The clock is ticking in Islamabad. Iranian Foreign Minister, along with senior delegations from the United States and Iran, will sit down for the second phase of Pakistan-mediated peace talks, a devel-opment that represents perhaps Washington’s clearest and final opportunity to extract itself from a conflict it never anticipated would last this long. The road that has brought both sides to this moment is long and littered with missed turning points, each one a potential exit that the United States either ignored or failed to recognize in time. Now, with the midterm elections looming and global energy markets already feeling the strain, the value of Pakistan’s quiet but persistent backdoor diplomacy has never been more apparent.
To understand why the stakes are so high, one must rewind six months. In June 2025, following a brief but intense confrontation led by Israel, US forces launched major strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities. President Trump, in his characteristic fashion, took to Truth Social to declare victory. “Monumental damage was done to all nuclear sites in Iran,” he wrote. “Obliteration is an accurate term.” This was a classic exit point. The administration had achieved a key objective: Iran’s nuclear infrastructure had suffered a serious, if not fatal, blow. Leaders change, regimes evolve, but a military target, once destroyed, stays destroyed. Washington continued to escalate the situation rather than retreating and declaring the mission a success. By January 2026, the situation had been further exacerbated by the United States’ external pressure and Iran’s internal unrest. The United States and Israel conducted coordinated air and missile strikes across Iran in February, resulting in the deaths of supreme leader Ali Khamenei and senior military officials, despite the ongoing indirect negotiations.
This was the second and most consequential missed exit. The US had achieved something extraordi-nary: the elimination of the head of the Iranian clerical establishment. The traditional counterterrorism playbook would suggest that, following the decapitation of hostile leadership, one should allow the dust to settle and internal dynamics to realign. Instead, the war deepened. Iran responded with missile attacks throughout the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, which transits through a fifth of the world’s oil, was effectively closed, resulting in a significant increase in petroleum prices. After inflicting catastrophic damage on Iranian infrastructure, the third missed exit occurred when demands for de-escalation through third-party mediation manifested. Pakistan quietly stepped forward.
Pakistan’s first phase of mediation, a two-week ceasefire brokered through backdoor channels, was itself an exit opportunity. Washington had secretly turned to Field Marshal Asim Munir, who became the linchpin of the back-channel effort, shuttling messages between Tehran and top US officials. The deal was a two-week pause in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz. That pause, according to Pakistani officials, was also meant to serve as a bridge to serious negotiations. However, the first round of direct talks in Islamabad on April 11 and 12, lasting more than 20 hours, ended without an agreement. The ceasefire expired on April 22, but President Trump, upon the request of Pakistan’s leadership, extended it, delaying any resumption of hostilities. This extension is precisely why this weekend, second phase is kicking off. If the United States fails to secure a deal now, it may not get another chance and we might loose our position as mediator.
Why is it essential for the US to participate in and commit to this second phase? The simplest answer is political and economic exhaustion. President Trump is racing against a brutal calendar: the midterm elections are only months away and his approval rating on the economy has hit an all-time low of 29 per cent, with gasoline prices rising more than 21 per cent. The war has become an electoral liability. Moreover, the Financial Times revealed that the White House had been desperate for a ceasefire as early as March, driven less by military triumph than by the alarming resilience of the Iranian regime, which has refused to break. The US strategy of instantaneous collapse has clearly failed. Iran’s vast landmass, dispersed military assets and ability to sustain a prolonged confrontation mean that any attempt to win a decisive military victory would be a strategic and political catastrophe.
For Pakistan, as mediator, the mediation has to succeed; Pakistan must make it mandatory for both parties to maintain the positive spirit of the process. This means ensuring that whatever is decided in Islamabad is executed fully and that no third party, particularly Israel, is allowed to violate the terms. Pakistan’s geographical location and its unique position of trust with not only the US and Iran but also with China and Russia give it the leverage to demand adherence.
The advantage of an exit that happens now, through Pakistan’s remarkable backdoor diplomacy, is immense. For the US, it is political survival and economic stability. For Iran, it is relief from crippling sanctions and the reopening of its ports. For Pakistan, it is the validation of its role as a global peace hub. This is not merely a deal between two hostile nations; it is the birth of a new geopolitical reality where the voice of the mediator commands as much respect as the power of the belligerents. The world will be watching Islamabad during second phase of mediation and if Pakistan can secure this peace, it will have secured its own future as the indispensable mediator of the twenty-first century.
—The writer is an international law expert and an internationally accredited arbitrator and mediator.
