NOW Iran and Afghanistan model radicalisation will move to Pakistan. These border sharing countries will be governed by different Islamic schools of thought. What will be the socio political future of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan then.
The US, West and China might have worked on it. Will this radicalisation not overshadow the entire region? The answer is yes. If out bursting radicalisation is not limited China and CPEC will suffer the most
. Before the formation of a new Taliban government, three back to back bomb blasts near Kabul airport claimed one hundred seventy lives including thirteen American and Biden’s response reflects the future scenario of the region.
In response to these bomb blasts today’s American drone attack on ISIS in Afghanistan tells the beginning of a new story.
Before the establishment of government the Taliban’s decision to create a society of their own liking should be kept in mind.
While the regime insists that their policies are strictly in accordance with Islam of their own interpretation.
They have legitimate right to introduce and implement. Ultra liberals among us are pained to emphasise that Taliban’s policies are an affront against basic human values. To me to some extent, but as a whole Absolutely Not. Two entirely different point of views.
From a liberal perspective the Taliban’s claim to authority is suspected on two counts. Firstly, their interpretation of Islam is flawed and secondly, the Taliban don’t represent the entire national legitimate will of Afghans.
The question that looms large and requires a coherent explanation is the evolution and working of the Taliban. This definitely will have strong radical impact on Pakistan. The Taliban remained an enigma in the past. It poses more questions than answers.
Was the Taliban a product of eccentricities of a society visibly bewildered by a world which had left it behind? What was the rationale behind the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam in Afghanistan’s political process? Why was a Third World state with a rudimentary infrastructure used as a pawn during the heyday of the Cold War and later by mindless Islamic fanatics, mercenaries and their ideologues? How could a failed state without a coherent political life make an arresting impact on the larger international scene? And have we seen the end of reactionary Islamism with the overthrow of the Taliban in the past?Now why and how Taliban came to power again after a war of two decades?
At a time when transnational activism has led to the decline of state sovereignty, unilateral undertaking by any will be treated with extreme anxiety.
National interest, slowly becoming a thing of the past has gradually made space for global interest.
What if a society or state chooses to interpret the rules of interaction with its counterparts according to its own distinct vision? Should this attitude be interpreted as illiberal and the community castigated? How should be reacted if the said community consciously decides to inflict injury upon itself and against imaginary enemies? The Taliban’s preference for a particular variant of Islam was a mere reintroduction of the Deobandi School of Thought, tried almost a century ago.
The radical Islamisation of Afghanistan began as a CIA-initiated move to unite the Muslims of the country against the occupying Soviet force.
Although US stopped its arms supply to Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, it did not sever strategic linkages with Afghan Mujahideen, who filled the power vacuum left behind by the retreating Soviet occupational force, and later with the Taliban.
Between 1994 and 1996 US maintained a shaky and ambivalent relationship with the Taliban and provided them with vital political support through its traditional allies in the region, namely Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
By propping up the Taliban, US thought they could create an anti-Iran and anti-Shi’a Movement which could severely limit Iran’s influence in the region.
As things got worse the USA simply handed over the responsibility of dealing with the country to its ally in the region — Pakistan.
Pakistan’s continuing support of the Taliban regime was couched in larger geo-political designs in South Asia.
Like its predecessor civilian government, Musharraf recognised the importance of a strategic ideological partnership with the Taliban.
But somewhere along the line the Taliban adopted an Arcadian premodern, and in some cases anti-Islamic, vision which did not reflect the CIA’s original role in Afghanistan.
Pakistan found itself in the middle of international criticism for recognising and promoting the interests of a regime in Afghanistan which then was internationally considered fascist, fundamentalist and terrorist.
What went wrong? Not for the first time where Afghanistan was concerned, the vagaries and inconsistencies of American policy worked against their own best interest in the region.
Before the Taliban take over, the tumultuous Afghanistan is simply a failed state without a coherent political life and therefore unacceptable to most of the nations of the international community.
Are the Taliban capable of keeping the masses and their representatives together in a fast disintegrating state where nationalism has truly and fully dissipated. The world can avert vandalisation of Afghanistan.
The world has pursued a policy in Afghanistan that primarily aimed at perpetuating Afghans self-seeking narrow national interests. All the Afghan rulers wilfully need to take care of the interests of Afghans.
There is no forgiveness on the part of the new regime of different Taliban which has brought new hope of peace and prosperity for Afghans while settling scores with another superpower.
On the other hand Kabul Airport tragedy reflects uncertainty amongst millions of Afghans.
Hope that once Taliban stepped into the chasm of Afghan politics they will replicate the strategic thinking of the regional powers and CIA. The rhetoric this time has a wider appeal because it is laced with some highly evocative messages.
—The writer, based in Islamabad, is book ambassador, columnist and author of several books.