ALONGSIDE reports of the proposed visit to the United States by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, a particular question has begun to attract growing attention: Will Pakistan cooperate in disarming Hamas? Some international media outlets have published analysis-like reports suggesting that this moment constitutes a serious test for the Field Marshal. According to this view, if he agrees to such a demand, public backlash in Pakistan would be inevitable; if he refuses, he risks displeasing President Donald Trump. On the surface, the argument appears persuasive.
However, only a few days ago, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, categorically stated that Pakistan has no interest in disarming Hamas. Two additional aspects of his statement deserve close attention. First, he made it clear that Pakistan would never be part of any initiative whose objective goes beyond disarmament and seeks to eliminate Hamas’s resistance capability altogether. Second, he articulated a principled position: Pakistan could consider participating in a legitimate peacekeeping force, but the disarmament of Hamas or the dismantling of its resistance capacity does not fall within the mandate of such a force. In this entire debate, it is also essential to take into account the position of Hamas itself, which remains the principal party to the conflict.
At the time of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, Hamas made its stance unambiguously clear. It stated that it would not lay down its arms before any external power; however, it could consider doing so before a legitimate Palestinian authority. This position brings Pakistan’s policy strikingly close to that of Hamas. If this convergence is acknowledged, many of the apprehensions being expressed regarding the Field Marshal’s anticipated meeting with President Trump lose much of their significance.
The question, then, is why do such anxieties persist despite Pakistan’s clearly articulated policy on Palestine and Gaza? The answer lies in a widely held assumption: that the United States is a power to which no country can say no—least of all when the president is Donald Trump. To a considerable extent, this concern is understandable. Yet it is equally true that complex international affairs cannot be assessed through simple arithmetic formulas. Understanding such matters requires careful consideration of historical precedents, diplomatic traditions and available strategic space. Recent history, in this regard, offers guidance that is both intriguing and instructive.
The first meeting between Field Marshal Asim Munir and President Trump was itself met with surprise and speculation. At that time, predictions similar to those we hear today were widespread. The most popular assumption was that Pakistan would now become an American instrument in efforts to suppress Iran. Did that actually happen? The answer to this question is best sought not in Washington or Islamabad, but in Tehran.
Professor Dr. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar currently heads the National Language Promotion Bureau (Idara Farogh-e-Quami Zaban). Since assuming this role, he has infused Islamabad’s intellectual and cultural environment with remarkable energy, for which he deserves due appreciation. In the second week of December, the institution organized an International Iqbal Conference, at which Iran’s Ambassador, Mr. Reza Amiri Moqaddam, delivered the keynote address. On that occasion, he stated that during the twelve-day war with Israel, Pakistan was the only country that stood firmly alongside Iran. “We are not merely grateful to Pakistan,” he said, “we kiss the hands of its leadership and bow our heads in reverence before the Pakistani nation.”
The precise forms of cooperation between Pakistan and Iran during the recent Iran–Israel conflict are known only to the leadership of the two countries. What is evident, however, is that Pakistan employed diplomatic wisdom in a manner that prevented Iran from suffering serious harm and ensured that the conflict ended before escalating into a larger catastrophe. It was this role that earned Iran’s gratitude—without provoking displeasure in Washington. The true measure of an effective foreign policy often reveals itself in precisely such moments.
When discussions about a ceasefire in Gaza were underway, similar apprehensions were voiced regarding Pakistan’s potential role. Yet once again, Pakistan demonstrated exceptional diplomatic agility. At that delicate juncture, it also benefited from the support of like-minded Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkiye. While it cannot be claimed that the Gaza ceasefire agreement was ideal or fully implemented in letter and spirit, it can be stated without hesitation that it brought an end to the worst bloodshed in Gaza. A place where even counting the dead had become impossible has now witnessed scenes of Palestinians celebrating, smiling and holding wedding ceremonies to the soulful rhythms of Arab music. Only a cynic could deny Pakistan’s role in helping move Gaza from devastation toward relative calm.
It is in the light of this very role that one should attempt to understand the likely outcomes of the proposed meeting between Field Marshal Asim Munir and Donald Trump. At present, any conclusions remain speculative. Yet when assessed against the ground realities in Gaza, the pessimistic fears being voiced do not appear particularly compelling.
There are several reasons for this. The foremost is that, under current circumstances, the Muslim world as a whole is not prepared to agree unanimously to the disarmament of Hamas. If Muslim countries collectively are unwilling to pursue such a course, how could Pakistan possibly undertake it alone? This question leads directly to its second dimension: regardless of how powerful the United States or President Trump may be, they cannot compel Pakistan in isolation to carry out such an agenda.
This, therefore, is another complex issue—much like the ceasefire itself—whose resolution requires extensive diplomatic engagement, ensuring that all parties, including Hamas, find the outcome acceptable. My assessment is that the forthcoming meeting will move in this very direction and that all assumptions—indeed, all suspicions—about Pakistan’s capitulation will ultimately prove unfounded.
—This writer is former advisor to the President of Pakistan, author & mass media theorist.
(farooq.adilbhuta@gmail,com)
