Syed Qamar Afzal Rizvi
IN an anti-peace move, India has currently deployed its navy warship in the South China Sea thereby displeasing the Chinese who have had already registered their annoyance over India’s violation of the LAC. The Chinese have been objecting to the presence of Indian Navy ships in the region. Reportedly, the Indian warship was continuously maintaining contact with their American counterparts over secure communication systems. How to interpret these Indian naval moves? Is New Delhi playing a so-called South China Sea card to pressure Beijing? But it looks that the Indian tactic which is highly risky could hardly help deter the Chinese position. Labelling India as a “useful pawn” of the US, military experts in China have warned New Delhi the deployment of its warships in the South China Sea will bear serious repercussions including the expulsion of its warships.
Though apparently or euphorically, it may be a clever move at the part of the Indian Government in the post-Galwan crisis — the move, which is likely to threaten to block crucial Strait of Malacca and of PLA Navy’s moves — could have produced desired effects of deterrence and equality while negotiating with the People’s Republic of China via diplomatic channels, yet in substance, the move may escalate tension between Beijing and New Delhi. Understandably, the South China Sea dispute involves the island and maritime claims among China and several nations within the region. China claims to have historically exercised exclusive control over the waters, a claim that cannot be denied. As a high proportion of the world’s trade passes through the South China Sea, there are many non-claimant nations including India that want the South China Sea to remain as international waters, with many nations including the United States of America conducting freedom of navigation’ operations (FONOPs). The region holds importance for India as Indian trade and economic linkages are growing with East Asian nations and with the Pacific region.
Long Xingchun, a senior research fellow of Academy of Regional and Global Governance and President of Chengdu Institute of World Affairs, astutely argues: “Deploying an Indian ship in the South China Sea would barely have any substantial influence on China. India has conveyed its hostility against China and showed loyalty to the US. But this will have no substantial impact on the South China Sea situation, the ownership of islands and reefs in the waters, the territorial disputes, or China’s security. India’s main purpose is to showcase its toughness against China amid the China-India border row — especially to cater to India’s nationalist sentiments”.
Li Jie, a Beijing-based naval expert thinks that ‘’ India is simply serving as an accomplice to the US. The US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy needs the support of allies and petty followers. The US is stirring up the South China Sea situation in an attempt to strategically check China. With this, India hopes to contribute to make the waters muddier and unstable. It seeks to create disharmony in the South China Sea in order to create an advantageous situation for itself.’’ While India isn’t party to the South China Sea dispute, its move into China’s territorial waters is perilous. Undeniably, Beijing operates from a position of strength in the South China Sea, wherein it has physical control over critical islands in the region. China has shown the US and its allies that what matters in a maritime territorial dispute is the actual ‘possession’ of the islands, and as long as the PLA exercises military control over the features, it will exploit their location to support broader territorial claims. For New Delhi, which has been concerned about the security of its trade-flows and energy interests in the South China Sea, however, Beijing’s placement of missiles points to sober reality. As the disputed islands are militarized, it could imperil freedom of navigation, making Beijing the main arbiter of the accepted range of ‘legitimate’ operations in the South China Sea.
However, conflicting territorial claims over the sea stretch back many decades but have intensified in recent years as China and its rivals have reinforced their positions on the rocks and reefs they hold. Lynn Kuok is the Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia Pacific security of the London-based IISS argues, his is something that should concern us all. India is providing naval patrol boats, satellite cover to monitor Vietnam’s waters and training for its submarines and fighter pilots — more military support than it is giving to any other Southeast Asian country.
Strategically, the South China Sea is a vital waterway through US$5 trillion of trade passes every year. The Strait of Malacca, the chokepoint which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, handles 5 times the volume of oil than the Suez Canal. Though India has improved its strategic ties with Far East nations via New Delhi’s act east policy, India could hardly exert pressure on China with the support of Far East nations. Most recently, China announced the creation of two new municipal districts that govern the Paracel and Spratly Islands, an attempt to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea by projecting a move that reflects administrative control over its territorial waters. Nevertheless, the Indian strategists amply doubt the objectivity of India’s recent penetration into the South China Sea as they believe that in such muddled waters, it is not clear what India will achieve with occasional naval visits except for irritating China by siding with Vietnam and the US.
And yet not surprisingly, China and Russia’s militaries grow closer, China could encourage Russia to support China’s claims by challenging the US warship, as Russia did near Philippine waters in June 2019. Consequently, China could claim a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone encompassing almost all of the South China Sea. China’s coast guard is the world’s largest, with more vessels than those of all its regional neighbours combined. While the US Coast Guard has started operating in the South China Sea, it does so at a limited scale and frequency. In this scenario, China could use its new restrictions as a rationale for creating greater, more frequent obstructions to other countries’ ability to re-supply their outposts.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
