IN 2014, Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) force composition of its fighter fleet was calculated at minimum 42.5 squadrons for implementing the Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan and lamenting two-front war mantra.
However, owing to gradual decommissioning of the aging fleet, IAF has been reduced to 32 squadrons which, according to the hosts of the India Today Conclave 2025, is likely to further shrink to 25-26 squadrons by 2030.The IAF’s current fleet is suffering from both qualitative and quantitative differential which becomes more pronounced when compared with nuclear armed neighbors equipped with more modern and more lethal aerial platforms. The IAF planned to address these deficiencies by simultaneously following two-pronged strategy: (i) inducting six squadrons of indigenously built LCA/Tejas (Mk-1, Mk-1A & Mk-2) of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL); (ii) by off-the-shelf purchase of 126 Rafale aircraft from France.
However, as far as indigenous production is concerned, LCA/Tejas project was recommended in 1969 and launched in 1984 and despite the lapse of over four decades of hard work and huge financial, technological and HR investments, HAL seems to be way short of its promised delivery targets and timelines. In the same regards, IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Amar Preet Singh has shown his frustration with the delayed decision-making by the political leadership and painfully slow progress by HAL. So far, almost 2 Squadrons of Mk-1 Tejas have been delivered to IAF while Mk-1A & Mk-2 have been planned to be produced from 2031 onwards. However, owing to issues pertaining to spare supportability and maintainability, the present serviceability/availability of these aircraft stands at less than 50%.Therefore, in the face of delayed production of Tejas, pursuance of the Defense Research and Development Organization’s (DRDO) Advance Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), seems an even distant possibility. Resultantly, IAF seems to be caught between indigenization and meeting the acute deficiencies of requisite force composition and so far, IAF’s indigenization efforts have proven to be a liability instead of being an asset. Ironically, IAF’s recent acquisitions are a piecemeal solution to a complex problem and do not commensurate with the aspired role within the overall geopolitical and geostrategic ambit of India. Procurement of weapon systems like Russian S-400 SAMs, French-built Rafale aircraft, USA’s Apache helicopters and P8Is ISR aircraft present acute deployment and employment limitations, especially in a potentially heavily contested and competitive airspace along the eastern and western frontiers.
India purchased five batteries of S-400 SAMs from Russia in 2018 for USD 5.5 billion out of which only three have been delivered while remaining two are planned to be delivered by 2027. Interestingly, S-400 SAMs weapon system constitutes four variants of missiles (60, 120, 250 & 400 km) out of which, the longest range missile is not part of the deal due to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) limitations. IAF has been caught in a serious dilemma between the optimum effectiveness vis-à-vis safety of S-400 SAMs in terms of their deployment. Relatively forward deployment can provide better engagement opportunities at trans-frontier ranges, however, it presents serious vulnerabilities against adversary’s long-range precision guided and anti-radiation stand-off weapons. Neutralization of IAF’s two S-400 batteries during the May 2025 M’arka-e-Haq is a testimony to such dilemma. Secondly, optimum employment of S-400 SAMs in a heavily contested air space where contiguity of borders and positive identification between the friend and foe within the large number of aircraft also presents serious challenges to avoid fratricide. Therefore, IAF is caught in a catch-22 paradox to deploy and employ S-400 SAMs either as an asset or a liability.
Similarly, IAF purchased 36 Rafale aircraft from France for almost USD 9 billion in 2016 which were delivered from 2019 to 2022. Granting 90% serviceability/availability rate, maximum 32 Rafale aircraft would be available to IAF at one given time to undertake/support offensive and defensive air operations simultaneously across/along its border with Pakistan. Given the fact that Rafale aircraft has serious interoperability limitations with other IAF platforms, force multipliers and command and control centers, therefore, it would add another layer of complexity towards its optimal performance, especially against technically, operationally and numerically compatible adversary. Such a precarious situation would get further complicated if IAF is compelled to operate simultaneously in a two-front war scenario. Meaning by, such an operational situation would leave IAF with either a piecemeal employment across the Western and Eastern borders thus making these high-tech platforms further vulnerable or IAF would have to opt out from one of the war fronts at the cost of other. Thus, despite being very potent aircraft, Rafael’s employment would become cost-prohibitive and may turn out to be a liability instead of being an asset.
IAF has inducted numerous heavy transport platforms—including American C-17 Globemaster-III and C-130J, Russian IL-76, IL-78 and Antonov AN-32, British HS-748, Spanish C-295MW and German Dornier 228—worth over USD 15 billion to achieve strategic airlift for two-front war scenarios. However, recent tri-services exercises revealed significant shortfalls in moving air assets efficiently between Eastern and Western fronts, even in a peaceful setting, indicating serious limitations in wartime conditions. To meet operational demands, the IAF would need to at least double its airlift capacity or lower its aspirations. These challenges, combined with delays in indigenization, growing qualitative gaps with regional competitors China and Pakistan and the dilemma of balancing self-reliance with off-the-shelf acquisitions, underscore the precariousness of India’s modernization efforts.
—The writer is a retired Air Officer from the PAF and currently serving at the DHA Suffa University (DSU), Karachi.
