ACROSS much of the developing world, rapid demographic growth is outstripping the outdated institutions designed to govern it. When state machinery built for smaller societies is forced to manage vastly larger, more urban and highly unequal populations, decision-making becomes dangerously distant from everyday reality.
Pakistan offers a stark case study in this governance gap. Since 1951, the nation’s population has expanded more than sevenfold. Yet, the country remains governed within the same basic four-province framework established decades ago. As a result, the average population per province sits at an extraordinary 60 million people, dwarfing international federal norms seen in nations like Indonesia, Nigeria and Brazil, where first-tier subnational units average between 5 and 8 million residents.
This structural mismatch creates severe internal distortions. Punjab alone is home to approximately 128 million residents whereas Balochistan covers nearly half the national territory but holds fewer than 15 million citizens. At the local level, a single policy formulated in a provincial capital is expected to address the needs of mega-cities like Lahore (population 13 million) and sparse rural districts like Harnai (population 128,000) alike.
The consequences of this administrative distance are visible in basic service delivery. National surveys show that nearly 28% of school-aged children are out of school, with provincial rates ranging from 21% in Punjab to a staggering 45% in Balochistan. Furthermore, the Planning Commission’s District Education Performance Index reveals that not a single one of Pakistan’s 134 assessed districts achieved a ‘very high’ performance rating. These disparities demonstrate how top-down policymaking fails to bridge the gulf between central budgets and grassroots outcomes.
To address these imbalances, consecutive governments have attempted legislative decentralization. The 18th Constitutional Amendment and the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award devolved major responsibilities to the provinces, alongside a larger share of federal tax revenues (increasing from 47.5% to 57.5%). However, devolving power from Islamabad to provincial capitals merely relocated centralization rather than eliminating it.
International experience shows that redrawing administrative geography can improve responsiveness when done correctly. Nigeria expanded its internal structure from three regions to 36 states, while Kenya replaced eight centralized provinces with 47 constitutionally empowered county governments. Conversely, countries like Lebanon demonstrate that multiplying local units without financial capacity creates administrative paralysis rather than progress.
For Pakistan, meaningful reform requires treating boundary restructuring as a spectrum of choices rather than a single silver bullet. Potential models range from modest proposals-such as dividing each existing province into four, creating 16 new units with an average population of 15 million-to more ambitious plans establishing 20 to 30+ units based on existing civil divisions.
Crucially, redrawing maps will fail unless paired with fiscal decentralization and local capacity. Currently, provincial own-source tax collection remains under 0.9% of GDP. In agriculture, the effective tax rate is just 0.3%. Without local taxation and reliable administrative enforcement, newly created units cannot deliver public services or be held accountable by citizens.
In an era defined by rapid urbanization, climate vulnerability and economic pressures, institutional proximity is essential for state resilience. When populations outgrow the boundaries of governance, nations must adapt their administrative geography so that power, resources and accountability finally align with the people they serve.
—The writer is an alumnus of QAU, MPhil scholar and a freelance columnist, based in Islamabad.
