ARGUABLY, for the people and the Government of Pakistan their sovereignty is equally paramount as that of great Powers. Thus, as the only Muslim nuclear power, the Pakistani nation strongly upholds the pride and importance of its strategic programme, which is the curator of Pakistan’s sovereignty. That said, Pakistan’s deterrent is the sole guarantor of its territorial integrity, self-governance and independence. Moreover, Pakistan’s missile programme is a bastion of country’s defence strategy against external threats, particularly posed by its neighbour India. Therefore, the acquisition of nuclear power and its allied capabilities remain a cornerstone of Pakistan‘s foreign policy and security strategy. A declared nuclear power Pakistan has the ability to deter any foreign aggression on its soil and can protect its sovereignty without being vulnerable to external intervention.
Pakistan developed its nuclear programme as a logical response to the hostile geopolitical environment of South Asia where Islamabad faced an existential threat from India’s nuclear capabilities. Thus, the nuclear tests, conducted by Pakistan in May 1998, were a significant milestone in the history of Pakistan thereby establishing a strategic balance in South Asia. Yet sadly, instead of realizing the importance of regional peace, security and strategic stability in the region, the western powers have been watching with skepticism, the development of Pakistan nuclear weapons programme, particularly the United States has been critical of advancing Pakistan’s strategic capabilities.
Pakistan strategic programme is the embodiment of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security strategy and strategic interests. Pakistan nuclear forces are under the control of national command authority, (NCA) which is responsible for making the decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Traditionally, Pakistan nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of minimum credible deterrence (MCD), meaning thereby that we seek to maintain a nuclear arsenal that is sufficient to deter an attack, but not to the extent that poses a threat to others. In order to counterpoise the threats posed to Pakistan through India’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), Pakistan in 2013 under the mentorship of Lt. General (Retd) Khalid Kidwai (an advisor to National Command Authority) , added more needed strategic dimensions to the doctrine of minimum credible deterrence (MCD), thereby broadly focusing on a full spectrum deterrence (FSD).
That said, the FSD doctrine covers the conventional and non-conventional threats, including the asymmetric threats posed by Pakistan’s adversaries, particularly India. The said doctrine is also accompanied by the concept of deterrence by denial—deterring an enemy by denying them the ability to achieve their objectives. The FSD also conceptualizes the need to control escalation thereby preventing a conflict from spiralling out of control. And essentially, the FSD doctrine fosters the concept of a flexible response—countering the threats posed from enemy’s nuclear forces. The FSD doctrine holds a comprehensive and proactive approach dealing with the complexity of modern threats.
Basically, Pakistan’s missile programme is designed to deter aggression from its adversaries, particularly India. Moreover, Pakistan’s missile programme, which is the backbone of our strategic programme, is strongly supported and monitored by a robust command and control system which enables the country to exercise effective control over its missile forces, responding quickly to the emerging security threats. Pakistan’s missile programme is largely indigenous with the country’s capability of developing its own missile system, including the Ghuari, Shaheen and Nasr missiles
Today, Pakistan’s missile programme includes land-based, sea-based and air based systems, providing the country with a multidimensional allied capability to proactively respond the threats from various directions. And also, Pakistan’s missiles have the potentiality of marking a significant range and accuracy, thereby targeting enemy’s positions with precision. In this regard, the country’s missile programme includes a range of system; the short range ballistic missile (SRBMs), the medium range ballistic missile (MRBMs) and the intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
The inclusion of Shaheen-3 and Ababeel ballistic missiles with MIRV capabilities is a testament to the commitment to defending Pakistan’s territorial integrity and maintaining a balance of power in the South Asian region. By acquiring or developing such capabilities, Pakistan can ensure that its deterrence remains profoundly credible of delivering nuclear warheads, proving a strong deterrent capability against any potential aggressor. The country’s strategic programme ensuring a credible deterrence helps maintain a balance of power in the region. Thus, the country’s nuclear-tipped missiles can reach targets deep within India. Additionally, while possessing the element of nuclear delivery, Pakistan’s missile system also consists of performing conventional capabilities, as they are used in the emergency scenarios, including counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations.
In essence, Pakistan’s strategic programme and its allied capabilities—a source of national pride and a symbol of the country’s commitment to its sovereignty—have always remained the pivot of Pakistan foreign policy and national security strategy, including an all-time hallmark of Pakistan’s political and military leadership. Therefore, Pakistan‘s Foreign Office justifiably rejects a biased US criticism over Pakistan’s BMD missile programme. In no way should South Asian strategic stability become a casualty of the South Asian strategic trilemma. It is true that India-US strategic partnership has heightened Pakistan security concerns.
It would be more productive for Washington to engage with Pakistan, a major Non-NATO ally, in a strategic dialogue instead of imposing sanctions on Pakistan ballistic missile programme. Viably, engaging Pakistan in a strategic dialogue can help the US understand Pakistan security concerns and priorities, particularly with regards to its BMD system. This, in turn, can enable both the sides to build trust while demystifying the myth of their strategic misunderstandings. Also, the US’ Asia Pacific Strategy and its implications for Pakistan security concerns need to be addressed. Hence, a pragmatic US engagement with Pakistan is more effective approach, which can help build a stronger and cooperative relationship between the two sides, the US and Pakistan.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law. He also deals with the strategic issues.
