TERRORISM remains a serious challenge in Pakistan, affecting security, governance and social cohesion.
Militant violence has targeted civilians and state institutions, creating economic and humanitarian costs. To curb this menace, Pakistan launched many anti-terrorism initiatives but fruitful outcomes are yet to be observed. Terrorism in Pakistan in 2025 deteriorated sharply, with terrorist incidents rising 34 percent to 699 nationwide, according to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) Security Report 2025. This escalation claimed at least 1,034 lives and injured 1,366 others, marking a 21 percent increase in fatalities despite intensified counterterrorism efforts that killed over 1,300 militants. The surge persisted even after assertions of control and the October closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, highlighting underlying vulnerabilities that differ from the state’s assessment of stability.
Field Marshal Asim Munir, repeatedly emphasized a zero-tolerance policy toward threats to national security during 2025 visits to garrisons and training exercises. In January 2026, he reaffirmed the defence forces’ commitment to safeguarding sovereignty amid multifaceted challenges, highlighting operational preparedness and innovation. Pakistani military spokespersons credited border fortifications and operations with curbing infiltration, pointing to minor late-year dips in cross-border attacks following the October 2025 closure of key crossings like Torkham and Chaman after deadly clashes. Yet these claims ring against PIPS data showing violence peaking throughout the year, with security forces suffering 437 deaths, 42 percent of total fatalities as militants targeted convoys, posts and personnel relentlessly. The border shutdown followed a terrorist attack and subsequent airstrikes on TTP hideouts in Afghanistan on October 9, which were met with retaliatory Taliban attacks. The measure was intended to curb incursions by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pro-government assessments by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) reported a 17 percent decline in attacks and lower civilian and security force casualties during November–December, attributing this reduction to disrupted militant supply and movement networks.
However, this relief proved both limited and delayed. In 2025, overall fatalities increased by 34 percent to 3,417, including deaths from counterterrorism operations, surpassing the 2024 figures by a wide margin. This rise highlighted the limited effectiveness of the measure against deeply rooted insurgent networks. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) bore the brunt, recording 413 attacks, a 40 percent rise resulting in 581 deaths and 698 injuries, driven by TTP and affiliates like Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. Districts such as North and South Waziristan, Bannu and D.I. Khan saw incessant ambushes, IED blasts and suicide bombings, with Independence Day assaults across 11 districts symbolizing direct state challenges. Security forces responded aggressively, but at steep cost: over 68 percent of KP attacks hit personnel, killing hundreds despite 602 militants downed in retaliations. In ground realities, TTP exploited ex-FATA governance gaps and Afghan sanctuaries, despite the border seal to rebuild, expanding south into Balochistan partnerships. This provincial hotspot, accounting for 59 percent of national attacks, highlighted how narrative optimism masked a spiraling insurgency fueled since the 2021 Taliban takeover.
Balochistan witnessed 254 attacks, up 26 percent, killing 419 and injuring 607, as Baloch groups like Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front shifted to sophisticated sieges, hijackings and blockades targeting infrastructure and state symbols. High-profile actions, such as the March Jaffar Express hijacking by the BLA-Jeeyand faction that killed 26 hostages, amplified political messaging and economic disruption. TTP and IS-K added 30 religiously motivated strikes, focusing on northern Pashtun areas. Violence spread to 21 districts, hitting security forces hardest while non-Baloch workers and CPEC projects faced kidnappings and bombings. The border closure disrupted trade but failed to halt BLA’s domestic evolution or TTP’s cross-affiliate operations, with 95 percent of attacks confined to the KP-Balochistan axis.
Sindh logged 21 attacks, mostly in Karachi, causing a few deaths but signaling urban creep by TTP and BLA. Punjab saw seven incidents, down slightly, including a TTP-claimed suicide bombing killing 12 at a judicial complex. Gilgit-Baltistan reported three strikes on security personnel. These fringes underscored militancy’s national diffusion, with 13 suicide attacks claiming 111 lives. Civilian toll, 354 non-combatants, exposed societal fraying, as did persistent polio team hits and sectarian flares. Despite record militant kills (1,313 in ops plus 602 retaliatory), attackers grew bolder, using infantry fire, IEDs and grenades in coordinated waves. PIPS has warned of strategic evolution post-Afghan Taliban rise, uncurbed by borders or rhetoric. Pakistan’s 2025 security remains precarious with a 34 percent attack surge and disproportionate force losses belie border closure gains and official records. TTP and Baloch insurgents thrive on adaptation, Afghan havens and state overstretch, demanding beyond kinetic responses, reforms in merged districts, madrassa oversight and Kabul pressure for true stability. Without addressing root enablers, the facade crumbles further.
To cope with terrorism, Pakistan should prioritize non-kinetic measures centered on governance, education and social cohesion. Strengthening civilian institutions, promoting inclusive development, countering extremist narratives through media and education, ensuring justice and accountability and addressing economic grievances can reduce radicalization and undermine the social foundations that sustain militancy over the long term.
— The writer is an educator, based in Sindh.
