflection point for our foreign and security policy.
The US–Israeli strikes on mark a decisive transition from years of shadow warfare and calibrated brinkmanship to open interstate conflict. What had long been managed through covert operations has now broken through the restraints of plausible deniability. The declared aim of degrading Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile forces and regional power projection capabilities signals a strategy that is less about deterrence and more about coercive restructuring of the regional order. The diplomatic scaffolding that once kept the conflict within manageable limits is eroded resulting in open-ended confrontation whose trajectory will be shaped as much by miscalculation and domestic politics in Washington as by formal strategic objectives
For Pakistan, this war is not a distant spectacle. It cuts across several of our most sensitive axes: relations with the United States, ties with Iran as a crucial neighbour, connections with Gulf monarchies hosting millions of Pakistani workers and our own delicate sectarian equilibrium at home. We now find ourselves compelled to practice a demanding form of strategic balancing in a context where the margin for error is extremely narrow.
The United States is still an important source of financial support, diplomatic influence and military equipment while Iran carries profound symbolic significance in our domestic sectarian and ideological landscape. A crude alignment with any anti-Iran coalition would risk destabilizing Pakistan’s western border, inflaming sectarian tensions and alienating important segments of public opinion. Conversely, overtly siding with Tehran would jeopardize relations with Washington and key Gulf partners aggravating Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities.
For the moment, Pakistan has articulated a stance of “principled neutrality” or “strategic clarity.” We have expressed opposition to further escalation, underscored Iran’s right to security and sovereignty and rejected any notion of participating militarily in the conflict or extending nuclear deterrence beyond its own borders. At the same time, have avoided incendiary rhetoric against Washington or its regional partners, instead foregrounding calls for restraint and negotiations. This posture is less an expression of comfort than of necessity: it is an attempt to preserve vital relationships on all sides while protecting our core red lines.
If the Iran theatre poses an external balancing challenge, the Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict presents a direct and immediate security threat. Since the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021, our long-held notion of Afghanistan as “strategic depth” has unravelled. Instead, Afghanistan has re-emerged as a source of strategic exposure. Militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have benefited from permissive conditions on Afghan soil, exploiting ideological affinities, terrain and political ambiguity to regroup and escalate attacks inside Pakistan. Simultaneously, Baloch insurgent elements are using Afghan territory as a sanctuary. Islamabad’s frustration with Kabul’s unwillingness or inability to act decisively against these groups has translated into a more overtly coercive posture: border fencing and fortification, mass deportations of undocumented Afghans and, most consequentially, cross-border airstrikes deep inside Afghan territory as defensive necessities. What began as a dispute over safe havens and cross-border attacks has gradually assumed the character of an interstate confrontation, with the latent possibility of spiraling into a more sustained conflict.
The Afghan front is not merely a foreign policy issue; it is deeply intertwined with our internal stability. Escalating cross-border skirmishes and militant retaliation translate directly into civilian casualties, displacement and a pervasive sense of insecurity in border provinces, particularly Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. At the same time, Pakistan’s economic distress circumscribes its capacity to manage this security burden. Rising defence expenditure, the cost of internal security operations, disruptions to cross-border trade and declining investor confidence all place additional pressure on an already fragile fiscal framework. The more resources are diverted to fighting fires on the western frontier, the fewer remain for social services, infrastructure and longer-term economic reforms—creating a feedback loop where insecurity undermines development and underdevelopment, in turn, fuels insecurity.
The Double Jeopardy of the US–Israel war on Iran and the Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict create a de facto two-front dilemma for us. On one front, a volatile and increasingly hostile environment along the western border demands sustained attention, resources and strategic creativity. On the other, a polarizing confrontation involving the United States, Israel, Iran and the wider Gulf region exerts diplomatic, economic and ideological pressure on Pakistan to choose sides in a war we cannot afford to join and cannot afford to ignore. This simultaneity risks strategic overstretch perhaps more than at any time since the early 2000s, to manage internal militancy, border tensions, economic crisis, political contestation and now a high-stakes regional war in its near neighbourhood. This is particularly acute in the maritime domain. The conflict with Iran has spilled into the Gulf and our energy security and trade routes will face serious disruption. The spectre of blocked sea lanes, attacks on shipping or punitive sanctions regimes would hit Pakistan’s import-dependent economy hard. Combined with constrained overland trade via Afghanistan would compress Pakistan’s economic and connectivity options at the very moment it needs diversification and resilience. The external crises reverberate across our internal fault lines as well and risks sharpening sectarian cleavages within Pakistan. Inflammatory narratives, casting Pakistan as part of an “anti-Iran camp” or conversely, as a supposed outpost of Iranian influence could be exploited by extremist groups and foreign actors alike. Meanwhile, the conflict with Afghanistan exacerbates ethnic and regional grievances, especially among Pashtun populations who find themselves on the frontlines of military operations, militant infiltration and economic dislocation. If policies are perceived as collectively punitive or as ignoring local voices, resentment may deepen, undermining the legitimacy of the state’s security agenda and complicating efforts to build a shared national narrative.
Beyond Pakistan’s borders, these twin crises are eroding already fragile norms of regional conduct. The large-scale use of force against Iran, justified in the language of pre-emption and regime containment, risks normalizing coercive military solutions to political and strategic disputes. If such strategies are perceived as effective, other states in the broader region may be tempted to adopt more aggressive doctrines, including cross-border strikes and targeted killings, against perceived threats. Our own resort to unilateral airstrikes in Afghanistan is part of this wider pattern. It reflects a broader shift toward militarized responses and away from patient diplomacy and institution-building. The danger is that South and West Asia drift into a “post-normative” security environment, in which sovereignty and non-intervention are increasingly conditional and where coercion, rather than negotiation, becomes the default instrument of policy. In such an environment, regional organizations and multilateral mechanisms, which are already weak, risk further marginalization. Initiatives that depend on a minimum level of trust, such as transnational energy projects, trade corridors and collective security dialogues, become exceedingly difficult to sustain. The long-term casualty of these trends is not only peace, but the very possibility of a shared regional future built on cooperation rather than conflict.For Pakistan, the current juncture demands a conscious effort to avoid entrapment in other actors’ wars while reclaiming agency over its own security trajectory. This requires a recalibration along four key axes. First, the western frontier strategy must move beyond episodic coercion toward a more integrated framework. That means pairing necessary counter-terrorism operations at home with a clear, legally grounded doctrine on cross-border action and embedding both within a renewed, realistic dialogue with Kabul. Second, on Iran, Pakistan must sustain an active yet militarily neutral posture. This entails firm opposition to nuclear use and regime-change warfare, rejection of participation in any combat coalition and willingness to facilitate channels of communication among Iran, Gulf States, Western powers and other regional actors. Pakistan’s value here lies precisely in its ability to talk to all sides without being perceived as a mere extension of any one camp.
Third, economic and energy vulnerabilities must be addressed not as a long-term aspiration but as an urgent strategic priority. Strengthening overland connectivity with China and Central Asia along secure corridors can offer alternatives if maritime routes are disrupted or politicized. Finally, domestic consensus-building is indispensable. In an environment of heightened polarization, both regionally and at home, we cannot afford to have its external posture dictated by short-term partisan calculations. A broad national understanding on red lines, regarding military involvement in the Iran war, nuclear policy and the strategic objectives toward Afghanistan, would provide much-needed continuity and predictability. Alongside this, proactive management of sectarian and extremist narratives, through regulation, education reform and inclusive political messaging, is critical to prevent internal fractures from becoming strategic liabilities. Pakistan today stands at the intersection of two dangerous trajectories: an expanding war in West Asia and a deteriorating conflict on its western frontier. We cannot unmake either crisis. What we can do, however, is to refuse the role of a passive bystander or expendable proxy and instead pursue a carefully balanced strategy that prioritizes de-escalation, internal cohesion and economic resilience. The choice is not between idealism and realism, but between short-sighted reactions and a longer-term, integrated vision of security. If we can stabilize our Afghan policy, resist entanglement in the Iran war and invest in the economic and political foundations of resilience, we may yet emerge from this turbulent period not as a casualty of regional turmoil, but as a constructive architect of a more peaceful order in our neighbourhood.
—The writer is former Ambassador, based in Islamabad.
