WHO was Mohsin Naqvi really targeting—the Prime Minister or the President? That is the central question arising from his much-discussed speech. The debate it has generated has produced countless interpretations, many of which seem to have missed the real point. The situation brings to mind Faiz Ahmed Faiz’s famous lines:
Ironically, the one thing that was never explicitly mentioned became the very point that provoked the strongest reaction. There is a popular saying: ask ten people, and you will hear ten different stories. That is precisely what has happened. Commentators have advanced extraordinary theories—from claims that Naqvi had issued a six-month ultimatum to suggestions that he had effectively presented an indictment against Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government. Some even speculated that the Prime Minister might dismiss Mohsin Naqvi just as Nawaz Sharif once forced General Jehangir Karamat to resign.
Such comparisons ignore the profound difference between the political realities of thirty years ago and those of today. The circumstances that led to General Karamat’s resignation belonged to a very different constitutional and institutional environment. Pakistan’s political system, civil-military relationship and constitutional framework have undergone significant changes since then. Ignoring these developments may make for sensational commentary, but it does little to improve public understanding. It is less journalism than what veteran journalist Nusrat Javed aptly calls chuskafaroshi—the business of selling sensationalism. It is true that Mohsin Naqvi spoke of the failure of the system. The real question, however, is: Which system was he referring to? Pakistan’s governance suffers from weaknesses in almost every sector. Yet the gravest failure remains the persistent disregard for the Constitution. The Constitution is undermined not only when it is violated but also when it is selectively implemented or conveniently ignored. Responsibility for this failure rests with society as a whole, although those exercising greater authority bear the greater burden. If one were searching for the country’s most serious systemic flaw, this would be the obvious answer. But a careful reading of Naqvi’s speech suggests that this was not the issue he intended to highlight.
Its context clearly indicates that he was reviving the long-standing debate over creating new administrative units. More accurately, he was not arguing for new provinces but for a more effective administrative structure. In Pakistan, provinces have acquired an almost sacred constitutional status, whereas administrative units remain a matter of governance rather than identity. The central message of his speech was that Pakistan urgently needs administrative restructuring. From the perspective of the Pakistan Peoples Party, however, new administrative units are virtually indistinguishable from new provinces, particularly where Sindh is concerned. Read in that context, Naqvi’s message appears directed at those resisting administrative reform—the PPP foremost among them. History offers an interesting parallel. During the debate over the partition of British India, the Indian National Congress argued that dividing India would be akin to slaughtering a sacred cow. The PPP displays a comparable sensitivity whenever the division of Sindh, or any proposal resembling it, is discussed. If this interpretation is correct, Naqvi’s speech may have served as a political signal to President Asif Ali Zardari through one of his closest associates: enough is enough; resistance to administrative reform cannot continue indefinitely.
Naqvi also introduced an idea that deserves serious attention. Instead of creating new provinces, he suggested retaining the existing provincial structure while establishing new administrative units beneath it. Given the constitutional complexities surrounding the creation of new provinces, this proposal offers an alternative that merits thoughtful debate rather than immediate political rejection. His criticism of the government’s laptop distribution scheme appeared more like an attempt to maintain balance than a fundamental disagreement with the Prime Minister. His remarks about “cockroaches,” however, sounded unmistakably like a warning that continued resistance to administrative reform could produce consequences extending far beyond ordinary political disagreement. This does not mean that the Pakistan Muslim League (N) is enthusiastic about creating new provinces. In reality, its position is not fundamentally different from that of the PPP. The difference lies less in policy than in political style and in the manner each party prefers to manage such sensitive constitutional questions. That raises a larger issue. If both major political parties remain reluctant to embrace administrative restructuring, can such reform ever become a reality? Some believe determined forces will eventually prevail. Others point to the fate of the Kalabagh Dam and major canal projects, asking why they have remained unrealised despite decades of discussion and repeated political commitments.
The answer lies in Pakistan’s constitutional structure. The federation has gradually become constrained in relation to the provinces, affecting governance, fiscal management and even matters of national importance. One consequence has been the steady weakening of local government institutions, as provincial governments have often been reluctant to devolve meaningful authority and financial resources. Punjab has at least attempted to sustain a functioning local development mechanism, whereas the performance of several other provinces has been far less encouraging. What happens next? The most likely scenario is that any future constitutional amendment will require prolonged negotiations, political bargaining and institutional compromise. The eventual middle ground may involve reforms to the National Finance Commission Award, stronger local governments and a fresh debate on administrative restructuring without reopening the contentious issue of provincial boundaries.
—This writer is former advisor to the President of Pakistan, author & mass media theorist.
(farooq.adilbhuta@gmail,com)
