THE flow of water, often a symbol of life and shared prosperity, is fast becoming a flashpoint between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
With nearly 80% of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s agriculture dependent on the Kabul River system, the upstream dam-building ambitions of Afghanistan, reportedly fueled by external geopolitical interests, pose an existential threat to Pakistan’s water security and regional stability. Afghanistan is a mosaic of five river basins, including the Indus–Kabul and Helmand. Critically, Pakistan and Afghanistan share nine rivers, supplying a significant portion of Pakistan’s water needs. The total annual average inflow from Afghanistan into Pakistan is approximately 23 million Acre-Feet (MAF), with a massive 17.5 MAF pouring from the Kabul River alone.
This interdependence is complicated by the Chitral River, which flows from Pakistan into Afghanistan, joins the Kabul and then re-enters Pakistan. Despite this intricate, life-sustaining shared resource, no formal Pak–Afghan water treaty exists, unlike the globally recognized Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between Pakistan and India. Failed talks between 2003 and 2014 left the crucial issue of flow-sharing unresolved. Afghanistan’s current water usage from shared rivers is relatively low at 1.8 MAF but is projected to double to 3.6 MAF by 2030 due to planned dam projects. The stakes are set to rise dramatically. Afghanistan currently operates 21 dams, 11 of which are on the Indus–Kabul basin. However, plans are underway to build 12 new dams and over 200 hydropower projects, requiring a 3 billion dollar investment. While Afghanistan’s government remains under sanctions, statements about constructing dams on the Kunar and Kabul Rivers suggest external encouragement.
This is where the geopolitical undercurrents surface. Pakistan views the timing and execution of this dam-building drive as benefiting India, an actor looking to reassert influence through indirect means. The concern is that Afghanistan’s outreach to India and its attempts to pressure Pakistan into silence regarding TTP/BLA terrorists hiding across the border reflect a coordinated political design. At India’s behest, this dam-building is aimed at undermining Pakistan’s water security as a downstream nation.
The impact of new upstream dams is substantial: a potential 5% reduction in Pakistan’s Indus Basin flow, translating to an agricultural shortfall of 0.75 MAF in Rabi and 3.7 MAF in Kharif seasons. Pakistan holds legal rights to equitable water use, protection from significant upstream harm, prior consultation on Afghan projects and transparent data sharing for cooperative management. Interrupting water flows without mutual agreement, as seen in the volatile Nile basin dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia, is a recipe for conflict.
Pakistan respects Afghanistan’s right to use its shared waters, but this must be achieved through mutual agreement. The IWT offers a pragmatic model for the two nations to adopt. Water sharing is too critical to be left to the whims of politics and should be prioritized on the agenda of multilateral forums like the Moscow Format and the Trilateral (China, Pakistan, Afghanistan) mechanism.
The shared rivers between Pakistan and Afghanistan are a common lifeline. A sustainable solution requires moving past political maneuvers and establishing a formal, equitable water-sharing treaty. The alternative is a dangerous escalation, where the quest for survival could potentially ignite a future water war.
—The writer is an alumnus of QAU, MPhil scholar and a freelance columnist, based in Islamabad.
