Bangladesh foreign policy façade
BANGLADESH became independent from West Pakistan in 1971 as a result of the war. It currently has a population and economy of 170 million and US$470 billion respectively. However, the country continues to receive dictation from major powers as it has no security alliance with major powers including the US, China, India or Russia. Its policy of “friendship to all’ is merely a rhetoric that cannot be called a foreign policy which Bangladesh has been following since its inception. Bangladesh has undoubtedly been making headlines for its economic success in the recent past, but the question is, how can this one-sided economic success guarantee lasting peace and security in Dhaka? In contemporary geopolitics, intense power contests between powerful states across the world, especially in South Asia, make Bangladesh completely insecure and vulnerable to these international rivalries.
Another dilemma that increases its vulnerability is being a non-nuclear power, unlike Pakistan, India and China, to deter any attack that would tip its balance of power. Therefore, a rational analysis of the given situation clearly reveals that Bangladesh is completely caught between the three nuclear powers that are at daggers drawn with one another. Any confrontation amongst these powers will certainly have disastrous consequences for Bangladesh. Furthermore, another flashpoint that cannot be ignored is the unstable and volatile state of Myanmar which will pose an existential threat to the safety and security of Bangladesh. More importantly, the staging of the Indo-Pacific theater with the recent close alliance by the US with India will have a direct impact on the security, economy and survival of Bangladesh.
According to some security analysts, China and India are engaged in a tug-of-war for Bangladesh and others have pointed out that Bangladesh is benefiting from China-India animosity. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that Bangladesh’s perceived advantage is more the result of power competition than the result of Dhaka’s active strategies to hedge between them.
In fact, Bangladesh has no foreign policy. What is over-cited by Bangladeshi officials as foreign policy, in effect, doesn’t stand as a policy by any means. Even in 1974 after the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman joined Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was convinced that friendship to all was not a policy. This one-sentence statement does not provide any policy goals, strategic planning, or methodology. At best, it can be regarded as an unrealistic dictum that echoes China’s greatest leader Deng Xiaoping’s realistic gnome of “hide your strength, bide your time.”
Although, during the Cold War as a member of NAM, Bangladesh’s rhetoric of “friendship to all” created some aspirational feeling but in practice it proved to be completely futile as a substantial and well-crafted policy. A policy always incorporates a combination of national core interests, priorities and strategies which Bangladesh’s completely lacks in its “Friendship to all” policy. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Foreign Minister have regularly emphasized Bangladesh’s foreign policy but failed to address how this friendship would be implemented in an environment of hostility.
Along with this narrative of friendship to all, Bangladesh, like other states, does not have the tools to exert complete control over the external environment to change the behaviour and intentions of other states in a way that Dhaka wants. Bangladesh will have to learn how to deal with geopolitics and realize that friendship is nothing more than a utopian idea. Bangladesh’s own history with its neighbours depicts the futility of its so-called friendship-to-all rhetoric. For example, Myanmar’s hostile actions along the borders and coordinated coercive tactics to push Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh by demographics undermine Bangladesh’s territorial sovereignty. In fact, this is Naypyitaw’s deliberate strategy of coercion solely to gain an upper hand over the Bay of Bengal in the long run.
Similarly, India’s continuous genocide of Bangladeshi citizens is clearly aimed at gaining dominance over Bangladesh. To apply coercion, New Delhi has also secretly deployed a set of agents to force Bangladesh to India’s terms, which is clearly not a sign of friendship. However, even in these contentious issues with neighbouring countries, Dhaka’s insistence on “friendship to all” is nothing but a folly in the national interest. Doesn’t this then give a false signal to hostile actors that Dhaka will stick to “friendship” even if it harms Bangladesh’s national interest, and they can get away with it at no cost? How can this be the foreign policy of a sovereign country?
“Bangladesh’s policy towards other countries is also in sharp contrast of Dhaka’s insistence on “friendship to all.” For example, Bangladesh doesn’t recognize Israel as a state because of its strong ties with the Muslim world, but Israel is recognized by 165 countries in the world. Until recently, Dhaka also did not recognize Kosovo as a country either. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan are by no means friendly. Then how does “friendship to all” stand in these circumstances? It is clearly evident that “friendship to all” is just a rhetoric of convenience, but in effect, it is nothing but empty words. In particular, as the world moves back toward great-power competition, many middle and small powers are choosing sides and forming alliances, while others adjust their strategic approaches to navigate intense geopolitical competition. Contrary to that, Dhaka’s insistence on the old rhetoric of ‘friendship-to-all’ shows the ill-preparedness and serious weakness of the country’s strategic vision. The latest reconciliation and economic and security alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the help of China is the fine example of building ties for the pursuit of national interests.
Any potential conflict between India and China will undoubtedly have a direct impact on Bangladesh due to India’s geographical weakness. If such a conflict emerges, how will Bangladesh adapt its foreign policy to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity? In such a situation, what kind of strategic vision should Bangladesh adopt to mitigate the risk? In fact, Bangladesh has no policy to address such a strategic conundrum.
For countries like Bangladesh, the lofty rhetoric of “friendship-to-all” is left as the ultimate pursuit. The priority of state policy should not give rise to perceived friendship or enmity but should pursue state affairs in a realistic manner, be it friend or foe. A delusional utopia of being friends with everyone is unrealistic. This is a folly for the national interest of Bangladesh. As the geopolitical restructuring and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region is under way, Bangladesh, as a key rimland state, must articulate a foreign policy that is conducive to its national interests not in the interest of a particular government.
—The writer is a geopolitical analyst and a freelance columnist based in Gujranwala.
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