PAKISTAN’S debate on the formation of new provinces continues to surface with renewed vigour, driven by the practical difficulties of governing a nation whose population now exceeds two hundred and forty million within an administrative framework that has remained largely unchanged since 1970. At present the country comprises four provinces—Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan—alongside the Islamabad Capital Territory and the territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Calls for additional units, whether limited to South Punjab or Hazara or extending to schemes of twelve, fifteen or even thirty provinces, arise from administrative overload, regional disparities, population pressure and a widespread sense that distant provincial capitals cannot respond adequately to local needs.
Those who favour reorganization argue that smaller provinces would reduce the administrative distance between citizens and decision-makers. Capitals such as Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta are far from many districts, hindering timely action in health, education, policing and disaster management. New units could tailor policies to regional needs, reduce Punjab’s dominance—which accounts for roughly half the national population—and give under-represented areas a stronger voice in provincial assemblies, the Senate and resource distribution. Development funds and institutions, long concentrated in existing capitals, could be distributed more evenly, while cultural and linguistic identities, particularly those of Seraiki and Hindko speakers, would gain recognition. Smaller governments could also be easier to monitor, potentially strengthening accountability and encouraging broader political participation. Proponents cite India’s state reorganization as an example.
Opponents, however, emphasize the heavy fiscal and administrative burden. Every new province would necessitate a governor, chief minister, cabinet, assembly, high court, secretariat, housing, vehicles, security and pensions, expanding the political class and locking in higher recurring expenditure at a moment when Pakistan already contends with deficits, debt and disputed National Finance Commission awards. Division along ethnic or linguistic lines risks intensifying identity politics, generating boundary disputes and fostering fragmentation rather than national cohesion. Constitutionally, the creation or alteration of provinces demands a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament together with the consent of the affected provincial assembly under Article 239—an exacting requirement in a polarized political climate.
Experience suggests that new units would not automatically cure deeper ailments of weak institutions, elite capture and insufficient accountability; they might merely transplant the same patronage networks closer to the districts. The protracted difficulties that have attended the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa illustrate how restructuring can lag for years. More provinces would also complicate federal arrangements for resource sharing and Senate representation, while smaller entities might prove financially fragile and more dependent on the centre.
These arguments gain sharper relief when viewed against the historical evolution of Pakistan’s provincial map. At independence in 1947, the western wing comprised West Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, along with princely states such as Bahawalpur, Khairpur and Kalat. Karachi was a separate federal capital territory, while several Baloch states briefly formed a union. In 1955, the One Unit scheme merged the western provinces and states into a single Province of West Pakistan, largely to establish parity with East Pakistan and curb provincialism.
Although intended to reduce administrative costs and facilitate constitution-making, One Unit centralized power and generated resentment in Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, where it was seen as an assault on regional identities. The arrangement lasted until 1970, when President Yahya Khan’s Legal Framework Order dissolved West Pakistan and restored four provinces along broadly pre-1955 lines. After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, these four provinces formed the core of the remaining state and the 1973 Constitution confirmed the structure.
Subsequent changes included the formalization of the Islamabad Capital Territory, the renaming of Baluchistan and Sindh, greater autonomy for Gilgit-Baltistan in 2009 and the renaming of the North-West Frontier Province as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010. The latter intensified demands for a Hazara province. In 2018, the former tribal areas were merged with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa under the 25th Amendment. Meanwhile, demands for a Seraiki or South Punjab province, restoration of Bahawalpur and other divisions have persisted, although no new full province has been created since 1970.
Running parallel to the provincial debate is Pakistan’s uneven history of local government, often regarded as a less costly alternative to creating new provinces. Ayub Khan’s Basic Democracies system of 1959 established councils at union, tehsil, district and divisional levels. Zia-ul-Haq revived elected local bodies in 1979, while Musharraf’s 2001 devolution plan created a three-tier system of elected councils headed by nazims, transferring significant administrative and developmental powers. Yet successive civilian governments have frequently delayed elections, dissolved councils or recentralized authority.
The 18th Amendment of 2010, through Article 140-A, required provinces to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial powers. Despite provincial laws and elections, implementation has remained inconsistent, with limited fiscal autonomy. Strengthening genuine local governments could therefore deliver many benefits associated with smaller provinces—greater proximity, responsiveness and accountability—without their heavy financial costs or the risks of ethnic fragmentation.
Ultimately, the demand for new provinces reflects genuine concerns about administrative overload, uneven development and distant governance. Smaller provinces could ease these pressures if designed around administrative efficiency, strong institutions and fiscal prudence rather than ethnicity alone. However, the constitutional hurdles, financial burden and potential for further division suggest that Pakistan should first strengthen local government. Any future reorganization should be based on broad national consensus, careful planning and institutional capacity so that it does not create new problems while attempting to solve existing ones.
—The writer is Director General Research, National Assembly Secretariat, Parliament House, Islamabad.
