For years, geography seemed to give India an advantage that diplomacy could not easily challenge. Bangladesh shares a long border with India, depends heavily on regional connectivity, and maintains extensive economic links with its larger neighbour. Yet geography may bring countries together; it does not give one country the right to decide how the other should conduct its affairs. That is the message increasingly emerging from Dhaka, and New Delhi would be unwise to ignore it.
Bangladesh is not turning its back on India. Rather, it is attempting to redefine the relationship. The difference is important. Dhaka appears willing to cooperate with New Delhi, but increasingly on the basis of sovereign equality rather than political expectations. The proposed visit of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to India illustrates this changing dynamic. Bangladesh has indicated that such a visit requires a “conducive environment” first, making clear that high-level engagement cannot be separated from unresolved bilateral concerns.
At the centre of the dispute is former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who remains in India after leaving Bangladesh following the 2024 political upheaval. Dhaka has repeatedly requested her extradition, while India maintains that the request is under examination through its legal procedures. Bangladesh has also objected to Hasina making political statements from Indian territory. For Dhaka, this is no longer simply a question concerning one individual. It has become intertwined with sovereignty, domestic political legitimacy, and the principle of non-interference.
This explains why Bangladesh’s present approach cannot simply be reduced to an “anti-India” shift. It is better understood as a search for strategic autonomy. Dhaka’s emerging “Bangladesh First” outlook seeks constructive relations with all major partners without becoming dependent on any one of them. Its expanding engagement with China demonstrates this diversification. Tarique Rahman’s 2026 China visit produced agreements and memorandums covering trade, investment, connectivity, and other areas, illustrating Bangladesh’s willingness to broaden its economic and diplomatic choices.
The unresolved Teesta dispute further exposes the limitations of India’s traditional approach. For years, Bangladesh has sought a water-sharing arrangement, while the issue has remained unsettled. Meanwhile, Dhaka has explored Chinese cooperation on the Teesta River project. The lesson for New Delhi is straightforward: when long-standing concerns remain unresolved, neighbouring states will naturally search for alternatives.
What is changing, therefore, is not Bangladesh’s geography but its diplomatic psychology. Dhaka increasingly appears unwilling to accept a “big brother, small brother” relationship. India may remain Bangladesh’s most consequential neighbour, but being the larger power does not automatically make its preferences acceptable.
This is a moment of strategic choice for New Delhi. India can either interpret Bangladesh’s growing autonomy as a threat and attempt to regain its previous influence, or it can recognise that a confident neighbour is ultimately a more reliable partner than a dependent one. If India genuinely wants stable and durable relations with Dhaka, it must replace assumptions of influence with genuine reciprocity.
Bangladesh is not closing the door on India; it is simply insisting that both countries enter through it as equals. That may be uncomfortable for New Delhi, but accepting this reality could be the beginning of a healthier relationship and, perhaps, a more balanced South Asia.
—The writer is a freelance columnist
