In May 1986, Parachinar Valley reverberated with the roar of F-16’s engines, as Squadron Leader Abdul Hameed Qadri navigated the rugged terrain, looking to intercept hostile Soviet aircraft. These Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions were routine for the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) during the 1980s, as Islamabad walked a tightrope between an uneasy peace and a possible spill over of the Afghan war. Most commentators regard the battles of Badin, Logewala, Sargodha and more recently Operation Bunyanum Marsoos as the finest hours of the PAF. Yet, few remember the aerial skirmishes at the frontier, which represent one of the most complex operations in the nascent history of Pakistan. These Aerial engagements were constrained by Rules of Engagement (ROE), technical limitations and compounded by political ambiguity.
The political backdrop of these aerial engagements was set during the ‘Afghan Jihad’ era at the height of the Cold War. President Zia Ul Haq played a crucial role in organising a resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force (DRAAF) retaliated by conducting air raids across the Pak-Afghan border. These largely consisted of Sukhoi Su-25 and Su-22 aircraft, which bombed Afghan refugee camps, causing civilian casualties.
In response to the DRAAF violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, PAF deployed F-6 Fighters, which were based on older Chinese versions of the MiG-19, capable of reaching Mach 1 speed. Consequently, the PAF had difficulty in interdicting Soviet aircraft due to the slower speed of its fighters and insufficient radar coverage on the Western border. In 1981, the Status quo on the frontier changed when President Zia successfully convinced the Reagan administration to authorise the sale of 40 F-16s, which were to be delivered between 1983 and 1986. These fourth-generation aircraft were equipped with advanced avionics such as the airborne intercept radars, fly-by-wire controls, better weaponry and were faster with a higher rate of climb. This made the F-16 a superior aircraft to its Soviet contenders, as they could interdict hostile aircraft using 20 millimetre Vulcan canons and AIM-9L missiles, which could be fired from the front quarters.
Apart from technical restrictions, the PAF had to operate under strict operational parameters, as Pakistan could not afford an escalation against the Soviets. The ROE detailed that hostile aircraft could only be targeted after positive identification (PID) of airspace violations across the Pak-Afghan border. To meet these strict requirements, the pilot must demonstrate superior situational awareness and achieve PID through the intelligence provided by the ground control and constant radio communication with friendly aircraft. To successfully engage hostiles, the pilot was requested to have an adept understanding of intercept geometry, sustain energy state, anticipate target egress manoeuvres and maintain fire discipline. These complexities were to be undertaken while operating in a narrow air engagement zone (AEZ) under fuel constraints.
To combat the growing Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace, the PAF had primarily adopted a reactive defensive posture along its western border, which would intercept any hostile aircraft. As such, regular CAP missions were assigned to the Number Nine Squadron (Griffins) and Number Fourteen Squadron (Tail Choppers), which conducted sorties along the border, equipped with the F-16 A (Fighting Falcon). On 15 March 1986, Squadron Leader Qadri from Nine Squadron spotted two soviet Su-22 aircraft, after positive identification he flew his F-16 within six miles of the target and launched his AIM-9L (sidewinder), which failed to hit the target. This prompted the hostile aircraft to retreat towards the Afghan border, but not before Qadri fired his second missile, which curled and hit the target. He pursued the second Su-22 and conducted a high yo-yo (a manoeuvre to gain or lose speed), shooting down the second retreating aircraft with an M61A1 Vulcan Cannon.
The skirmish at the Parachinar valley set the tone of air combat between the PAF and the DRAAF, which was fought at the edge of grey zone operations. In another encounter, on 30 March 1987, Wing Commander Abdul Razzaq shot down an AN-26, widely believed to be an Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) aircraft. Likewise, on 16 April 1987, Squadron Leader Badar Ul Islam, a veteran from the 1965 and 1971 wars, shot a Su-22 near the Thal desert. On 4 August 1988, Squadron Leader Athar Bokhari shot down a Soviet Su-25 fighter aircraft; the captured pilot was Colonel Alexander Rutskoy, who later became the Vice President of Russia in 1991. On 12 September 1988, Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mahmood destroyed two MiG-23s in the south of Chitral and shot a Su-22 on 3 November 1999, marking the last kill of the war. Overall, the Number Nine Squadron shot down three aircraft while Number Fourteen Squadron had five confirmed kills, raising the total tally to eight enemy aircraft destroyed during the course of the Afghan war.
While the air skirmishes of the frontier may be lesser-known chapters of the PAF, their lessons are important as they emphasise the fire discipline, strategic restraint and proportionality. The professionalism of the pilots and their leadership displayed strong compliance, operating within their operational parameters. This ensured that the sovereignty of Pakistani airspace was protected without the risk of being pulled into a larger conflict. To this day the valley of Parachinar carries the legacy of these kills, forever cementing the status of PAF as the vanguard of Pakistan.
Syed Ahmed Ali is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), in Islamabad, Pakistan. He can be reached at [email protected]
