Following the Jaffar Express hijacking, the declaration of the National Security Committee of Parliament was well received, as it appropriately reflected the concerns, sentiments and the desires of the people.
However, these assertions must now be expeditiously translated into concrete policy objectives and vigorously followed up.
Further, the following major lessons learnt from the Jaffar Express and past terrorism episodes must be incorporated in our counter terrorism response: First and foremost, bold and unambiguous political directions are needed to trace and eliminate foreign terrorists, their masterminds and their financial and logistical support, particularly inside Afghanistan.
This aligns with our right to self-defence under the UN Charter (Chapter 7, Article 51).
A mix of overt and covert actions can disrupt terrorist operations, force relocation and deny resources, supporting our defensive cis-frontier strategy under the NAP.
Many countries, including India, use this approach for counterterrorism and, at times, political gain.
In view of the forgoing and the Armed Forces constitutional obligation to defend Pakistan, from internal and external enemies, no additional political authorization is needed for this course.
Though we already possess a casus bello for our actions as mentioned earlier, we can further legitimize them, if needed, with the ample and credible dossiers of evidence against terrorists, already held with us.
Repelling and containing terrorism inside Pakistan must be reappraised and should continue, as a secondary, but vital defensive component.
This must now include greater emphasis on cis-frontier pre-emption, through blocking land, sea and air entry points of terrorists and obtaining sufficient early warnings.
Enhanced surveillance and intelligence capabilities, greater coordination of multiple agencies at the federal and provincial levels and soliciting public support of LEAs through WhatsApp contacts, will be needed for this.
While the Armed Forces tackle terrorists in the border areas, maintenance of law and order and neutralization of urban and rural terrorists must be the prime responsibility of the provinces through their Counter-Terrorism Departments.
Deploying a well-funded, trained and equipped force has been mandated in the NAP, yet this remains the weakest link in our response chain.
The reason?
Most provinces have ignored this division of responsibility and are reluctant to spend adequately on their security, despite their lion’s share of over 57 percent of all the national resources, (since 2010, following 18Th Amendment).
Ironically the same Amendment has impoverished the Federation (noted by IMF too) and it can’t afford additional security spending, without borrowing loans or taxation.
Thus, good governance dictates that the provinces realize this and adequately protect their people and critical infrastructure, particularly roads and railways, communication in inaccessible areas and forensic science laboratories etc.
They must earmark specific budgets and even impose additional taxation, if needed for implementation of these measures, besides adopting transparent verifiable spending mechanisms for the purpose.
Failing this, the Federation could reduce, re-appropriate or withhold their share of federal resources.
The three percent share in NFC award, promised for erstwhile FATA, (Merged KP Districts) must be fully honoured, as stipulated in the 25th Constitutional Amendment and bulk of these funds must be earmarked for security.
Taking cue from the current US policies on migration, we must end our excessive hospitality of hosting millions of foreign refugees, particularly Afghans, for our security and borrowed economy.
Further, political, diplomatic or economic incentives being showered on the present Afghan Government, must now be directly linked to their attitude, response and reciprocity to our concerns.
This must include stricter border control measures at Chaman and Torkham, closing all other crossing points and demand for respecting the decree (fatwa), of their own spiritual leader, stating that any attack by Afghans outside their country is not ‘Jihad’.
Besides, we must demand that the edict be applied to the TTP, BLA, and other terrorists, who have pledged allegiance to Afghan rulers and are sponsored by them.
Additionally, greater intelligence sharing and collaboration with countries like China, Iran, UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—who have economic stakes in Pakistan—should be pursued.
These nations must be urged to use their influence to prevent Afghan territory from being used to destabilize Pakistan.
This is crucial to safeguard our commercial interests, including CPEC and Reko Diq, from foreign economic terrorism.
Such actions also protect human and non-human capital, reduce internal security costs, and mitigate disruptions to supply chains and investor confidence.
Equally significant is the need that, all calls for dialogue with domestic and foreign terrorists, who do not recognize and respect our constitution and sovereignty and who mercilessly kill innocent citizens, even at places of worship and in the month of Ramazan, must end.
As alluded during the NSC meeting, we shouldn’t be seen as a soft state, unwilling or incapable of defence against criminals or terrorists-an impression that can erode our deterrence capability, diminish our international stature and corrode investors’ confidence.
Finally poisonous narratives of the terrorists, extremists, digital warriors and their sympathizers must be forcefully negated by our politico- religious leadership, at every level, and discredited by state and private media, academia and society, for the cause of our survival.
Those who willfully shirk from this imperative are clearly with our nemesis and must be dealt with accordingly.
Only through such policies can we hope to send clear messages to the terrorists and their sponsors that we have decided to defeat them decisively.
—The writer is the former President of NDU Islamabad. (genraza@yahoo.com)
