AFGHANISTAN stands once again at the edge of internal chaos. Barely four years after Taliban’s dramatic return to power, fault lines within the movement are widening into open rivalries. Power struggle, tribal divides and conflicting ideological visions are eroding what was once portrayed as a unified Islamic Emirate. Beyond Taliban’s inner circle, exiled opposition figures such as Ahmad Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are quietly preparing to exploit the Taliban’s internal rift. If current trends continue, Afghanistan could descend into another civil war — one with devastating consequences not only for its people but for Pakistan and the wider region’s fragile economic and security landscape.
Taliban today are not the cohesive force they appeared to be in August 2021. Behind facade of unity lies a simmering struggle between Kandahari faction led by Hibatullah and Haqqani Network based in eastern Afghanistan, under Sirajuddin Haqqani. Kandahari faction, representing traditionalist core of Taliban, dominates ideological and religious apparatus of the regime. Akhundzada rules from Kandahar, insulated from Kabul, issuing decrees that often reflect rigid clerical orthodoxy — such as restrictions on women’s education and employment. His faction is supported by key figures in Taliban’s religious council and southern tribal networks.
Opposing this faction is more politically pragmatic Haqqani Network, controlling much of the security apparatus, intelligence and parts of Kabul’s administration. Sirajuddin Haqqani and his allies advocate for limited international engagement, investment and some moderation in governance to avoid total isolation. This internal tug-of-war has intensified over appointments, resource allocation and relations with neighbouring countries. Although Akhundzada retains ultimate authority, Haqqanis have gradually expanded influence within interior ministry and among younger Taliban commanders. In recent months, reports of armed standoffs between units loyal to Kandahar and Haqqani fighters have surfaced, hinting at a deeper fracture that could erupt into open confrontation.
Taliban’s political opponents — many of whom fled the country after 2021 — are regrouping. National Resistance Front (NRF) led by Ahmad Massoud, has been reorganizing in northern provinces and Panjshir Valley. Massoud’s forces, though limited in strength, maintain symbolic importance as last bastion of armed resistance. With growing dissatisfaction among ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, NRF could become a rallying point if Taliban’s internal divisions deepen. Former Uzbek warlord Dostum is also believed to be mobilizing his old networks in northern Afghanistan, particularly around Jowzjan and Faryab. Though now in exile, Dostum retains tribal and militia influence that could reemerge if the security situation deteriorates.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — once a Taliban ally and now a political opportunist — is reportedly in contact with both factions and foreign backers, seeking to position himself as a broker or spoiler depending on how events unfold. His shifting loyalties make him unpredictable, but his long history in Afghan politics ensures he will not remain on the sidelines. Among these actors, Ahmad Massoud’s NRF currently appears to be the most organized, but Haqqani Network remains strongest armed faction overall within Afghanistan. Should Taliban leadership collapse or splinter, Haqqanis are well-positioned — militarily and politically — to assert dominance over rival groups.
Given these dynamics, Afghanistan appears perilously close to another civil war. Combination of tribal rivalries, economic collapse and ideological discord is explosive. If civil war reignites, Afghanistan’s fragile infrastructure and humanitarian conditions would deteriorate rapidly. Millions could be displaced again, triggering a new wave of refugees toward Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia. The country could once again become a breeding ground for transnational extremist groups such as ISIS-Khorasan, which already conducts frequent attacks on Taliban forces and civilians.
For Pakistan, a renewed Afghan civil war would be catastrophic. Islamabad’s western border would become unstable, reopening routes for cross-border militancy and arms trafficking. Pakistan faces growing wave of terrorist attacks linked to TTP, which operates from Afghan soil under the Taliban’s watch. Afghan civil war would provide TTP and similar groups more space to regroup and launch attacks inside Pakistan. TAPI gas pipeline and CPEC would be jeopardized. Both depend on cross-border stability and international confidence in Afghanistan’s transit corridors. Civil war would make such projects unviable, depriving Pakistan and its neighbours of potential energy and trade revenues at a time when regional economies are desperate for growth.
The wider region would not escape unscathed. Iran, China and Central Asian States fear that Afghan instability could spill across borders. Beijing’s Belt and Road ambitions in the region, including potential integration with CPEC, would be delayed. Taliban still have time to avert collapse, but only if they can bridge their internal divides. Leadership in Kandahar seems unwilling to compromise, dismissing calls for political inclusion and regional balance. Without genuine reconciliation within the movement and engagement with ethnic minorities, Afghanistan’s political fabric may again tear apart. Another Afghan implosion would erase two decades of regional development hopes and fuel the very extremism that both sought to contain. Afghanistan’s internal rifts are no longer a hidden power struggle — they are the warning tremors of another possible civil war. And if history is any guide, the shockwaves will not stop at the Afghan border.
—The writer is editor, political analyst and author of several books based in Islamabad.
