Bakhtawar Raza
Maldivian President Mohamed Muizze recently signalled Male’s readiness to help revive SAARC by facilitating the resumption of its meetings. Within weeks, India’s foreign minister answered. He said the reasons behind SAARC’s continued paralysis are well known and pointedly held one member state responsible for the impasse.
This exchange captures the central dilemma facing SAARC. Although its members express support for reviving the organization, one member repeatedly maintains that conditions are not conducive to resuming engagement.
Dhaka has emerged as one of the advocates for SAARC’s revival. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has framed revival as Bangladesh natural responsibility as SAARC’s initiator , while former chief adviser Muhammad Yunus continued to argue that its spirit remains alive, while Dhaka’s top leadership has called for renewal , institutional reforms and political commitment. A Bangladeshi roadmap in July stressed the need for political goodwill. Dhaka’s message is straightforward : BIMSTEC can complement SAARC, but it cannot replace the only South Asian forum where all states sit at the same table. Yet, there is growing disconnect between diplomatic enthusiasm and political action.
Regional leaders appear willing to endorse cooperation in principle, but remains largely absent from the negotiating table. The central issue is difficult to overlook. In 2016, the 19th Summit was suspended due to IndiaPakistan tensions. Till now, New Delhi’s position has remained consistent toward renewal of bilateral relations.
External Affairs Minister S.Jaishankar highlighted only one member in his conversation as responsible for the impasse. Regardless of how this justification is viewed, the consequence is that SAARC remains unable to function due to India’s aggressive posturing and its ambition to control the agenda of cooperation in South Asia.
SAARC’s challenge is not simply the absence of cooperation; it’s the inability to separate regional aspirations from bilateral disputes. It is for sure that SAARC has not died of neglect. It has been held hostage. The consequences extend well beyond the India-Pakistan relationship. Bangladeshi political leaders have repeatedly highlighted how bilateral conflict between Pakistan and India has constrained regional commerce, diplomatic cooperation and connectivity.
The economic consequences of SAARC’s paralysis are measurable. South Asia is the only region that is not economically integrated. According to a World Bank Report, Intra-regional trade accounts for only 5 percent to 6 percent, compared to 25 percent in ASEAN, which makes South Asia the World’s least economically integrated region.
The reasons that further constrain commerce are high border, regulatory costs ,and logistics. Despite an estimated potential of at least US$67 billion, regional trade stands at roughly US$23 billion. South Asia does not lack economic potential; however, it struggles to translate geographical proximity into economic cooperation Furthermore, SAARC’s continued deadlock directly affects smaller members such as the Maldives.
As a small economy, Maldives has limited bargaining power, but has a strong interest in regional cooperation. Male economy generates 30 percent of its GDP with tourism, while its import dependence is substantial. In 2024, its goods imports touched US$3.63 billion, while itsexports were only US$92.4 million with India.
This difference shows why regional connectivity and collective engagement matter for smaller states like Maldives. President Muizzu’s efforts to revive SAARC have the same intention to prefer regional connectivity over bilateral tensions, because smaller states often have most to lose.
Similarly, despite the impasse, efforts to revive SAARC are continuing. Bangladesh and Nepal continue to push for SAARC revival and Dhaka is making regional connectivity as its foreign policy determinant. Kathmandu has similar organizational reactivation aspirations. In the same way, Pakistan is exploring alternative avenues for regional cooperation.
Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Ishaq Dar, has termed that the SAARC’s failure is leading Islamabad towards trilateral cooperation with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and China. For this purpose, the idea of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan grouping has surfaced; however, it will take time to transform into an established bloc. The quest for regional connectivity is encouraging regional countries, especially smaller states, to develop a consensus to establish a framework outside the SAARC. This is where the speeches fail. Goodwill statements alone cannot revive SAARC, whether they come from Male, Dhaka or Islamabad. Its revival depends on whether India, as the region’s largest member, is willing to distinguish the future of regional cooperation from bilateral disputes.
SAARC’s charter already provides for excluding bilateral and contentious issues from its deliberations, offering an existing framework for moving forward. What remains uncertain is the political willingness to use it. Can India allow an eight-member regional agenda to advance even when its own relationship with Pakistan is strained? At first instance, rejuvenating SAARC does not require a full-fledged normalized relationship between India and Pakistan. There are avenues of mutual cooperation such as disaster response, climate resilience, healthcare, and trade facilitation. These steps can contribute to proximity of India and Pakistan on multiple issues, including trade. The World Bank estimates that normalized India-Pakistan trade could grow from around US$2 billion to US$37 billion.
Despite restrictions, commerce has not come to a halt. It has been channelized through costlier informal routes and third countries without regulatory oversight. SAARC may not resolve major disputed issues, but it can be empowered by regional countries to resolve issues that can change the socio-economic landscape of South Asia. India may find alternative regional groupings such as BIMSTEC, BBIN, the SCO and IORA to build partnership and connectivity, often through forums that do not include Pakistan, but these cannot fully substitute for an organization that brings all eight South Asian countries under one framework.
Actually, the regional countries want connectivity for shared prosperity, rather than becoming a hostage to India’s regional interests. Alternate groupings may help India to pursue its interests, but none offers the same inclusive framework as SAARC presents.
South Asia cannot easily replace the idea of a shared regional home with the ambition and interest of one country that wants to control its small neighbouring countries to pursue its self-centred foreign policy objectives.
