FOLLOWING the Pahalgam incident Indian unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT-1960) on April 2025, has generated serious legal, political and strategic concerns across South Asia. The move not only undermines a long-standing bilateral agreement but also raises important questions regarding international law, treaty obligations and regional stability. A close examination of the treaty reveals that there is no provision allowing either party to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from it unilaterally. The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank and signed in 1960, has long been regarded as one of the most durable water-sharing agreements in the world. Despite wars, military standoffs and prolonged political hostility between India and Pakistan, the treaty survived every crisis for more than six decades. Its resilience stemmed from the understanding that water should remain insulated from political confrontation and military tensions.
Clause 12 of the treaty clearly establishes its permanence. According to this provision, the treaty “shall remain in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments.” In practical terms, this means that any amendment, modification, or termination requires mutual agreement between both India and Pakistan. Furthermore, any such change must be formalized through a separate treaty ratified by the two states. There is no clause that authorizes unilateral suspension, partial withdrawal, or independent reinterpretation by either side. Therefore, India’s decision to suspend the treaty on April 23, 2025, lacks legal justification under the treaty itself. The suspension was reportedly linked to allegations of “sustained cross-border terrorism by Pakistan.” However, such political accusations do not constitute lawful grounds for abandoning international treaty obligations. International treaties are designed precisely to survive periods of political disagreement and conflict. If every state were permitted to suspend agreements based on unilateral allegations, the entire structure of international law would become unstable.
The principles governing international water law also challenge India’s position. International legal norms emphasize equitable and reasonable utilization of shared rivers by riparian states. They further obligate states to cooperate, exchange information and protect shared river systems from political coercion. The concept of denying downstream populations access to water as a political pressure tactic directly contradicts the spirit of modern international water governance. India has also attempted to justify its position by invoking Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article addresses a “fundamental change of circumstances” as a possible basis for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty. However, the article imposes strict conditions. The changed circumstances must have constituted an essential basis for the treaty itself and the change must radically transform the obligations still to be performed.
Neither condition appears applicable in the present case. The India-Pakistan relationship has historically remained tense since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Political hostility, military confrontation and mutual distrust existed even before the treaty was negotiated. The framers of the Indus Waters Treaty were fully aware of these realities and still chose to establish a durable water-sharing mechanism capable of surviving conflict. In fact, the treaty successfully endured the wars of 1965, 1971 and the Kargil conflict of 1999 without suspension. Moreover, the treaty itself already contains mechanisms for addressing disputes, technical disagreements and changing circumstances. These mechanisms include bilateral negotiations, neutral expert proceedings and international arbitration. Over the last several years, India has repeatedly sought renegotiation of the treaty. Pakistani analysts and international experts have viewed these efforts with concern, arguing that New Delhi aims to restructure the agreement according to its own strategic and developmental priorities. India issued multiple notices to Pakistan regarding treaty modifications and also reduced the sharing of hydrological data related to the western rivers allocated primarily to Pakistan under the treaty. Suspension of IWT is intended less as a legal measure and more as a political bargaining tool to pressure Pakistan into renegotiations. Such an approach risks weaponizing water in a region already burdened by geopolitical instability and climate-related stress. Water disputes between nuclear-armed neighbors should never be transformed into instruments of coercive diplomacy.
Indeed, the broader political environment today remains deeply polarized. Decades of unresolved disputes, competing regional ambitions and recurring crises continue to shape bilateral relations. Under such conditions, destabilizing a successful water-sharing arrangement may produce consequences extending far beyond diplomacy, affecting food security, agriculture, energy production and human livelihoods across the region. Pakistan also maintains that India has already violated the treaty spirit through the construction of dams, hydroelectric projects, water storage facilities and diversion structures on the western rivers. Islamabad argues that several of these projects undermine Pakistan’s water rights guaranteed under the treaty. These concerns have repeatedly surfaced in bilateral discussions and international legal forums.
Given the seriousness of the current situation, Pakistan should seek greater involvement from the World Bank, which played the role of guarantor and facilitator of the treaty, as well as from the UN and other international forums. Any future dialogue between India and Pakistan regarding water disputes should remain within the original legal framework of the Indus Waters Treaty rather than outside it. Ultimately, the survival of the treaty for more than six decades demonstrated that cooperation over shared resources is possible even amid hostility. Undermining that framework through unilateral actions sets a dangerous precedent not only for South Asia but for international river agreements worldwide. The need of the hour is not suspension or coercion, but renewed diplomatic engagement grounded in international law, mutual respect and regional stability.
— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
