Muqaddam Khan
IN August 2021, soon after the Afghan Taliban dramatically swept to power and overthrew the US-installed regime, Pakistan’s then spy master, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, was sipping tea in one of Kabul’s fanciest hotels.
Our military and political pundits were delighted, considering it a huge strategic triumph and a win-win situation for Islamabad, believing that calm would prevail on Pakistan’s western flank.
Pakistan had also reopened two main land border crossings with Afghanistan at Torkham and Chaman. However, Pakistan’s political pundits and military strategists had miscalculated and misread the Taliban. The Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s close embrace radiates insecurity and instability in Pakistan, especially in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. It is their common ideology and geostrategic interests that force them to hold each other tightly, posing a grave threat to Pakistan’s security and keeps the region boiling.
But why have the Afghan Taliban turned their guns on Pakistan? Firstly, riding on the saddle of a thumping victory after inflicting an ignominious defeat on the sole arbiter of the international order along with its powerful allies, they feel proud of the outcome of the war on terror, claiming that the Afghan nation had defeated three superpowers: Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the former Soviet Union in the 20th Century and the US in the 21st Century.
Secondly, since the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, Afghan rulers have felt that they carry more weight than Pakistanis, despite the fact that landlocked Afghanistan conducts its trade through Pakistan. Afghanistan’s irredentism and negative vote against Pakistan’s entry into the UN, there are many examples from the past to the present where Kabul has strived to play a much bigger role than its actual capability, preventing them from fully exploiting the potential of their neighbourhood.
Thirdly, the Taliban feel that the TTP is their strategic asset; therefore, they have not taken action against it. During the Afghan War, the TTP fully supported the Taliban against the US and its allies and now the Afghan Taliban do not want to take action against them. The Taliban’s leaning towards the TTP and India are two major issues, as the current Afghan rulers consider the Pakistani Taliban their loyal partners. The Taliban have given more importance to the TTP than to Pakistan and herein lies the dilemma.
Fourthly, the Afghan Taliban are Pashtuns who are fundamentally freedom-loving. They do not accept anyone’s domination and want to maintain an independent policy at all costs. Earlier, it was said that Pakistan had a major hand in the emergence of the Taliban in the 1990s. Then, during the US occupation of Afghanistan, it became a widely-held belief that the Taliban leadership was based in Pakistan, that their regrouping began in the tribal belt and that the Quetta Shura was the real policy-formulating body, ultimately forcing the US to opt for a shameful retreat.
The Taliban want to shed this dominant Pakistani shadow and strive to assert its independent status at the global level. At this stage, it is very difficult for the Taliban to swallow their pride and adopt a flexible approach. They have a war mentality and believe that war is the solution to every problem.
—The writer is contributing columnist, based in Swabi.
