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Saturday, November 21, 2026

India’s Precision Paradox

Indias Precision Paradox

Ayeza Areej

When technology becomes central to military dominance, warfare can appear more predictable and controllable than it actually is. In the contemporary world, precision strikes and limited military operations create an illusion of contained engagements, which encourages states to employ military force while disregarding the possibility of wider repercussions. This reflects the Ulrich Beck’s idea of risk compensation, whereby confidence in technology’s ability to mitigate risks can encourage greater risk-taking behavior. The paradox is that capabilities intended to make military operations more precise and controlled may instead embolden states to engage risky kinetic entanglements. In the South Asia region, this is a dangerous assumption as even limited military incursions between the two nuclear-armed states can generate escalation risks that neither side may be able to control.

This paradox is increasingly evident in India’s military posture towards Pakistan. New Delhi’s repeated resort to air strikes and limited military incursions reflects misplaced confidence in its ability to employ calibrated force without triggering uncontrollable escalation. This approach is reflected in India’s increasing defense budget, which experienced a surge from INR 6.2 trillion to FY 2024–25 to INR 7.85 trillion in FY 2026–27. More importantly, the allocation for Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) increased substantially from INR 268.17 billion in FY 2025–26 to INR 291 billion in FY 2026–27. This magnitude of defense expenditure highlights New Delhi’s interest in the research and development for indigenous defense and sophisticated technologies to attain strategic ascendency.

This focus on tech-driven invincibility is also reflected in India’s Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018, which emphasizes surgical strikes, punitive destruction and force modernization. The 2026 edition of the doctrine further reinforces the very same mindset as it emphasizes on technology-enabled warfare by prioritizing precision capabilities, unmanned systems, AI and multi-domain operations.

Consequently, India appears to view surgical strikes and limited wars as repeatable instruments of statecraft for achieving domestic political objectives. The 2019 Balakot strikes and the operational shortcomings of Operation Sindoor (2025) illustrate India’s growing willingness to employ stand-off precision capabilities against Pakistan. However, confidence in advanced military capabilities creates a perception of military superiority, which ultimately incentivizes pre-emptive aggressive actions.

India’s Operation Sindoor exposed this gap between the perceived control offered by technology and the realities of military confrontation. During the aerial confrontation, Pakistan shot down four Rafales, one Mirage 2000, one Su-30 and one MiG-29, which proved to be major operational and reputational setbacks for New Delhi. It demonstrated that the ability to initiate a precision operation does not necessarily translate into the ability to dictate its course or outcome.

Despite suffering serious setbacks, India has continued to accelerate its military modernization under domestic political pressure, which suggests that the May 2025 confrontation has not fundamentally altered its approach to the use of force. The subsequent procurement initiatives indicate that New Delhi’s determination to strengthen its behavioral logic of risk compensation by expanding its conventional military options. Following the Pahalgam episode, India’s Ministry of Defense released its Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) in September 2025. The document envisions a future military built around AI, space, cyber and unmanned systems, alongside preparedness for nuclear threats. It identifies AI-enabled loitering and stealth drones, reportedly capable of operating at ranges of approximately 1,500 km and altitudes of up to 60,000 feet, as well as jamming platforms designed to counter drone swarms within a 15 km radius.

India’s efforts to expand its indigenous precision-strike arsenal are equally significant. Its decision to pursue domestic production of approximately 600 HAMMER precision-guided weapons marks another step towards greater self-reliance in air-launched munitions. These modular weapons are expected to equip the Indian Air Force’s Rafale and Tejas fleets. Similarly, on 7 May 2026, DRDO and the Indian Air Force conducted the maiden flight trial of the Tactical Advanced Range Augmentation (TARA) weapon. It is India’s first indigenous glide weapon system designed to convert unguided warheads into precision-guided munitions. Its satellite-aided variant reportedly achieves a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 20 meters and its imaging infrared variant offers accuracy of less than 3 meters.

India’s missile capabilities are developing along the same trajectory. On 5 November 2026, DRDO conducted a successful user-evaluation flight test of the Pralay quasi-ballistic missile. The solid-fueled, canisterized and road-mobile conventional missile has a reported range of 150–500 km, a warhead capacity of 350–1,000 kg and a CEP of less than 10 meters. Such developments demonstrate India’s determination to improve the accuracy, reach and availability of its conventional strike options. It illustrates how India’s pursuit of advanced military and precision technologies fosters technological overconfidence, distorts the risk perceptions of military and political leaders, and ultimately produces more aggressive behavioral outcomes in the use of force.

However, India’s overconfidence on military technology to limit collateral damage and contain military operations may lower the perceived costs of using force. Therefore, technological advances intended to reduce operational risks can inadvertently encourage more aggressive strategic behavior. In case of India Pakistan nuclear dyad, this mindset can have serious consequences. The designation of an operation as surgical, limited or proportionate does not determine how the leadership of the targeted state interprets it. An attack that appears geographically contained to the initiator may be perceived as a significant strategic threat by the receiving state, prompting retaliation and impacting strategic stability. Moreover, ambiguity surrounding the nature and objectives of an attack, particularly against dual-capable military infrastructure, could complicate an already fragile escalation environment. The danger lies in the assumption that technological confidence can provide control over an inherently uncertain escalation process, even though not every limited strike will inevitably lead to an all-out war.

Thus, India’s calls for Operation Sindoor 2.0 and the normalization of military action risk institutionalizing a cycle of brinkmanship in which each confrontation fuels an arms race and drives further military modernization, retaliation and counter-retaliation. Ultimately, technological superiority may enhance the ability to strike, but it does not guarantee the ability to control escalation. This distinction is particularly consequential in nuclearized South Asia because miscalculations can quickly extend beyond the limits of a conventional conflict. India must recognize that precision does not equate to strategic control, and that the confidence to initiate politically motivated surgical strikes does not ensure the ability to contain its consequences.

Ayeza Areej is a researcher at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS). She earned a gold medal in Strategic Studies from the National Defence University (NDU) and is currently pursuing an MPhil in Strategic Studies at NDU. Her expertise spans military strategy, defense modernization, emerging technologies, nuclear security, and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Areej can be reached at [email protected].

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