THE renewed debate over creating more provinces in Pakistan reflects genuine public frustration with weak services, distant decision making and unequal development. But the discussion often begins with a sweeping claim that the system has failed. Before redrawing provincial boundaries, Pakistan must identify which parts of the system have failed, why they failed and how a new structure would prevent the same weaknesses from returning.
The failure is not one-dimensional. It may lie in political governance, including unstable governments, weak parties and ineffective parliamentary oversight. It may lie in administrative performance, visible in overcentralized bureaucracy, poor services and weak financial management. It may also lie in institutional imbalance, where authority overlaps, responsibility remains unclear and accountability is limited. These are different problems and require different remedies.
There are valid arguments for creating new provinces. Pakistan’s population exceeds 241 million and is administered mainly through four provinces. In many areas, citizens remain far removed from provincial capitals and struggle to access administrative, health, education and development services. Smaller units could improve representation, shorten administrative distance and allow greater focus on neglected regions.
Yet a new province would not automatically be better governed. If it inherits the same political interference, centralized bureaucracy, weak accountability, unequal development and poor financial discipline, Pakistan may increase the number of governments without improving governance. Smaller boundaries cannot compensate for unreformed institutions.
This concern is visible in the existing system. Local government elections have often been delayed, local bodies remain financially dependent on provincial governments and municipal institutions frequently lack control over staff and budgets. Provinces demand greater autonomy from Islamabad but are often reluctant to transfer meaningful authority to districts, cities and communities. This contradiction lies at the heart of Pakistan’s decentralization problem.
The Constitution already provides a route through Article 140A, which requires provinces to establish local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility to elected representatives. Genuine devolution, however, requires more than periodic elections. Local governments need predictable financial transfers, authority over municipal services, qualified staff and institutional continuity. Without these elements, they remain dependent extensions of provincial administrations.
Creating a province is also much more than appointing a governor and chief minister. It requires a provincial assembly, secretariat, civil service, police structure, planning and finance departments, and supporting judicial and regulatory institutions. These costs must be weighed against expected improvements in representation, service delivery and regional development.
Economic viability should not mean that every new province must operate without federal support. Existing provinces also depend on federal transfers. The real test is whether a proposed province has a credible revenue base or development potential, manageable administrative costs and the institutional capacity to use public resources effectively.
The political dimension cannot be ignored. New provinces would affect revenue sharing, water distribution, natural resources, assets, liabilities, Senate representation and electoral influence. They would also challenge established provincial interests and raise questions of identity, language and regional control. Unless these matters are addressed through broad political agreement, new boundaries could generate new disputes instead of resolving old ones.
International experience offers a useful but limited lesson. India has created several new states in response to administrative, regional and political demands. Some achieved greater administrative focus, while others continued to face inequality and weak services. South Africa recognizes national, provincial and local governments as distinct but interdependent spheres. The central lesson is that smaller units may create an opportunity for reform, but only clear authority, institutional capacity and strong local government can turn that opportunity into results.
Before any major constitutional change, Pakistan should establish an independent commission on administrative and territorial reform. Its membership should include constitutional experts, economists, administrators and representatives from all provinces and affected regions.
The commission should examine population pressures, regional inequality, fiscal capacity, bureaucratic performance, service delivery gaps and the division of responsibilities among federal, provincial and local governments. It should identify which practices must end, which institutions need reform and what administrative model would operate differently in any proposed province.
The goals of reform must follow directly from the failures identified. If poor service delivery is the problem, targets should cover schools, hospitals, water, transport and administrative response times. If excessive centralization is the problem, success should be measured by the actual transfer of funds, staff and decision making authority. Other indicators should include financial discipline, transparency, public satisfaction and reduced regional development gaps.
No proposal for a new province should proceed unless it clearly explains its fiscal structure, administrative model, local government system, division of powers and mechanism for accountability. Periodic reviews should then measure whether those commitments are being met.
Pakistan cannot afford another generation of incomplete arrangements. The real choice is not simply between four provinces and more provinces. It is between cosmetic restructuring and meaningful institutional reform. Maps can reorganize territory, but only a genuinely reformed system can improve governance.
—The author is a Financial, Institutional Development and Governance Specialist.
