THE recent crisis in Kashmir has reminded me of my university days. It must have been around 1985 or perhaps a year later.
Time or Newsweek carried a colored illustration showing a dagger plunged into the very heart of Chad. The dagger’s hilt was held by two hands, one French and the other Libyan, reflecting the widespread perception that both countries were using Chad as a battleground for their competing interests. A few days later, a student political organization active on Kashmir affairs published a pamphlet depicting a dagger thrust into the map of Kashmir. One hand on the hilt was shown as India’s, the other Pakistan’s.
The memory of that pamphlet returned as I observed the conduct of the Joint Awami Action Committee. In Kashmir, there has rarely been any disagreement over the question of its relationship with Pakistan. Over the past eight decades, AJK has been governed by numerous political parties representing diverse and often conflicting ideologies. Yet they all shared one point of consensus: the slogan “Kashmir Banega Pakistan” (Kashmir Will Become Pakistan). The slogan was coined by the late Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who earned the title of Mujahid-e-Awwal for his armed struggle against Dogra rule.
This slogan became the foundation of politics in Azad Kashmir. At the same time, it is also true that there were people in Kashmir who held a different view, one represented by that long-forgotten pamphlet. They existed, but only in negligible numbers. Even the expression “a pinch of salt in flour” would exaggerate their presence. By the time of the 2005 earthquake, it had become evident that this segment had shrunk even further. During that devastating natural disaster, the people of Pakistan shared Kashmir’s suffering with remarkable compassion and solidarity. Addressing the people of Kashmir, Yasin Malik remarked: “Remember this: in your hour of hardship, Pakistan stood shoulder to shoulder with you. When the time comes to decide Kashmir’s future, do not forget Pakistan’s sacrifice.”
Before making this statement, Yasin Malik had represented, in Indian-administered Kashmir, the same political current that did not subscribe to Sardar Qayyum’s slogan. Afterward, however, the situation changed. One could say that the political constituency harboring negative sentiments toward Pakistan virtually disappeared. This perception was largely accurate. Following Malik’s remarks, the political landscape changed significantly and the slogan of an independent Kashmir struggled to maintain relevance in Azad Kashmir—until the emergence of the Action Committee.
Who are the people behind the Action Committee? Their slogans and conduct make their identity difficult to miss. Ideologically, they belong to the same camp that does not view Pakistan favorably in the context of Kashmir. Whether through their activities and slogans in Azad Kashmir or through the actions of their sympathizers abroad, particularly in Britain, they display a hostile attitude toward Pakistan. This is evident from the slogans raised at their gatherings and rallies as well as from their abusive rhetoric against Pakistani institutions. The important question is this: if Yasin Malik, once the most prominent advocate of an independent Kashmir, had adopted a more sympathetic view of Pakistan, where have these people come from? Understanding this question is essential to understanding the current crisis.
Two developments are particularly significant in this regard. Imran Khan emerged as a new phenomenon in Pakistani politics and rapidly gained popularity. Before coming to power, he suggested in an interview that the Kashmir dispute could be resolved by dividing the territory into three parts. After he assumed office, August 5, 2019 arrived, when Narendra Modi’s government revoked Kashmir’s special constitutional status and formally integrated it into India. Beyond rhetorical opposition, Pakistan failed to mount an effective response, leading many to believe India acted confident that Pakistan’s reaction would remain limited. Following this move, several Indian leaders declared that their next objective would be Azad Kashmir. Having suffered a decisive setback in the Maarka-e-Haq on May 10, India knows a direct military takeover is not feasible and therefore appears to have adopted the strategy it has pursued in Balochistan and the former tribal areas: promoting instability and unrest.
Many of the statements and actions of the Action Committee reinforce these suspicions. They are unwilling to register and participate in the political process, presumably because they know the Kashmiri electorate would reject them, and they appear intent on disrupting elections. Their rallies, along with conversations attributed to their leader Shahzad, reportedly based in Afghanistan, in which he allegedly instructs members not to allow elections under any circumstances, have raised concerns. Allegations that they are armed and seek confrontation, conversations involving Shaukat Mir, and their assertion that even the abolition of refugee seats would not satisfy their demands suggest that their agenda extends far beyond the issues they publicly raise.
Taken together, these developments indicate that the crisis unfolding in Azad Kashmir may be linked to the same designs that have shaped the Modi government’s approach toward the region. For this reason, the matter must be handled with extreme caution. Every decision should be taken after careful deliberation and with a cool head. In conclusion, we must also examine our own shortcomings. It is often our mistakes that create the space in which such tendencies are able to grow and flourish.
—This writer is former advisor to the President of Pakistan, author & mass media theorist.
(farooq.adilbhuta@gmail,com)
