THE British India got partitioned into two sovereign states of India and Pakistan back in 1947. It was the time when the planet had come out of the second world war and was at the verge of entering into yet another war this time however not the hot war but the cold one. Yes, the long Cold War between the United States(US) and the erstwhile Soviet Union that ultimately came to an end with disintegration of the latter in the early 1990s. This had divided the world into two rival camps — one led by the US and the other by the former Soviet Union. Both utilised their allies as tools for serving their regional strategic interests and countering their rival camps.
The India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru decided to keep the newly born state of India non-aligned with any of the two super powers. His vision for the South Asian massive state was to have a leading role of the countries non-aligned with either of the two powers. For the same reason, the Indo-US relationship stood estranged throughout the Cold War. In 1949, Nehru had a long tour of Washington but to no avail because of the neutral role so outlined by him for India. But, even then, the US’ inclination oscillated like a pendulum between the two strategically important states of South Asia —India and Pakistan — throughout Cold-War depending on its own interests in the region.
In mid-1950’s, Pakistan got engaged with US, first in Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and then in Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), thus getting status of its treaty ally. This prompted Indian premier to visit the rival camp Moscow in 1955, and the same year, the Soviet’s President Khrushchev reciprocated with his visit to India. Consequently, the Soviet Union embraced India with a ‘blind support’ for her forcible occupation of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. For its close ties with the Soviet Union, India’s relations with US stood cool during the first decade of its independence.
In 1959 however the then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s visit to India was the first ever by a serving US President in a bid to improve relationship with it. Soon after was John F. Kennedy in power. In fact, the US felt sensitive to rise of China and it saw in India the potential to deter the same. Therefore, the Kennedy Administration tilted towards India and considered it a strategic partner to deter rise of communist China. That’s why, in Sino-Indian’s border skirmish in 1962, US supported India by supplying to it arms and ammunition that was subsequently used against Pakistan in 1965’s Indo-Pak war. This was despite Nehru had leading role in founding Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and then using it for enhancing the Soviet’s influence in member states. Johnson Administration following Kennedy’s assassination nonetheless maintained relationship concurrently with both the South Asian rival countries.
The objective was to deter China through India and ease tension with it through Pakistan. New Delhi’s strategic and military relationship with Washington wasn’t at the cost of its ideological relationship with Moscow. Rather, with the passage of time, the Indo-Soviet bond went stronger and stronger. Moscow provided substantial economic and military assistance to New Delhi. In August 1971, both the countries signed a treaty in pursuance of which the Soviet Union was to deter China if it supported Pakistan in its possible attack over India from the western side in the 1971’s war. This helped India to accomplish its task of converting eastern wing of Pakistan into a sovereign state of Bangladesh.
India’s first nuclear detonation in 1974, no doubt, caused cracks in Indo-US relations. However, the Carter administration’s anti-Pakistan posture let India to enjoy its close ties with US. When, forced by India’s nuclear test, Pakistan also embarked on its nuclear program for its own defense, the Carter Administration not only did sternly oppose to it but also suspended her military and economic aid. Alongside, President Carter, as spontaneous reaction, acknowledged India’s hegemony in South Asia and paid official visit to New Delhi in 1978. The same year, Indian anti-Soviet Premier Morarji Desai reciprocated with return visit to Washington. In this way, both the countries once again came close to each other. Subsequently, however, US asked India to let her nuclear installations inspected by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s inspectors which India refused to and, as such, US suspended nuclear assistance to her. But this didn’t cause much bearing on their mutual relations.
The Soviet’s military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 sharply elevated Pakistan’s strategic importance due to which Washington once again came close to Islamabad. It was Pakistan that fought this long war as a frontline state against Soviet Union but the beneficiary was US and none else. As fallout, the global landscape changed altogether with the US emerged as the lone super power in early 1990’s. Hence, for the post cold-war, the US re-calculated its interests and, based thereon, reshaped its global agenda with India gaining importance in its foreign policy pasture. India too sensing the ground realities gave up the cold-war politics and adapted itself to the new situation. It’s indeed the post Cold-War’s Indo-US relations that matters for geopolitics in the region. The same will however be discussed in another column on the score.
—The writer is a retired civil servant and freelance columnist based in Swat.
