Democracy is dead—long live democracy is a modern adaptation of the monarchist proclamation, “The king is dead, long live the king.”
It is used to highlight the failure of existing democratic systems while affirming belief in the ideal, principle and potential of democracy as a form of governance. The phrase reflects the tension between the perceived decline of traditional democratic institutions and the enduring ideal of self-governance. It underscores the severe threats posed by the “Deep State” alongside opportunities for reinvention and reform. Experts widely agree that rising autocracies endanger democratic processes, noting that democracy is in global decline but not destined for an “irrevocable fate.” The future depends on whether societies can adopt robust regulatory and governance mechanisms and reinvent democratic participation for the public good.
In the present day democracies, nearly all undemocratic regimes hold some kind of elections. Such exercises are often dismissed as transparent attempts to garner legitimacy and build a democratic veneer for authoritarian rule. But might these elections, imperfect as they are, actually further the cause of democracy? Many scholars are now arguing that they can, at least under some circumstances. The title of a 2009 book edited by Staffan Lindberg sums it up neatly: Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition. And a new paper by Daniela Donno evaluates the conditions in which authoritarian elections can lead to more democracy. Flawed elections are also a critical part of the “competitive authoritarianism” defined in 2002 by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way.
In a new CFR book, Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic Lessons from Democratic Transitions, authors find that imperfect elections under authoritarianism can indeed advance democracy “…even if elections are flawed or fraudulent, that they are held, gives these countries a better chance at democracy, unlike the situation in closed single-party regimes, military dictatorships or absolute monarchy.” Indeed, the process of voting helps deepen and entrench democratic processes and develop traditions, norms and expectations of citizen participation. Moreover, elections can unleash demands for change that can spiral out of the regime’s control.
Four examples from the book—two in Latin America and two in Eastern Europe—illustrate these dynamics. In Brazil, the military regime held elections to enhance its legitimacy by allowing an opposition party it believed it could control, but defections during a deep economic crisis led to the unexpected 1985 victory of Tancredo Neves and restored civilian rule. In Mexico, the long-ruling PRI held regular elections to maintain appearances, even helping the opposition win seats, but an economic downturn enabled opposition forces to press for more transparent elections, paving the way for the PRI’s defeat in the 2000 presidential election. In Poland, Communist leaders believed they had designed rules guaranteeing them a majority after Round Table talks, yet unexpected defections and strong opposition support allowed the Solidarity movement to form a government instead.
Similarly, a rigged 2004 election triggered Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, as hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Kiev against the faulty vote, securing a re-vote that elected Viktor Yushchenko. Although Ukraine’s democratic advance has not endured, the episode shows the power of flawed elections as triggers for change. A farcical election and brutal state violence make Tanzania another example of a government not fit for purpose, while in Nigeria the question is not whether violence in the north is motivated by religion, but why commentators are reluctant to admit it.
Of course, policymakers should not ignore electoral shortcomings and must call out manipulation and fraud. Indeed, it is the hypocritical juxtaposition of democracy’s promise and the reality faced by those who are excluded and disenfranchised that often sparks popular uprisings. In the United States, the dis-function between rhetoric and reality proved a powerful force for change during the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Recognizing the role sham elections can play in furthering democratic progress, reformers interested in democratization should pressure autocratic governments to hold at least some kind of vote.
Presently many countries remain less than democratic. But if history is any guide, their elections could someday provide surprising momentum for democratic change—and give citizens valuable experience that could help them sustain democracy if and when it emerges. The increasing inter-disconnectedness of a broad range of authoritarian states has been overshadowed in recent years by writings about the axis of China, Russia and North Korea and how their links could cause global upheaval. Several of these writings call these countries an “axis”—of upheaval, autocracy or another term suggesting their work together with massive negative impacts. For instance Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine of the Center for New American Security have written about how the big autocrats (as they falsely allege) impact the Ukraine war. They also discuss how, more broadly, they are coordinating their military and diplomatic activities to possibly overturn the current international system.
Writing in a similar vein, the academic Hal Brands, distinguished professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, notes that “China and Russia have a ‘no-limits’ strategic partnership.” He further argues that the big four “intensify pressure on an imperiled international system to expand their cooperation in the future. By sharing more advanced defense technology or collaborating more extensively in crisis or conflict, they could upset the global equilibrium in even more disturbing ways.”
—The writer is Former Civil Servant and Consultant (ILO) & International Organisation for Migration and author of seven books.
