TWENTY-five years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, one question remains: why did the attackers do it? It is uncomfortable, but avoiding difficult questions does not make societies safer. The 25th anniversary offers an opportunity to remember not only what happened, but the circumstances and ideas that made the attacks possible. The attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda, a militant organization that claimed religious justification for its violence and drew upon an extremist interpretation of Islam. Its leaders portrayed their struggle as a religious war and gave political grievances a theological character. Understanding this ideological dimension is essential to understanding 9/11. Yet acknowledging the role of Islamist extremism must not be confused with blaming Islam or Muslims. Islam is followed by more than a billion people worldwide, most of whom have nothing to do with political violence. Muslims themselves have repeatedly been among the victims of militant organizations, while countries such as Pakistan have suffered enormously from terrorism carried out in the name of religion. Removing the ideological motivation of terrorist organizations from the discussion leaves an incomplete explanation. The challenge is to remember 9/11 without sanitizing its causes or turning remembrance into a general indictment of Muslims.
The attacks also exposed failures in intelligence, coordination among security agencies and assessment of the threat posed by al-Qaeda. They transformed American foreign policy, reshaped airport security and expanded intelligence cooperation. Perhaps the most important lesson is that terrorism cannot be defeated through military force alone. Ideas, propaganda, recruitment, financing, networks and political grievances all contribute to the environment in which extremist organizations operate. The United States responded to 9/11 by launching the war in Afghanistan and later invading Iraq. Although the conflicts had different origins, both became part of the wider American response to terrorism. Afghanistan experienced two decades of foreign military involvement before the Taliban returned to power in 2021, while Iraq suffered invasion, political instability and sectarian conflict. The wider Middle East was profoundly affected.
Al-Qaeda was severely weakened, its leadership disrupted and its operational capacity reduced. Osama bin Laden was eventually killed. Yet militant violence did not disappear. Other organizations emerged, most notably the Islamic State, while extremist networks adapted to new technologies and political circumstances. The lesson is not that military action is irrelevant. States have a responsibility to protect their citizens and confront organizations that deliberately target civilians. However, military power alone cannot eliminate an ideology, particularly when extremist movements exploit political grievances, social exclusion, weak institutions and conflicts. Pakistan was not a distant observer after 9/11. As a frontline state in the international campaign against terrorism, it paid a heavy price, with militants targeting schools, mosques, markets, military installations and public institutions. Its experience shows why language surrounding religious extremism matters. Terrorism cannot be fought by portraying criticism of extremism as an attack on religion, nor without confronting the narratives that justify violence. Religious freedom must be protected while the use of religion to justify murder is firmly rejected.
One of terrorism’s most damaging consequences is the social division it creates. Terrorist organizations seek to spread fear beyond their immediate victims, provoking governments into excessive responses, communities into mutual suspicion and societies into polarization. When citizens begin viewing one another through the lens of religious identity, terrorists achieve a victory even when militarily defeated. The United States should remember the victims without forgetting the perpetrators’ ideological justification.
The 25th anniversary, therefore, is an opportunity for honest reflection. Why did the attackers believe murdering civilians was justified? How did al-Qaeda recruit and radicalize its members? Why were warning signs missed? What mistakes followed the attacks? Which policies made the world safer and which created new dangers? What forms of extremism remain capable of exploiting modern societies? These questions cannot be answered through slogans. Twenty-five years is long enough for memories to fade, but not long enough for the lessons of 9/11 to become irrelevant. Terrorist organizations have changed their methods, technology has transformed propaganda and recruitment and political conflicts have shifted. Yet extremist movements can still turn grievances into violence. Remembering 9/11 responsibly means confronting that reality without allowing fear, prejudice or collective blame to distort the lessons of history.
—The writer is Assistant Professor of Pakistan Studies at the Imperial College of Business Studies, Lahore.
