‘A whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again’, these were the words which President Trump used on 7 April 2026 in what was widely believed to be a veiled threat of using nuclear weapons to annihilate Iran. This casual invocation of civilisation destruction is not limited to ‘Trumpian demagogy’, but rather reveals a deeper desensitisation towards nuclear weapons. The normalisation of this discourse represents an existential threat to humanity and challenges the status of atomic bombs as an ‘unthinkable weapon’. The use of nuclear coercion as an instrument of state policy represents a slippery slope towards the normalisation of nuclear threats which may ultimately spiral into an all-out nuclear war.
On 6 August 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb against Imperial Japan. The effects were devastating, 78,000 in Hiroshima and 40,000 people in Nagasaki died instantly. The aftermath of the nuclear bombing led to an additional death of 90,000 people, who suffered from widespread buns, radiation sickness, genetic mutation of unborn infants and physical injuries. This episode deeply shocked the world and started a flurry of weapons regime and arms control initiatives, which gradually lost steam in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War generation has grown accustomed to a period of extended nuclear stability which have caused an erosion of collective memory and has fostered a deeply rooted status quo bias that has diminished the fear of nuclear weapons. As a result, the current discourse around nuclear weapons has been subject to the influence of escalatory policies, ideological rhetoric and increased belligerency under a nuclear overhang. To re-sensitise humanity to the horrors of nuclear war, the commemoration of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August represents an ideal opportunity to reaffirm their commitment against atomic weapons.
Apart from the erosion of collective memory, the collapse of arms control regimes and rules based order has provided an ideal environment for nuclear coercion, where states can take escalatory steps without fear of reprisal or legal accountability. In a situational of International anarchy, it is the most dominant states which set the precedent of compliance. On 13 December 2001, President George W. Bush announced that United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This had massive implications for nuclear stability, as the ABM treaty provided mutual vulnerability which discouraged states from engaging in a nuclear arms race. With the collapse of the treaty, North Korea, China and Russia began developing sophisticated ballistic missile systems, which created a more volatile international security landscape. Similarly, President Trump’s withdrawal from Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 further destabilised the deterrence architecture. The INF treaty eliminated ground based ballistic and cruise missiles which had a range between 500 to 5,500 kilometres. This provision was an essential part of European deterrence as long ranges ensured that there was enough response time, which is essential to discourage counterforce strategies. Likewise, President Trump’s insistence on the resumption of underground nuclear test represents a violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Aside from obvious environmental contamination, nuclear testing also incurs the risk of nuclear proliferation.
The collapse of arms control regimes is driven by the growing overconfidence of states perceived capability to manage escalation ladder. This has led to riskier strategic behaviour, reflected in the normalisation of attacks against nuclear power plants (NPP). Attacks on the Zaporizhzhia and Iranian NPP indicate the erosion of strategic redlines which were established during the Cold War. Such developments are particularly alarming even for nuclear armed states, as these precedents could lead to the development of comprehensive counter force strategy. This could destabilise established deterrence between states, as adversaries may be more inclined to launch a pre-emptive strike, triggering a nuclear retaliation which could eventually culminate in mutually assured destruction (MAD).
Nuclear coercion, erosion of rules based order and overconfidence of states in their ability to manage escalation all represent threats to strategic stability. Deterrence, while reliable is often taken for granted by the international community, where the use nuclear weapons seems unrealistic prospect. Yet, the very foundation that sustains deterrence and makes it a viable framework is the existence of international norms. The erosion of these norms and principles are therefore not an abstract or moralistic concern, but a real threat to the very survival of humanity itself. It is thus in this very spirit, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August is not merely a historical event but as a foundational principle of renouncing nuclear aggression, embodied in the words ‘Never Again’.
Author’s Bio: Syed Ahmed Ali is a research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. He writes on technopolitics and can be reached at [email protected]
Keywords: Nuclear, Deterrence, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Security
