IWT: India exploits treaty’s framework
CURRENTLY tension between the two nuclear armed states — India and Pakistan — is brewing over water resources in the Indus river system endorsed by the fact that despite Pakistan’s justified reservations over Indian intension of building the Kiru, Rattle and Pakal Dul hydropower projects on the Chenab river (a reflection on Modi’s ultranationalist policy vis-à-vis the Indus water Treaty (IWT), New Delhi is making progress on these disputed projects.
Pakistan had already shown its reservations— over Indian hydropower projects on the Neelum River in IOK — accompanied by the profound impact of climate change in the wake of growing ecological and hydro-economic challenges.
From the geographical angle, India is located upstream to Pakistan on all six rivers. Pakistan’s lower geographical position — not only to the Indus Rivers in India, but also to the Kabul River in Afghanistan — makes it reliant on both neighbours for its waters.
Being an upper apiarian country, India took some pivotal advantages.
Pakistan is especially vulnerable to changes in water supply, and is likely to become South Asia’s most water-stressed nation in the next two decades.
Beyond irrigation and basic sustenance, the treaty thus also carries national security implications: Pakistan is highly justified in apprehending that India is unfairly using its upper-riparian geography to manipulate the flow of water through diversion or built-up storage in dams, flooding Pakistan during the rainy season or cutting water during the dry season.
This is why Pakistan watches Indian hydropower designs closely. During the 2021 PIC visit, the eight-member Pakistan delegation raised objections to the hydropower developments of the Pakal Dul on the Marusadar River (a tributary of the Chenab) and Lower Kalnai, on another tributary of the same river.
The delegation also requested information on Durbuk Shyok and Nimu Chilling, two of four projects under construction.
While Pakistan accuses India of “continuously violating the treaty by building dams on the western rivers”, India maintains that these are ‘run-of-the-river’ projects’ permitted under the treaty.
In 2016, Pakistan chartered concerns to the World Bank, which did not act fairly enough to resolve differences regarding separate projects.
While during the recently held three days meeting between the Indus Water Commissioners in March 2022 in Islamabad, both the sides had forwarded their recommendations.
Islamabad complained that the Indian side flow data was not sufficient as to satisfy Pakistan’s concerns.
Reportedly, conversely to Pakistan’s warranted concern, “India is fast moving towards achieving the capacity to manipulate the water flows of Pakistani rivers as in a new development, it has finished not only the civil works but also almost completed the diversion tunnel for the Kiru hydropower project of 624MW the new one being erected on the Chenab River…’’ Arguably, over the past two decades, Pakistan has launched multiple attempts to prevent India from building dams on both the Chenab and the Neelum rivers (see Kishanganga dam conflict).
The Neelum is a tributary of the Jhelum River and Pakistan has opposed both projects on the grounds that they contravene the Indus Waters Treaty signed by the two countries in 1960 (Gupta & Ebrahim, 2017).
Whereas, a study shows that descalation of water conflict is core to long-lasting cooperation to manage transboundary water resources can be achieved by establishing joint institutions.
However, with only a limited number of trans boundary rivers governed by treaties and even smaller number of them being multilateral in nature.
This is the main reason why, besides being operational for almost six decades, questions are still being raised on its sustainability.
The IWT applies to the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej (“Eastern rivers”) and the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum (“Western rivers”) including all their tributaries. ) A revisionist argument pleads that the IWT must adopt certain essential provisions which are incorporated in the Watercourses Convention, 1997.
Using the Convention as a reference point, the countries should revisit the IWT, and bring it in line with the Convention.
This would mean incorporating provisions regarding the factors determining equitability, and devising a sharing regime based on those factors as opposed to the current mechanical divisions of rivers.
It would also require India and Pakistan to incorporate adequate provisions for protection of the environment, as well as for integrated management of rivers by the two nations.
‘’ Historically, data sharing for supporting applied research is an exception rather than a policy.
Even in the agreed and functional water treaties (e.g., IWT), the flow data sharing which is an integral part of the sharing mechanism is frequently unfulfilled.
Additionally, even when the data are shared there is no mechanism for the research community to get an access to it.
This issue can be resolved by promoting open data policy to give free data access to international supervisory bodies and other stakeholders for promoting transparency and applied scientific research.
Some experts believe that sharing of trusted flow data can exponentially ease the tension among the riparian and diverts leaders to evenly focus on the crisis.’
Time and again, Pakistan has been reminding the Indian side to fairly provide the data flow, but New Delhi has ignored Pakistan’s request.
The record shows that till 1997, IWT remained instrumental in resolving the water issues between the two states, albeit beyond this period, the treaty remains inefficient to address the grievances—vindicated by the fact: ‘’India and Pakistan have been in disagreement over whether the Kishenganga Project on River Jhelum and the Ratle Project on River Chenab, initiated by India, are in violation of the IWT.
Thus, an inherent flaw in the Treaty is ambiguity, which makes room for conflict.As pointed out by Ramaswamy Iyer, one party can claim to be in full conformity with the criteria laid down in the treaty, and the other party can say that this is not the case’’.
Despite some gray areas, in the IWT, neither India should exploit it, nor should the World Bank and its Court of Arbitration (C0A) adopt a premeditated approach.
It goes without saying that to regulate the treaty provisions, a proposed joint action plan requires some prerequisites to be completed for its strategic implementation.
’’ To start with, the stakeholders need to form an internal mechanism for the real-time monitoring of flows along the length of the transboundary Rivers.
The other prerequisites include (1) real-time sharing of flow data with the concerned parties; (2) a research wing to identify the effects of changing climate on the river flows; (3) a governing body to supervise the research wing and data collection mechanism; (4) a combined forum containing officials of all the riparian countries to make a decision on the conflict and (5) an international guarantor to supervise the treaty’’.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
