PAKISTAN shares a 900-kilometre border with one of the world’s largest energy endowments: 208 billion barrels of proven oil — about 12 per cent of global reserves, the third largest in the world — and nearly 1,200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the second largest after Russia. Combined, this resource base carries an estimated market value of around $20 trillion.
The 900-km border is the most under-traded, under-piped, under-utilised asset Pakistan has. What can move across it? One: crude oil — 8–10 million tonnes a year, worth $4–6 billion. Two: diesel, petrol, furnace oil — $2–3 billion. Three: LPG, ethane, naphtha — $1–2 billion. Four: fertilizer and downstream chemicals — $1–2 billion. Five: cross-border electricity — 1,000–2,000 MW, worth $1–1.5 billion. Total tradable energy basket: $9–14 billion a year.
Red alert: Pakistan’s most valuable corridor is not blocked by geography—it is blocked by policy. What can be piped? Natural gas — 750 to 1,000 mmcfd through the Iran–Pakistan pipeline — replacing imported LNG and saving $5–7 billion a year. Refined fuels through product pipelines — diesel, petrol — cutting logistics costs and import leakages by another $1–2 billion. Add it up: $6–9 billion annually. Not from new discoveries. From moving molecules more intelligently.
How can the 900-km border be monetised? Start with Gwadar — storage, blending, transshipment — a $1–2 billion opportunity. Add transit: Iran–Pakistan–China flows, pipelines and trucking corridors, another $2–3 billion annually. Then the real prize — petrochemicals. Feed cheap ethane, LPG, and naphtha into fertilizer, plastics, and polymers. Export more. Import less. That’s $5–8 billion. Add it up: $8–13 billion a year.
Add it up. At the low end: $9 billion plus $6 billion plus $8 billion — $23 billion a year. At the high end: $14 billion plus $9 billion plus $13 billion — $36 billion a year. A $23–36 billion opportunity. The menu is large. Execution has been negligible. Red alert: This is not theoretical. This is not distant. This is sitting on a 900-km border. Pakistan’s balance-of-payments problem is, at its core, an energy problem (annual energy imports $20–25 billion). Every dollar saved on LNG, oil, and diesel is a dollar earned. Stack those savings — gas substitution, crude discounts, imported electricity — and they begin to behave like revenue. This is Pakistan’s energy arbitrage margin.
Remember: Pakistan does not run out of rupees — it runs out of dollars. And those dollars leave for three things: oil, LNG, and petroleum products. Why hasn’t Pakistan monetised the 900-km border? Three reasons. One: sanctions risk — banks, insurers, and contractors step back. Two: contract credibility — investors fear policy reversals and payment delays. Three: fragmented decision-making — multiple ministries, regulators, and provinces, each with veto power.
Red alert: Capital does not wait. It walks away. The day sanctions lift, capital will not queue — it will race. China will move from Gwadar inward. Turkey will position itself as a westward hub. Gulf players will secure upstream stakes. The first mover captures the corridor. The late mover pays transit. What does Pakistan need to do? Pakistan needs three decisions. One: ring-fence energy contracts with sovereign guarantees. Two: create a single-window authority with binding timelines. Three: pre-negotiate pipeline, refinery, and grid agreements before sanctions lift. Yes, sanctions may persist. Yes, geopolitics can shift. But Pakistan must prepare for upside, not just manage downside. Countries that wait for certainty miss opportunity.
Total impact: up to $36 billion – roughly 10 percent of Pakistan’s GDP. That’s nearly one-tenth of the entire economy. That’s equivalent to most of Pakistan’s annual export earnings. That’s a large chunk of total federal revenues. This is not a marginal opportunity—it is a balance-sheet event. Pakistan is not energy-poor. It is policy-poor. Fix the 900-km border — and the dollars will follow.
—The writer is a journalist and
political analyst.
