The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has entered its second phase, yet its momentum, productivity and expansion remain suboptimal due to persistent geopolitical, geo-economic and bureaucratic challenges. Despite concerted efforts by Islamabad and Beijing, uncertainty continues to surround CPEC 2.0. Compounding these difficulties is the growing social media disinformation targeting CPEC, China and the Pakistan-China friendship, which has widened the trust deficit and undermined investor confidence.
The recent visit of Liu Haixing, Head of the Communist Party of China’s International Department, to Pakistan has provided renewed momentum to bilateral cooperation. His meetings with senior civil and military leadership, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Forces General Asim Munir, focused on regional security, counterterrorism cooperation and the proposed “Joint Security Corridor”. These engagements reflect a shared determination to strengthen security cooperation, protect Chinese nationals and investments and create a stable environment for CPEC 2.0.
Unfortunately, CPEC has increasingly become a target of regional proxy networks and terrorist organizations, particularly in Balochistan and around Gwadar Port. Attacks attributed to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and other militant organizations have created serious security challenges for Chinese personnel, infrastructure and investment. Repeated attacks on Chinese nationals have weakened investor confidence and complicated development projects. These threats carry significant socio-economic and geo-economic consequences for both countries.
CPEC is designed to promote regional connectivity, infrastructure development, industrial cooperation, agricultural modernization and shared prosperity. However, its strategic and economic significance has also generated regional competition and opposition. Meanwhile, deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and persistent border tensions have created additional challenges for CPEC’s northern connectivity. Concerns regarding militant sanctuaries, cross-border infiltration and the activities of the TTP, ISKP and other extremist networks have further complicated regional security.
Consequently, Pakistan has explored alternative connectivity routes through China’s Xinjiang province towards Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Such diversification could strengthen regional trade, reduce dependence on vulnerable transit routes and create new opportunities for Central Asian integration. Gwadar’s geographical position also offers considerable potential for maritime trade and regional logistics, particularly amid instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, terrorism, regional rivalries and proxy conflicts remain major obstacles to realizing its full economic potential.
Against this backdrop, China’s willingness to deepen counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan is both timely and strategically significant. Under CPEC 2.0, the two countries intend to expand collaboration in industry, agriculture, mining, information technology and private-sector investment. However, these objectives cannot be achieved without a predictable security environment, efficient governance and sustained investor confidence. The recent discussions between Chinese and Pakistani leadership demonstrate their shared commitment to strengthening the all-weather strategic cooperative partnership.
In this context, the Center for Knowledge and Public Policy has consistently advocated establishing a “Corridor of Pakistan-China Safety and Security” to protect the mutual interests of both countries and safeguard their flagship development initiative. This proposal deserves serious consideration as CPEC moves into a more diversified and investment-oriented phase.
The joint military exercise “Karakoram 2026”, conducted in Xinjiang in October 2026, highlighted the importance of Pakistan-China defence cooperation and regional counterterrorism coordination. Meanwhile, reports concerning Beijing’s reassessment of its engagement with the Taliban government and its concerns over unfulfilled counterterrorism commitments suggest a more cautious regional approach. These developments reinforce the need for coordinated regional efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration and promote stability.
To translate diplomatic and military initiatives into sustainable policy outcomes, this article proposes an Integrated Security and Safety Model (ISSM) based on four interconnected pillars: Physical Domain, Cyber-Physical Domain, Intelligence Domain and Governance Domain. Grounded in a Realist-Institutionalist approach to international relations, the model combines national security imperatives and credible deterrence with institutionalized bilateral cooperation. It recognizes that sustainable regional stability requires effective security capabilities as well as durable mechanisms for consultation, coordination and accountability.
The first pillar involves establishing a “Corridor of Safety, Security and Counterterrorism” through stronger border management, modern surveillance, technological monitoring and coordinated security arrangements. Advanced unmanned surveillance systems, artificial intelligence-based monitoring and appropriate robotic technologies could strengthen situational awareness and reduce risks to security personnel. Pakistan and China should also explore modern defence technologies, including surveillance platforms and Z-10ME helicopters, within appropriate legal and operational frameworks.
The second pillar requires establishing a Joint Group for Information Sharing and Intelligence-Based Operations. This institutional mechanism would facilitate timely intelligence exchange, threat assessment, strategic coordination and capacity-building. Moving beyond parallel security arrangements towards coordinated intelligence-led responses would improve both countries’ ability to anticipate and address emerging threats.
The third pillar concerns establishing a Joint Cybersecurity Operational Group. Since CPEC 2.0 increasingly depends on digital infrastructure, smart logistics, financial systems and technological integration, cybersecurity must become an essential component of corridor protection. The proposed group should focus on protecting critical infrastructure, preventing cyber intrusions, strengthening digital resilience and developing coordinated responses to cyber threats.
The fourth pillar focuses on governance and institutional reform. Improving administrative capacity in Balochistan, strengthening local government institutions and ensuring meaningful community participation are essential for sustainable peace. Any proposed administrative restructuring of the province should follow constitutional procedures, democratic consultation and local consensus. Similarly, strengthening the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks and introducing transparent investment procedures would accelerate project implementation and improve the business environment.
Ultimately, CPEC 2.0 requires a comprehensive approach integrating security, economic development, institutional efficiency and regional diplomacy. Pakistan and China must move beyond reactive security arrangements towards a proactive, technology-enabled and institutionally coordinated framework. The proposed Integrated Security and Safety Model offers a potential pathway for achieving this objective.
The future of CPEC 2.0 depends not merely on infrastructure development and financial commitments, but equally on shared security, public trust, institutional resilience and regional stability. A Pakistan-China Corridor of Safety and Security could therefore become an essential foundation for transforming CPEC into a sustainable engine of regional connectivity and prosperity.
