PAKISTAN’S governance crisis is often explained in remarkably simple terms: the bureaucracy is inefficient, corrupt, resistant to reform and responsible for administrative failure. There is certainly substance to some of these criticisms. No institution should be beyond accountability and civil servants who abuse authority, take bribes or deliberately obstruct public service must face consequences. But blaming the bureaucracy alone is neither fair nor sufficient. Before judging civil servants, we must examine the institutional environment in which they are expected to function.
For decades, political leadership has exercised considerable influence over appointments, transfers, postings and promotions. Political considerations have frequently entered areas that should primarily be governed by merit, competence and institutional requirements. The result has been a civil service increasingly exposed to political pressure and career uncertainty. The irony is that the same political leadership that interferes in administration often later complains about bureaucratic inefficiency. This raises a fundamental question: Can an institution remain professional when its professional hierarchy is repeatedly subjected to external influence?
Consider the case of senior civil servants. An officer does not simply become a Grade-22 officer overnight. Promotion to the highest regular grade follows a long career and scrutiny of service record, performance, ACRs/PERs, disciplinary history and other prescribed criteria. The state therefore examines an officer’s professional record before declaring that officer suitable for Grade-22. Yet there are instances where Grade-22 officers, after receiving this recognition, remain without important assignments while Grade-21 officers are appointed to head major administrative organizations.
There may be legitimate exceptions. A position may require specialized expertise, statutory qualifications or particular experience that a Grade-21 officer possesses. Seniority alone cannot determine every appointment. But when a Grade-21 officer is preferred over available Grade-22 officers without a clear, objective and recorded justification, institutional morale suffers. The message to the civil service becomes disturbing: professional performance may matter less than personal influence. Such perceptions can weaken confidence in the very system that is expected to deliver effective administration.
The same concern arises with Management Position (MP) and contractual appointments. The original rationale for such arrangements is understandable. Government may need specialists whose expertise is not available within the regular civil service. Bringing outside professionals into specialized positions can therefore be valuable. The problem begins when such arrangements appear to be used selectively to accommodate retired officers or preferred individuals on highly attractive packages while serving officers with decades of experience continue under substantially less rewarding salary structures.
The issue is not whether a retired officer should ever be appointed. The real question is whether the appointment is genuinely based on merit and necessity. If someone is the best person for a position, the government should have no difficulty demonstrating why. Where appropriate, positions should be advertised, eligibility criteria should be clear, qualified candidates should be considered and the selection process should be transparent. Remuneration should also be defensible in relation to the responsibilities and expertise required. Transparency would eliminate much of the controversy.
Salary is another neglected dimension. Pakistan demands honesty, efficiency and professionalism from public servants while failing to recognise the responsibilities of senior public office. Low remuneration does not justify corruption; an honest officer must remain honest. But institutional design matters. A professional bureaucracy requires conditions where competence is rewarded and integrity protected.
The problem becomes serious when inadequate compensation combines with arbitrary postings, political pressure and uncertain career progression. An officer who believes advancement depends more on political connections than professional performance will hesitate to take difficult decisions. Institutional decline occurs through such signals over many years.
When officers lose confidence in the promotion and posting system, decision-making becomes cautious. Officers avoid responsibility, files move slowly and innovation declines. Eventually, governments complain that the bureaucracy is unwilling to make decisions. But an uncomfortable question remains: Who created these incentives?
Pakistan must stop treating bureaucracy as an isolated problem. Administrative failure has a political dimension. Political governments have the responsibility to determine policy, while bureaucracies must implement policies efficiently and remain accountable. But control should not become political domination.
Civil servants must remain accountable for corruption, incompetence, misconduct and poor performance. At the same time, safeguards are needed against arbitrary appointments, politically motivated transfers and interference. Senior appointments should follow transparent criteria. If a Grade-21 officer is selected over Grade-22 officers, the reasons should be recorded. Contractual and MP-scale appointments should be open and competitive.
Transfers should not become instruments of political pressure. Accountability must work in both directions. A civil servant who misuses authority should be held responsible, while those who undermine merit through arbitrary appointments or political interference should also face consequences. Pakistan cannot build good governance while weakening the institutions expected to deliver it.
The uncomfortable question is whether Pakistan has allowed its bureaucracy to become professional, merit-based and secure enough to act in public interest. A Grade-22 officer is not automatically entitled to every senior position, but demonstrated competence should not be disregarded. A retired officer may be the best contractual candidate, but the appointment should survive public scrutiny.
The governance crisis is a shared responsibility. Bureaucrats must accept accountability, while political leadership must accept responsibility for the institutional environment it creates. Good governance requires professional bureaucrats and responsible politicians with rules to prevent personal interests from overriding institutions. Pakistan must reward competence, protect integrity and respect merit. Only then can it demand governance the country needs.
—The writer is Senior Retd bureaucrat, based in Lahore.
