Dr Tasneem Ahmad
he Prime Minister’s Coordinator on Agriculture and Food Security in his linkedin article has defended the federal government’s decision to import one million tonnes of wheat by arguing that the government has sided neither with farmers nor consumers, but with the market and the import decision is merely a market-stabilisation measure based on international price parity and prudent food security management.
The argument is intellectually appealing. However, it overlooks a fundamental principle of agricultural governance: food security begins with farmer security. A government entrusted with ensuring national food security cannot afford to remain neutral between food producers and market forces. Its foremost responsibility is to protect the country’s productive capacity while ensuring affordable food for consumers.
The question is therefore not whether wheat imports are inherently good or bad. Pakistan has imported wheat before and may need to do so again under exceptional circumstances. The real question is why emergency imports became necessary immediately after the government declared a bumper domestic wheat harvest of nearly 30 million tonnes and total availability of over 32 million tonnes against an estimated national requirement of about 31.4 million tonnes. If these official estimates are accurate, then where has Pakistan’s wheat vanished? This contradiction lies at the heart of the present debate. Either the production estimates are inaccurate, strategic reserves have been poorly managed, procurement policies have failed, or market intelligence has been ineffective. In each case, the issue is not market economics but governance.
Before committing approximately US$330 million in scarce foreign exchange for wheat imports, the government owes farmers and taxpayers a transparent explanation. Why and how provinces reported shortages? What independent assessment justified the import? How much wheat remains in private and public storages? Why were strategic reserves allowed to fall to historically low levels? Without clear answers, imports appear less a policy necessity than an admission of administrative failure. The official defence further argues that domestic wheat prices have appreciated significantly since harvest, suggesting that farmers have benefited from market forces. This conclusion does not reflect the reality of Pakistan’s rural economy. Most wheat growers in Pakistan are small holding farmers. Immediately after harvest they must repay agricultural loans, settle input costs, pay labour, meet household expenses and finance the next cropping season. The Coordinator also argues that wheat prices should increasingly be aligned with international parity. In principle, this is a reasonable objective. Yet parity must extend beyond prices alone.
Pakistani farmers compete under vastly different conditions from producers in countries that export wheat. They face rising costs of fertilizer, diesel, electricity, irrigation, certified seed and agricultural credit, while climate variability continues to increase production risks. Unlike farmers in many developed and emerging economies, they receive limited institutional support, inadequate crop insurance and insufficient investment in research and extension.
Countries frequently cited as champions of market economies—including the United States, China, India and members of the European Union—continue to protect their strategic agricultural sectors through subsidies, direct income support, crop insurance, investment in research and predictable procurement policies. Asking Pakistani farmers to compete solely on international prices without comparable institutional support is neither equitable nor economically sustainable. More importantly, governments are not expected to be neutral between farmers and speculative markets. Their constitutional and economic responsibility is to safeguard the national interest. In agriculture, the national interest begins with ensuring that domestic food production remains profitable enough to sustain future supplies.
Consumers undoubtedly deserve affordable food, and vulnerable households should receive targeted assistance through transparent social protection programmes. However, affordable food tomorrow depends upon farmers remaining willing and able to produce today. A policy that weakens producers in the name of protecting consumers eventually harms both.
The timing of the import decision also deserves closer examination. Imports announced immediately before or after harvest inevitably depress market confidence and discourage farmers than normal seasonal price benefits. Such policy may signal reduce incentives for future wheat cultivation, encouraging farmers to shift towards alternative crops. The consequences are predictable: lower domestic production, greater dependence on imports and increasing pressure on Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. This is not merely a debate about one million tonnes of imported wheat. It is a question of national food security strategy.
Pakistan’s wheat challenge cannot be solved through imports alone. Sustainable food security requires accurate crop forecasting, transparent production estimates, predictable procurement policies, adequate strategic reserves, investment in research, improved seed systems, efficient irrigation, modern storage infrastructure and effective market intelligence. Above all, it requires restoring farmers’ confidence that national policy will support domestic production rather than undermine it.
The PM’s Coordinator is not simply an observer of agricultural markets. He is the government’s principal adviser on agriculture and food security. His foremost responsibility should therefore be to recommend policies that strengthen domestic production, improve farmers’ confidence and reduce dependence on imported food—not merely explain why imports have become necessary.
A government need not choose between farmers and consumers. But neither can it remain indifferent between farmers and market speculation. When the interests of food producers, traders and consumers diverge, the government’s first obligation is to protect the productive foundation of the nation.
Pakistan’s vanishing wheat is therefore not simply a story of production or prices. It is a story of policy consistency, institutional accountability and agricultural governance. Wheat can always be imported. Farmers’ confidence, once lost, is far more difficult to restore. A nation that cannot protect its wheat growers today may ultimately find that it has sacrificed not only its foreign exchange but also its food sovereignty.
—The writer is former Plant Protection Adviser, based in Islamabad.
