Last week, the Pentagon confirmed that it has completed its review of the AUKUS project and de-cided to proceed with arming Australia with nuclear-powered submarines.
The review identified areas to strengthen the pact. This $368 billion deal involves Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines to counter China’s military growth. The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is viewed by critics as a potential threat to global strategic stability primarily by creating a precedent for nuclear proliferation, fueling an arms race in the Indo-Pacific and undermining the international non-proliferation regime. Juxtaposing the US-China perceived perspectives and the strategic implications of this deal in terms of strategic stability and nuclear non-proliferation, profoundly suggests that the deal weaves a western trajectory of dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby paving the way for increasing regional tensions.
Seen from the western perspective, AUKUS is a recently built trilateral partnership based on promoting defence and security cooperation between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Though apparently this strategic partnership fundamentally aims to deepen diplomatic, security and defence cooperation between the three states, yet the AUKUS is also focused on deepening integration in defence-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains, with particular emphasis on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and new undersea capabilities.
While fulfilling the AUKUS objectives in terms of the efforts of other espousing partnerships and regional groupings, such as Five Eyes and the Quad, to develop coordination in areas including diplomacy, global governance, the AUKUS alliance, also seems to be focusing ‘’to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and the necessary infrastructure to upkeep them, while keeping with partners’ international obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regimes’’.
In contrast, the Chinese perceived perspective argues the AUKUS nuclear deal–involving the US, UK and Australia–is a move which is primarily targeting China’s strategic influence. China views the deal, specifically the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, as a means for the US and its allies to contain China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific region. This perception is fueled by China’s concerns over the potential for increased military presence and capabilities in the area, which could challenge its regional dominance.
The deal also raises concerns about nuclear proliferation and regional stability, further intensifying China’s strategic anxieties. Contextually, the Chinese officials and state media have consistently criticized the agreement for stimulating a regional arms race. The introduction of SSNs into the region, which can operate undetected for extended periods, raises concerns about the potential for dangerous incidents and a subsequent military build-up by China in response. There are three major aspects that raise global peace concerns which significantly support the Chinese stance: Firstly, though Australia’s submarines will be nuclear-powered, not nuclear-armed, China.
Secondly, AUKUS complements existing US-led initiatives like the Quad, argues the deal is a worrying breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by transferring highly sensitive nuclear propulsion technology to a non-nuclear weapons state. This sets a precedent that Beijing worries could lead to the expansion of the “club” of countries with military-grade nuclear technologies contributing to a multi-layered security network that some Chinese commentators view as a strategy of “encirclement”. This has prompted China to strengthen its own strategic ties, particularly with Russia, including joint military exercises, to counter perceived Western challenges. And thirdly, Australia’s shift from conventional to nuclear-powered submarines signals a readiness to invest in advanced, long-range capabilities for potential conflict scenarios, which changes China’s strategic calculus regarding Australian involvement in potential disputes, such as over Taiwan.
And yet, the western partners of the deal argue that Australia’s collaboration with the IAEA ensures robust verification measures are in place to prevent nuclear proliferation. They also claim that information barriers can confirm the absence of nuclear weapons and the deal serves a strategic purpose in boosting regional deterrence against China and promoting Indo-Pacific stability. However, the peace strategists counter that this kind of western arrangement undermines the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation regime, viewing it as contradictory to the regime’s goals.
Meanwhile, the peace strategists express concerns about the AUKUS nuclear accord, particularly in the context of global non-proliferation efforts. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Australia’s handling of nuclear was generated by the AUKUS program is a key consideration. The accord’s implications for the link between deterrence and non-proliferation also raise strategic questions and the desire of most states to avoid nuclear weapons emphasizes the importance of compliance with non-proliferation agreements.
Moreover, many experts and nations, including China and Russia, fear the AUKUS deal sets a “bad precedent” that could justify other non-nuclear-weapon states in pursuing their own nuclear submarine programs, potentially leading to regional arms races. Critics argue the agreement “exploits an important lacuna” in the NPT and challenges the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is further argued that there is an arising Risk of nuclear material diversion: The use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel in some submarine reactors raises concerns that the fissile material could be diverted for use in nuclear weapons programs. Also, this development may significantly increase regional tensions: countries like China view AUKUS as a hostile, “Cold War mentality” initiative that increases instability in the Indo-Pacific region and forces them to take countermeasures.
In summary, the AUKUS nuclear deal suggests that despite stated efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, the world appears to be moving towards a state of increased nuclear saturation. This deal is going to strain Australia‘s relations with regional nations, including France, while potentially affecting relations between Washington and Beijing. Several nations are modernizing and expanding their nuclear capabilities, challenging the progress of global non-proliferation efforts. Concerns are mounting that the AUKUS partnership may trigger a surge in regional militarization. Thus, a careful consideration of long-term implications of such agreements is paramount to prevent the nuclear proliferation.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law.
