Operation shock & awe ends in ignominy & disgrace
TWENTY years back, when George Bush, after the 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre in New York, declared war on Afghanistan in 2001 and on Iraq in 2003 and ordered bombing of innocent civilians, little did he know (or even speculate) about the ultimate outcome of longest American war, humiliation and ignominy it will bring to those, who, without thinking of the likely consequences, attacked world’s poorest people under the pretext of “terrorism”.
Had they read the history of Afghan people, they would have perhaps chosen other options than attacking a country whose people are warriors, fighters and revenge is deeply embedded in their culture, tradition and blood.
American policy planners and strategists must be flabbergasted that in spite of possessing the most advanced weaponry, “state-of-the-art” tanks, missiles, aircrafts and what not, they could not defeat the Afghans, who were only fighting with a Kalashnikov on their shoulders.
The lesson we must learnt is that it is not the gun but the man behind the gun which matters and the culmination of the Afghan war has once again reminded the world that the old maxim still holds good.
The writing on the wall was clear. Afghanistan has been abandoned not only by the world powers that promised never to do it again, but also by the Afghan National Army that simply disintegrated without even putting up a real fight.
In time honoured fashion, leaders in provinces cut their side deals, bought their insurance policies, got bribed or convinced, and opened the gates of the cities and garrisons for the Taliban militia to take over. No matter Kabul fell to the Taliban in days rather than weeks, as some had predicted.
Coming to recognition, there are strong speculations that Chinese will probably be the first to recognize the Taliban regime, followed by the Russians, Central Asians, and perhaps Iran will follow suit too.
Pakistan has clearly stated that the decision to recognize the new regime, headed by Taliban, will be a collective decision with all friends in the region on board.
No eyebrows will be raised if the Western countries also come back to Kabul. But even if they don’t, no one will be too bothered about it.
The West will turn its back on Afghanistan, occasionally speaking about the human rights situation, treatment of women and religious minorities, and curbs on personal liberty.
The bottom-line is that the world is reconciling itself to a Talibanised Afghanistan. The charade of Doha dialogue has run its course. Its sole purpose of giving some international visibility and legitimacy to the Taliban has been served.
At the same time, it was useful in lulling the Americans and the Afghans and stringing them along in a completely fruitless dialogue.
Indeed, much before the Taliban take over, with no victory in sight, mounting costs in human lives, wrecked infrastructure and perennially paralyzed governing institutions, Afghanistan seemed to be stuck in a very destructive impasse
Not surprisingly, all sides involved, in their own way were aware that outright military victory was unattainable and hence were looking for a face-saving way-out of this predicament through a negotiated solution.
In situations of this kind, negotiations may offer a suitable alternative through which core interests can be protected and promoted.
More importantly, negotiated solutions generate a unique advantage as they grant much needed legitimacy to the actors and related interests that have been jeopardized by the violence used to achieve them unilaterally.
However, the fact that parties may explore negotiations is primarily an indication of conflict fatigue, and in no way a guarantee that negotiations will yield a mutually acceptable solution that all parties are willing to implement.
The Biden Administration is facing a general crisis of credibility concerning its commitment to the broader Middle East, following the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The U.S. military posture in Syria is particularly concerning, with regional experts Neil Quilliam and Fred Hof warning of a pullout.
Contacts with Arab and Israeli leaders during recent travel to the region reinforce those authors’ assertions regarding doubt in the administration’s staying power.
Nevertheless, in view of the international outcry about the conduct of the American withdrawal, and new need to show steadfast grit against terrorists, especially the Islamic State (IS), the U.S. is unlikely to pull out of Syria.
Over the last decade, the situation in Syria has deteriorated into one of the most serious internal conflicts in the region along with Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, increasing sobriety about rapprochement with Iran, which is acting as aggressively on the ground in the region as on the nuclear file, suggests a more active role for Washington in Syria is needed. Consequently, there is growing awareness that the U.S. must do more to demonstrate resolve.
Looking ahead, Afghanistan’s internal state and potential return as a terrorist hub depend largely on four factors in the weeks and months after the U.S departure at the end of August.
How the international community deals with the Taliban will condition its actions. The best chance for moderating Taliban behaviour would come through a successful U.S.
campaign to orchestrate concerted pressure on the group by an unlikely coalition of neighbours and great powers.
To do so, Washington would have to overcome the reflexive tendency of many of these — India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran — to see Afghanistan as a kind of geopolitical chessboard on which to enhance influence or checkmate another’s.
Finally, detecting and neutralizing any threat of terrorism again taking root will depend on how well the U.S. can shift from 20 years of a close, richly resourced presence to remote operation, which is always more difficult.
This will require a robust human and technical intelligence collection, coordinated with capabilities ranging from drones to special operations launched from facilities outside Afghanistan and coordinated with basing countries.
Hiranmay Karlekar –Consultant Editor, The Pioneer, writing in his book “Endgame in Afghanistan: For Whom the Dice Rolls” covers a wide territory related to the war in Afghanistan, the stakes the whole world – and not just the United States – had in it, and its possible outcome.
It shows that it is not merely a war for the future of Afghanistan, but a conflict between the regressive world view of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and modernity.
The book examines the consequences of an American exit from Afghanistan under circumstances indicating a defeat; the ability of its successor to hold its own thereafter; and the regional and global geo-strategic consequences, including those on Pakistan, of a Taliban/Al-Qaeda takeover of Afghanistan.
Taking an analytical multi-disciplinary approach, coupled with meticulous research, this book focuses on areas hitherto neglected.
Linking known but scattered information in entirely new and cohesive analyses, the author presents the kind of comprehensive picture of the Afghan war and its consequences that no other book has done, so far.
— The writer is former DG (Emigration) and consultant ILO, IOM.
