North Korea’s plan for solid-fuel ICBM
ON 8 February, North Korea commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army in customary fashion, employing the occasion’s parade to possibly unveil its “exponentially” expanding missile system to the global audience. The parade featured fireworks, military bands and uniformed soldiers marching in unison to spell out “2.8” – the date of the celebration – and “75”. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attended the parade along with his wife and daughter, while trying to portray himself as a “family man”.
The parade showcased North Korea’s formidable military power, including at least 10 of the North’s largest Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and vehicles designed to carry a solid-fuelled ICBM. North Korea has long sought to develop a solid-fuel ICBM because such missiles are easier to store and transport, more stable and quicker to prepare for launch and, therefore, harder for the United States to detect and destroy pre-emptively. The weapons on display also included “tactical nuclear weapons operation units.” The parade comes after a record year of missile testing by North Korea in breach of UN economic sanctions. That has led to several flare-ups of tensions on the Korean peninsula.
The parade was a direct attempt to exhibit the “formidable nuclear strike capability of the DPRK,” particularly its technological advances towards solid-fuelled ICBMs. The scale and scope of the weaponry on display has rekindled the debate about the loutishly belligerent thrust behind the expansion of missile and nuclear program. “They’ve shown more ICBMs in the latest parade than they’ve ever shown before, consistent with a longstanding directive from Kim Jong Un on mass producing nuclear weapons and delivery systems,” commented US-based analyst Ankit Panda. This poses a serious problem for the United States because it has planned its homeland missile defence system to deal with a “limited” missile threat from North Korea, “while North Korea has now demonstrated that its nuclear capabilities are way beyond ‘limited’.
North Korea was sending a clear message by parading more of Mr. Kim’s most advanced Hwasong-17 missiles. This display serves as a reminder of North Korea’s nuclear capability and its determination to continue developing its nuclear and missile programs despite international sanctions and pressure. The parade was closely monitored by observers for clues about the reclusive regime’s progress on its banned ballistic and nuclear weapons. Two key elements at the anniversary parade have captured the attention of military experts. One, the high number of Hwasong-17 missiles which has busted the myth of “limited” missile capacity of the DPRK. And two, at least five heavy transporters-erector-launcher vehicles – without missiles – were shown publicly.
These launcher vehicles, with chassis adapted for liquid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), carried large empty canisters commonly used for housing and launching solid-fuel missiles. The exhibition of the launcher vehicles which has inordinate symbolic value of the intent as well, gave a clear signal to the outside world that North Korea either has acquired the solid-fuel missile technology or it is almost there and giving the “finishing touch” to it. Seen against the reports that were already circulating in the media about North Korea’s advances in manufacturing solid-fuel motors, the appearance of launcher vehicles is quite momentous at this stage.
The answer to the question why the DPRK, having a handsome inventory of liquid-fuelled Hwasong-17 missiles that can easily hit the US, is desperate to develop the solid-fuel missile system is very simple. The liquid-fuelled missiles are filled with liquid propellants which cannot be kept in containers for prolonged periods, meaning the missiles can’t maintain “ever-ready status”. Consequently, they must be fuelled every time before launch in a process that can take hours for preparation and requires specialist equipment. This process may provide opponents with a visual alert of launch preparations and time to identify, react to, and neutralize a missile before it is launched. In contrast, solid-fuel missiles can be fuelled from the point of manufacture, allowing operators to maintain a high state of readiness and the potential to launch within minutes.
The addition of solid-fuel ICBMs to the missile force would make it a more credible strategic weapon by providing a more capable, less vulnerable pre-emptive and retaliatory capability. Their fuelling apparatus is also less observable, therefore, more secure from being detected by the surveillance satellites. North Korea first developed the liquid-fuelled missiles because it was easy and quick process. However, in 2019, North Korea first time divulged its desire to develop solid-fuel systems when it demonstrated designs for a new generation of solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles and larger-diameter solid motors for medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In January 2021, Kim Jon Un publicly expressed his intentions to move towards the solid-fuelled missile systems.
While the display of transporters-erector-launchers may depict North Korea’s progress towards the goal of acquiring solid-fuel ICBMs, a more tangible milestone reportedly was observed in December 2022 with a static ground test of a new large-diameter solid-fuel motor at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground. Without claiming it as an ICBM motor test, Pyongyang described this event to be of ‘strategic significance’. The 140-tonne force generated by the motor can facilitate the first stage of an ICBM, with a mass of approximately 100–115 tons. Though it is too early to predict when a solid-fuel ICBM test launch might occur, but the provocative nature and propaganda value of missile tests mean the development timeline for the technology is not the only factor that will guide the decision.
North Korea’s solid-fuelled missile project involves many technical and developmental challenges with an unpredictable time frame. With its excessively belligerent missile testing, which kept the international community keep guessing about Pyongyang’s actual designs for nuclear tests throughout 2022, there is every reason to believe that Kim Jon Un is very serious in “exponentially expanding” the missile and nuclear development projects – certainly a major threat to the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. While the development of a solid-fuel ICBM by North Korea remains unpredictable in terms of timetable, it will certainly fuel insecurity and unpredictability in the coming days.
