China & Ladakh: Modi’s Kashmir policy backfires
AFTER all, Modi’s unilateralist Kashmir policy is boomeranging back. While manifold rounds of negotiations between Indian and Chinese military commanders since a deadly clash in June last year in Ladakh had helped contain tensions and led to troops pulling back from some disputed areas, efforts to disengage from other hotspots stalled yet, thereby paving the way for any consequential dagger drawn between the two nuclear — armed states — China and India.
The still-unresolved Ladakh crisis has created a new geopolitical conflict—marked by China’s strategic actions in Ladakh— accompanied by an increased militarisation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This new geopolitical and strategic reality imposes a far-reaching impact in the region.
‘’Won’t let any attempt to change the status quo along India’s border’’, said Indian Army Chief Gen MM Naravane (Jan 15).
Though officially, since May 2020, India and China remain intermittently engaged in a tense military stand-off at multiple points in eastern Ladakh along the LAC, New Delhi has claimed that Beijing amassed military manpower and equipment near the border in violation of border agreements, accusing that the Indian military was not allowed on its regular patrols by Chinese soldiers, thereby also pointing the most serious clash took place in June 2020 at the Galwan Valley which left 20 Indian soldiers dead. At least four Chinese soldiers were killed, according to official Chinese statements.
In contrast to India, China incurred only marginal material costs; it was probably more concerned with the prospect of continued deterioration in its relationship with India. Given the cost/benefit analysis of the current crisis situation, Beijing holds a very dominating position over New Delhi.
“The indications are very clear, that the Chinese are not going to move back from their position of April 2020 which is what India has been insisting upon.
They have put the onus on India by saying it is up to us to adopt a responsible position,” said Jayadeva Ranade, who heads the Centre of China’s Analysis and Strategy.
“It basically means that India now has no option to manning two hostile borders because this situation is here to stay.” Despite the apparent beginnings of disengagement, Chinese forces remain posted in some areas previously controlled by India.
The most operationally valuable of these is the Depsang Plain in north-eastern Ladakh. Privately, Indian officials have been sharing the view that given the complexities of diplomatically or militarily returning to the status quo ante, the permanent deployments may possibly be their best option to manage the crisis.
Notably, the long-standing Indo-China border skirmish over the demarcation of the Himalayan frontier between the two countries came to a head- on Oct. 20, 1962, with a massive Chinese offensive both in the Ladakh area of north-east Kashmir ardently claimed by China as part of Sinkiang province and across the McMahon Line in the North-East Frontier Agency (N.E.F.A.).
Whereas in Ladakh the Chinese did not advance beyond the areas claimed by them as part of Chinese territory, at the eastern end of the Himalayan border powerful Chinese forces made a 100-mile advance into the NEFA which brought them almost to the plains of Assam before hostilities ceased on 21 November , when the Chinese announced a unilateral cease-fire and the withdrawal of their troops to positions “12 miles beyond the line of actual control which existed between India and China on 07 November 1959’’.
The Chinese statement, by implication, appeared to suggest that the Chinese were prepared to withdraw to the McMahon Line at the eastern end of the Himalayan frontier while continuing to hold their gains in Ladakh at the western end.
Heavy casualties were suffered by both sides during the month’s fighting (20 Oct to 21 Nov ).
And yet subsequently, India’s actions, after the revocation of article 370 in blatant denial of the UNSC resolutions have offered ample impetus for the Chinese deployments in the Galwan valley-affiliated Ladakh territory. China has reinforced its troops and developed supporting infrastructure on its side of the LAC.
Chris Biggers, the director of mission applications at the radio frequency (RF) geospatial intelligence firm Hawk Eye 360, also noted that despite official disengagement at the friction points of Galwan, Gogra and Pangong Tso, Chinese forces continued to remain “near the border at their previous turnaround and throughout the Galwan valley and east of Kongka La”.
In view of Biggers, it helps China to geostrategic ally operationalise its new Theatre Commands and Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), providing a real-world scenario in an expeditionary setting.
The People’s Liberation Army( PLA) — mirroring the Indian Army — has constructed winterised housing and logistics to sustain its recently deployed forces for the long term, along with fixed weapons positions such as airfields and surface-to-air missile systems.
The fact on the record is obvious enough that despite the Indo-China war ceasefire along with the LAC in 1962, there remained high potentials as far as the Chinese stand on the border along the Ladakh in Kashmir. Veritably, because of the pacifist Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai‘s policy of peaceful co-existence with neighbours, the issue was hibernated.
And yet subsequently, India’s actions, after the revocation of Article 370, have offered ample impetus for the Chinese deployments in the Galwan valley-affiliated Ladakh territory. China has reinforced its troops and developed supporting infrastructure on its side of the LAC.
Both China and Pakistan rejected to accept Kashmir’s status quo ante. China has taken a tactical decision to deploy a regiment of robot army in the coldest eastern Ladakh region.
According to the Foreign Policy Magazine, ‘’While pundits agree that Asia is the site of an ongoing shift in the global power balance, what gets little attention is how New Delhi’s reworking of military priorities—forced by events on the disputed Sino-Indian border—will have far-reaching geopolitical consequences for the world.’’
To prevent the impending nuclear escalation along with LAC and the LoC, New Delhi must offer a comprehensive peace dialogue with both China and Pakistan on the disputed status of Kashmir.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
