The recent visit of Afghan Interim Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi to India (October 9–16, 2025) coincided with the military aggression of the Afghan Taliban regime along Pakistan’s western border.
Although Pakistan successfully repulsed the attacks and inflicted significant losses on the Taliban militia, the timing and nature of these developments suggest a coordinated plan between India and the Afghan Taliban directed against Pakistan. During his stay in India, Mr. Muttaqi adopted an unusually hostile tone toward Pakistan, echoing New Delhi’s rhetoric more like an Indian spokesperson than a foreign dignitary. His visit, despite UN sanctions on the Taliban regime reflects a deeper and forward-looking geopolitical alignment between India and the Afghan Taliban, aimed at Pakistan.
Following the ancient Indian strategist Chanakya’s maxim, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” India appears to have revived and deepened its engagement with the Taliban government. Historically, New Delhi maintained this strategic approach toward Pakistan since 1947. However, India’s relations with the Taliban regime (1996–2001) were hostile, given the Taliban’s Islamist orientation and their resistance to anti-Muslim regimes and Western alliances. Nonetheless, India’s intelligence agency; the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), quietly established contacts with Taliban figures during the early 2000s when India had a significant presence in Afghanistan under the US and NATO-led reconstruction mission.
As noted by Professor Happymon Jacob, India began openly engaging with the Taliban soon after they retook Kabul in August 2021. Some Taliban leaders reached out to Indian officials and RAW representatives, while others opposed such engagement, given Pakistan’s early support and logistical assistance during their takeover.Jacab further observes: “Delhi has few friends left to be trusted upon, across a large swath of the South Asia and even in Southeast Asia as well as China. In that geopolitical context Afghanistan is important for India where Taliban appear willing to play ball.” Besides, an Indian genera recently said; Afghan Taliban fighters can be hired as killers for a few thousand USDs; a claim that raises the question of why India would risk its own servicemen against Pakistan when proxy actors are available. FAK (TTP), together with Afghan Taliban militias, therefore appear to be among the instruments India is using to foment instability inside Pakistan.
Despite the Taliban’s unfriendly posture from the outset, Pakistan maintained diplomatic engagement with the regime for two key reasons: a) To restrain the activities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), now rebranded as Fitna al-Khawarij (FAK), which operates from Afghan territory with support from RAW and the defunct NDS and b) To preserve regional stability by maintaining cordial ties with the regime—unlike during the tenures of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, who remained openly hostile toward Pakistan. India’s invitation to Mr. Muttaqi this October seems to be part of a larger plan following its defeat in the brief four-day border conflict with Pakistan (May 6–10, 2025). Unable to confront Pakistan militarily, India appears to have sought indirect means by cultivating the Taliban and utilizing Afghan soil for subversive purposes.
Since its military setback in May 2025, India has felt increasingly isolated in South and Central Asia, where its hegemonic ambitions have alienated neighboring states. Ironically, despite the Taliban’s past hostility including the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, New Delhi extended a red-carpet reception to the Taliban’s foreign minister, representing an unholy alliance between a Hindu-extremist regime (BJP-RSS) and an extremist Islamic government. India’s goal is clear: to exploit the growing rift between Islamabad and Kabul, and to use the Taliban regime and its affiliated militant networks against Pakistan. Yet, Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan remains undeniable Pakistan continues to provide vital trade routes, humanitarian aid, healthcare, and employment opportunities to Afghan citizens. Historically, Pakistan has hosted over five million Afghan refugees and remains Afghanistan’s most accessible and supportive neighbor.
Contacts between Indian and Taliban officials have been steadily increasing since 2022. A key meeting took place in Dubai on January 8, 2025, between India’s Foreign Secretary and the Taliban’s Acting Foreign Minister. Both sides agreed to “revive historic ties” through trade, people-to-people contact, and cooperation in development projects including defense and security training. They also agreed to process trade via Iran’s Chabahar Port, managed by India.
According to a Wilson Centre report by Mirwais Balkhi, “BJP–Taliban Ties and Their Implications” (December 12, 2023), there have been multiple exchanges of delegations between India and the Taliban regime. During one such meeting, Taliban Interior Minister Anas Haqqani and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub urged New Delhi to reopen its embassy in Kabul and enhance military cooperation. Mullah Yaqub even expressed interest in “strategic and defense collaboration” with India marking a major policy shift from the Taliban’s past stance. Subsequently, India reopened its embassy in Kabul and signed a trade expansion agreement with the Taliban government in October 2022, allowing commerce through both air corridors and Chabahar Port.
The RAW–NDS alliance has long exploited Afghan territory to promote terrorism inside Pakistan. The Taliban regime has been abetting the terrorists of FAK and BLA from its soil to Pakistan.The evolving India-Taliban Regime and FAK (TTP) alignment poses a grave threat to Pakistan’s national security and regional stability. Pakistan must revisit its Afghan policy and intensify diplomatic engagement at international forums to expose this unholy nexus. Irrespective of the outcome of Doha talks, being hosted by Qatar, robust counter-terrorism measures, coupled with strategic outreach to friendly states, will be essential to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and neutralize emerging regional conspiracies.
— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
