The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 is widely regarded as one of the most enduring water-sharing agreements in the world. Under the Treaty, the three Western Rivers (the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan, while India received unrestricted rights over the three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi). Despite this clear division, recent developments suggest that India is moving towards the diversion of water from the Chenab River, a Western River allocated to Pakistan, into Indian-controlled river systems. According to reports, India has begun work on an 8.7-kilometre tunnel through the Great Himalayan watershed. Once completed, the tunnel is expected to transfer water from the Chenab through a 113-kilometre canal into the Beas basin. This project effectively seeks to move water from a river system allocated to Pakistan into one allocated to India under the Treaty. This development is significant not merely because of the volume of water involved, but because of its implications for the fundamental architecture of the Indus Waters Treaty. India’s rights over the Chenab are limited and specifically defined within the Treaty. These rights relate to domestic use, non-consumptive use, agricultural use within prescribed limits and certain hydroelectric projects, all confined to the Chenab drainage basin itself. The Beas basin falls outside that drainage system. Consequently, transferring water from the Chenab basin to the Beas basin raises serious legal and treaty-related questions.The Treaty was founded on the principle of separation between the Eastern and Western river systems. Any inter-basin transfer between the two systems touches upon the very framework upon which the Treaty was negotiated and implemented.
For more than six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty survived multiple wars, military crises and periods of severe political tension because both countries broadly adhered to its central principles. The current controversy emerges at a time when the Treaty itself has become the subject of heightened legal and diplomatic disputes.India’s decision of April 23, 2025, to place the Treaty in what it described as “abeyance” marked an unprecedented development in the history of the agreement. New Delhi justified its position by citing national security concerns following the Pahalgam incident. Pakistan rejected the move, arguing that the Treaty contains no provision allowing unilateral suspension by either party.
Pakistan subsequently approached the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). On June 27, 2025, the Court issued what it termed a “Supplemental Award of Competence,” concluding that the Indus Waters Treaty remains in force and cannot be unilaterally suspended or held in abeyance by either party. The Court observed that the Treaty’s provisions do not permit unilateral suspension and emphasized that any attempt to halt dispute-resolution mechanisms would undermine the effectiveness and purpose of the agreement itself.The ruling reinforced a fundamental principle of international treaty law: agreements remain binding unless altered or terminated through procedures specifically provided within the treaty framework. Article XII of the Indus Waters Treaty stipulates that modification or termination requires mutual agreement between India and Pakistan. Consequently, the Court maintained that unilateral action cannot override treaty obligations.
Pakistan welcomed the ruling and called upon India to comply with both the Treaty and the dispute-resolution mechanisms established under it. India, however, has challenged the authority and jurisdiction of the PCA in the matter and has maintained its position regarding the Treaty.The controversy intensified further following remarks attributed to Indian Home Minister Amit Shah, who reportedly stated that India would seek to divert water from the Western Rivers towards Rajasthan through an extensive canal network. Such statements have generated serious concern in Pakistan, where officials view any attempt to significantly reduce downstream flows as a violation of treaty commitments and a threat to Pakistan’s water security.The broader issue extends beyond legal interpretations and political rhetoric. Water remains a critical strategic resource for both India and Pakistan. Agriculture, food security, energy production and livelihoods across the Indus Basin depend upon predictable river flows. Any action perceived as altering long-established arrangements inevitably carries significant geopolitical consequences.
At a time when climate change, population growth and water scarcity are increasing pressure on South Asia’s river systems, adherence to established legal frameworks becomes even more important. The Indus Waters Treaty has endured for sixty-six years because it provided a rules-based mechanism for managing one of the world’s most complex transboundary river systems. Any action that challenges its foundational principles risks introducing greater uncertainty into an already fragile regional environment.For Pakistan, the challenge now lies in pursuing diplomatic, legal and institutional avenues to safeguard its treaty rights. Equally, for both countries, preserving the credibility of the Indus Waters Treaty remains essential not only for bilateral relations but also for regional stability. In matters of water governance, timing and adherence to agreed rules are often as important as the resource itself. For Pakistan, therefore, time is indeed of the essence.
— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
