PAKISTAN’S relationship with Afghanistan has long been shaped by border tensions, security concerns and mistrust.
Now, another serious issue is beginning to emerge: water. What was once seen as a technical matter of river management is increasingly becoming a strategic concern, one that could affect agriculture, food security and regional stability. The immediate concern comes from Afghanistan’s reported plan to build a dam on the Chollar River, an important tributary of the Kabul River. This river system is highly sensitive because it begins in Pakistan’s glacier regions, flows into Afghanistan and then returns to Pakistan. In other words, it is a shared water source. Any major upstream diversion by Afghanistan could reduce the flow of water reaching Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where many communities depend on the Kabul River for irrigation and livelihoods.
Pakistan may, in theory, have the option to redirect this river upstream so that it remains within its own territory. However, such a move would require major financial resources, technical capacity and long-term planning. At present, that is far easier said than done. This is why the issue matters so deeply. The Kabul River, fed by the Kunar River, plays an essential role in the agricultural economy of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Any disruption in its flow would not only create an environmental problem but also an economic one. Pakistan already depends heavily on water for farming, with around 94 percent of its freshwater withdrawals going to agriculture. A decline in water availability would directly affect crops, rural incomes and food prices, placing even more pressure on an already fragile economy.
Pakistan’s vulnerability, however, is not only because of what its neighbors may do. It is also rooted in its own weak water management. The country has one of the largest irrigation systems in the world, yet a large amount of water is lost through seepage, poor maintenance and outdated infrastructure. Groundwater has often been used as a backup, but water tables are falling and this cannot remain a long-term solution. The country’s storage capacity is also dangerously limited. Pakistan stores only about 30 days of water in relation to Indus flows, leaving very little buffer against drought, delayed rainfall or seasonal shocks. In such a situation, even a modest upstream change can have serious downstream consequences. Unless Pakistan improves its own water governance, every external pressure will hit harder.
The concern becomes even more sensitive because of India’s growing involvement in Afghan development projects. India’s support for the Afghan India Friendship Dam and other infrastructure initiatives has raised concerns in Islamabad. From Pakistan’s point of view, the fear is not only about a single project. It is about the possibility that water, like other regional pressure points, may gradually become another tool of strategic leverage. Whether that fear proves fully justified or not, Pakistan’s anxiety is understandable. It is already living under water stress and facing upstream dependence. In that context, any Afghan project involving shared rivers will naturally be viewed with concern.
Yet this issue is also part of a wider global trend. Across the world, water is becoming one of the most valuable and contested resources of this century. Climate change, shrinking glaciers, rising demand and weak governance are all increasing pressure on river systems. For Pakistan, the danger is even greater because its rivers depend heavily on glacier-fed flows. Any disruption in this natural cycle could deepen an already serious crisis. The consequences of water stress are not limited to policy debates. They are felt most by ordinary people. Farmers face lower yields, food prices rise and communities struggle with increasing scarcity. In that sense, water insecurity is not only a foreign policy issue. It is also a human, economic and national stability issue.
Pakistan does have options. It can invest in better storage, modernize irrigation, reduce water losses and regulate groundwater use more effectively. It can also pursue practical dialogue and cooperation with Afghanistan rather than allowing every shared river issue to become a source of suspicion. But this will require seriousness, political will and a recognition that internal neglect has made the country far more vulnerable than it should be. The real challenge is not only how Pakistan responds to Afghanistan’s water plans. It is whether Pakistan can finally treat water as a national priority. If it does not, future tensions may become harder to manage. But if it acts wisely, this moment could become an opportunity to build both national resilience and regional cooperation.
—The author is a former technocrat and works on national issues, governance and institutional development.
