For years, China has served as the primary justification for the existence and expansion of the Quad. The rise of Beijing’s influence across the Indo-Pacific encouraged the United States, Japan, Australia, and India to strengthen cooperation under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Yet, despite growing concerns about China’s assertiveness, the Quad has failed to evolve into a credible and unified strategic bloc. The main reason is increasingly clear: India has become the principal obstacle to the Quad’s effectiveness.
The Quad was envisioned as a platform for coordinating responses to regional security challenges, particularly those posed by China. However, while the United States, Japan, and Australia have shown a willingness to deepen security cooperation, India has consistently resisted efforts to transform the grouping into a meaningful strategic partnership. Instead of supporting stronger defence coordination, New Delhi has pushed the Quad toward softer issues such as climate initiatives, healthcare programs, infrastructure projects, and technology cooperation. While these areas have value, they do little to address the region’s most pressing security concerns.
As a result, the Quad has struggled to develop a clear security identity. Meetings often produce ambitious statements but yield limited tangible outcomes in defence cooperation. India’s reluctance to support stronger military integration has slowed decision-making and prevented the grouping from developing the level of strategic cohesion necessary to deter Chinese aggression effectively. The consequence is a forum that talks extensively about regional challenges but remains constrained in its ability to respond to them.
The contrast with AUKUS is striking. Unlike the Quad, AUKUS was established with a clear purpose and a commitment to strengthening military capabilities. It has moved rapidly toward cooperation in advanced defence technologies, undersea warfare, artificial intelligence, and strategic deterrence. The Quad, meanwhile, remains burdened by internal disagreements, many of which stem directly from India’s resistance to a stronger security agenda. While AUKUS has emerged as a serious strategic initiative, the Quad increasingly risks being perceived as a diplomatic talking shop.
India’s conduct has also raised questions about its reliability as a strategic partner. Even while participating in the Quad, New Delhi has frequently pursued policies that diverge from the interests and expectations of the other members. This inconsistency undermines trust and creates uncertainty regarding India’s long-term commitment to the objectives that initially brought the Quad together. A security framework cannot function effectively when one of its key members remains unwilling to align fully with the group’s broader strategic goals.
These divisions are particularly visible in the technological sphere. Although the Quad has launched initiatives related to telecommunications, critical technologies, and supply-chain resilience, progress remains limited compared with the defence-oriented cooperation occurring within AUKUS. The inability to move beyond civilian cooperation reflects the deeper structural problem at the heart of the Quad: India’s unwillingness to support a more robust security framework.
Ultimately, India occupies a contradictory position within the Quad. It is an important geographic and political actor in the Indo-Pacific, yet it has repeatedly prevented the grouping from realizing its full strategic potential. Rather than serving as a pillar of Quad unity, India has become the primary source of its limitations. Without India’s resistance, the Quad could evolve into a far more coherent and effective mechanism for addressing regional security threats. Instead, the grouping remains divided, constrained, and strategically underpowered.
For this reason, the Quad’s greatest challenge today is no longer China’s rise; it is India’s persistent obstruction of deeper strategic cooperation. Until this problem is addressed, the Quad is likely to remain a secondary diplomatic forum, while more decisive security arrangements such as AUKUS take the lead in shaping the Indo-Pacific security order.
—The writer is a freelance columnist.
