The recent diplomatic engagements between the Afghan Taliban regime and India mark a significant shift in regional geopolitics.
In an apparent bid to win New Delhi’s confidence, the Taliban government has intensified efforts to assure India that it can facilitate its political, security and economic interests, particularly those aimed at countering Pakistan and expanding Indian access to Central Asia. This emerging convergence raises critical questions for regional stability and the strategic balance in South and Central Asia. Following the week-long visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, another high-level Afghan delegation is in New Delhi, led by Nooruddin Azizi, the Taliban regime’s Minister for Industry and Commerce. Azizi’s visit carries notable weight because it directly addresses economic and logistical cooperation; areas where India has historically sought influence in Afghanistan. During this visit, Azizi will explore alternative routes for bilateral trade, mechanisms to ease import-export processes, expansion of trade volumes and the possibility of granting India transit access through Afghan soil into Central Asia.
A key component of these discussions relates to India’s continued control and operational responsibilities at Iran’s Chabahar Port. Under a 10-year agreement signed in May 2024, India Ports Global Limited (IPGL), a state-owned enterprise, is administering, modernizing and operationalizing the port. Despite geopolitical turbulence and periodic sanctions on Iran, India has steadily maintained its footprint at Chabahar. The port remains the centerpiece of New Delhi’s long-term strategy to bypass Pakistan and establish an alternate, direct trade corridor to Afghanistan and onwards to Central Asia. Beyond the port, India had already invested heavily in regional connectivity during the US-led occupation of Afghanistan. The Zaranj–Delaram Highway, constructed in 2009 at a cost of $136 million by India’s Border Roads Organization, connects the Iranian border to Afghanistan’s ring road, linking major Afghan cities such as Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. This road was a strategic attempt to give India a reliable trade and military-logistics route independent of Pakistani territory. Through these projects, India sought to embed itself deeply into Afghanistan’s state structure; politically, economically and even in the realm of security.
It is no secret that Indian presence in Afghanistan expanded exponentially during the 2001–2021 international intervention. India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), developed strong links with Afghanistan’s former intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), now replaced by the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) under the Taliban regime. Over the years, this intelligence nexus allegedly facilitated anti-Pakistan terrorist activities, particularly in the former FATA region, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Simultaneously, India leveraged Iranian vulnerabilities to its advantage. Despite the sanction’s regime against Iran, India became one of the major importers of Iranian oil and gas for years and used Iranian territory to support activities detrimental to Pakistani security, particularly in Balochistan.
Even during the Trump Administration’s strict sanctions campaign, India benefited from selective exemptions related to Chabahar due to perceived American strategic interests in countering China. Although President Trump initially restricted Indian use of the port, Washington later allowed New Delhi to resume operations; an indication that Indo-US strategic convergence often supersedes temporary diplomatic friction. Against this backdrop, the Taliban’s outreach to India appears to be part of a broader geopolitical alignment. India is now preparing to fully reopen its embassy in Kabul, an extraordinary step, given that New Delhi has not recognized the Taliban regime and has historically viewed it as extremist and incompatible with India’s domestic governance model. Indian officials have previously described the Taliban using derogatory terms, even referring to them as “snakes.” Yet geopolitical interests now override ideological differences.
There are several strategic implications of deeper Taliban-India cooperation. First, any trade and transit arrangements through difficult and costly routes via Chabahar and the Zaranj–Delaram corridor are unlikely to be economically sustainable for Afghanistan in the long term unless heavily subsidized. If India shoulders the bulk of these costs, it will naturally demand significant political, security and intelligence concessions from the Taliban regime. Second, the Indian strategic re-entry into Afghanistan, facilitated by the Taliban, would have a direct and adverse impact on Pakistan. India’s intelligence footprint could expand once again, enabling anti-Pakistan militant groups to exploit Afghan soil. Evidence of resurgent terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan already suggests cross-border facilitation. A structured Indian presence in Kabul would further embolden such networks.
Third, India’s deepening engagement in Afghanistan may also be intended to counter China’s growing interest in Afghan minerals, infrastructure and connectivity projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing seeks stability and access, particularly for projects linked to the Wakhan Corridor and its broader Central Asian influence. An Indian foothold in Kabul, especially one backed quietly by major Western powers could complicate China’s long-term strategic plans.
In essence, the emerging India-Taliban proximity is not merely bilateral cooperation; it reflects a wider geopolitical realignment where global and regional powers may be converging to reshape Afghanistan’s role in regional politics. The Taliban’s economic desperation and limited international recognition have made them increasingly amenable to foreign influence, particularly from actors who can offer political legitimacy and economic incentives.
Pakistan and China must closely assess these developments and formulate a comprehensive strategy to counteract potential threats. A coordinated diplomatic, security and economic approach is necessary to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a staging ground for destabilizing the region. The growing closeness between New Delhi and the Taliban regime has far-reaching implications not only for Pakistan but also for regional stability, trade routes and the wider geopolitical contest across South and Central Asia.
— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
