MADAARIS or Islamic seminaries, hold a central place in Pakistan’s religious and social structure. For millions of low-income families, they provide free education, food and accommodation, filling a void left by the weak public schooling system. Historically, Madaaris have produced religious professionals—clerics, imams and teachers—just as secular institutions produce doctors, engineers and lawyers. Over time, however, they have also been accused of encouraging extremism and militancy.
Since independence in 1947, every government has attempted to reform madrassa education to integrate it into the mainstream system and curb its role in radicalization. Yet each initiative has faced strong clerical backlash, preventing success. The first serious effort came under General Ayub Khan in 1961, when a committee was formed under the Ministry of Education to revise curricula and place Madaaris under government supervision. It recommended adding contemporary subjects such as science, mathematics and social studies alongside religious instruction so graduates could meet the needs of a modern economy. But religious groups dismissed the proposal as an attempt to weaken their political influence and the plan collapsed.
A similar reform attempt in 1975 under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also failed, partly because his government was soon overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq, who depended heavily on clerical support. Under Zia, Madaaris—especially those aligned with the Deobandi school—expanded dramatically as they became recruitment and indoctrination centres for the Afghan jihad. Extremist ideas were deliberately introduced into madrassa curricula to motivate fighters and transform religious education into a political tool. Students were taught that apostasy and polytheism were punishable by death worldwide, giving them a sense of religious authority to enforce such punishments. They also learned that only Muslims had the right to rule, making non-Muslim governments illegitimate.
Additionally, Madaaris propagated the belief that Muslims everywhere should unite under a single Islamic caliphate, rendering independent Muslim nation-states unacceptable. The modern sovereign nation-state was portrayed as a form of polytheism incompatible with Islam. These ideas produced a rigid ideological framework that encouraged militancy and intolerance toward pluralistic political systems. After the Afghan jihad, Madaaris continued functioning as recruitment centers for militant groups. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan further strengthened this network, ensuring that Madaaris remained linked to extremist movements.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought renewed international pressure on Pakistan, as global powers increasingly viewed Madaaris as training grounds for extremism. General Pervez Musharraf responded by tasking the Ministry of Religious Affairs with preparing a new National Education Policy. This led to the Madrasah Reform Project (MRP) in 2003, which aimed to integrate religious and secular education, introduce modern textbooks and equate madrassa degrees with formal qualifications. But once again, religious leaders resisted the reforms, fearing loss of authority and control. As a result, the MRP failed to deliver meaningful change. By 2001–02, clerics from all sects united under the Ittehad Tanzeem-ul-Madaris-e-Deeniya, an umbrella organization formed to oppose government modernization efforts. Religious leaders argued that reforms were attacks on Islam.
The December 16, 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, which killed more than 130 children, forced the government to adopt the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism. One major point involved the registration and regulation of Madaaris, widely criticized for reinforcing sectarian and extremist thinking. Yet madrassa authorities viewed this clause with suspicion, interpreting it as an attempt to interfere with religious institutions. A central challenge in madrassa reform is financial oversight. Madaaris are run by administrators (Muntazims) who operate with almost complete autonomy. There are no external audits and all expenditures are approved solely by madrassa heads.
The persistence of failed reform efforts is rooted in deep social, political and institutional factors. Clerical resistance lies at the heart of the issue. Religious leaders see reform proposals as direct threats to their authority, influence and identity. Political expediency adds to the problem: successive governments have relied on clerics for legitimacy and support, making them unwilling to challenge religious institutions directly. Furthermore, the government’s approach has been inconsistent. Reform efforts gain momentum during crises, such as terrorist attacks or international pressure, but are abandoned once the immediate need passes. This stop-and-go pattern has pre-vented long-term change, leaving the madrassa sector vulnerable to radical influences.
Despite decades of attempts—from Ayub Khan’s committee in 1961 to Musharraf’s MRP in 2003 and the NAP in 2014—madrassa reform remains elusive. Strong clerical resistance and weak political will have allowed Madaaris to remain outside the mainstream education system. As a result, they continue producing graduates isolated from contemporary society and susceptible to radical ideologies. Unless the state develops sustained political commitment and religious leaders accept modernization, Madaaris will remain vulnerable to extremist influences, undermining Pakistan’s broader efforts to counter radicalization.
— The writer is an educator, based in Sindh.
