PAKISTAN’S governance crisis is not merely a question of economic mismanagement; it is fundamentally rooted in the concentration of political and administrative power. Despite a nearly sevenfold increase in population since independence, Pakistan continues to operate through the same four-province structure, leaving vast populations geographically distant from decision-making centres. With more than 241 million people, the country requires a governance model that reflects its demographic realities, regional diversity and growing administrative challenges. Yet proposals for new provinces and empowered local governments remain trapped in political resistance, largely because decentralization threatens interests of entrenched elites.
Punjab, with approximately 127.7 million people, accounts for nearly 53 per cent of the national population. Sindh has around 55.7 million residents, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 40.9 million and Balochistan 14.9 million. Governing such enormous territories through centralized provincial capitals inevitably creates administrative distance, unequal development and limited political representation. Longstanding demands for Hazara and South Punjab provinces reflect genuine grievances regarding resource distribution, employment opportunities and political exclusion. However, despite repeated provincial assembly resolutions, these demands have made little constitutional progress. Article 239(4) requires a two-thirds majority in the affected provincial assembly, making provincial restructuring particularly difficult when existing political interests perceive decentralization as a threat.
The concentration of political power within influential families is reinforced by economic privilege and unequal resource distribution. A PIDE-linked study found that at least half of the legislators elected in 2002, 2008 and 2013 belonged to political families, while 41 per cent of their runners-up shared similar backgrounds. Meanwhile, investigations have highlighted substantial Pakistani-owned property holdings in Dubai and London, while the UNDP estimated that elite privileges cost Pakistan $17.4 billion annually, equivalent to 6–8 per cent of GDP. Land inequality further entrenches this influence, with approximately 1.1 per cent of the population reportedly controlling 22 per cent of agricultural land. Together, these patterns restrict political access, reinforce inherited influence and undermine equal representation. The consequences are increasingly visible in Pakistan’s socioeconomic indicators. National poverty reportedly increased from 24.3 per cent in 2015–16 to 28.9 per cent in 2024–25, with rural poverty reaching 36.2 per cent. Balochistan faces particularly severe deprivation, with an estimated poverty rate of 47 per cent, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at 35.3 per cent, Sindh at 32.6 per cent and Punjab at 23.3 per cent. Inequality has also widened, while food insecurity affects approximately one-quarter of households.
The failure to strengthen local governments represents another manifestation of elite resistance. Article 140A of the Constitution requires provinces to establish elected local government systems and devolve political, administrative and financial authority to them. Nevertheless, local governments reportedly receive less than five per cent of consolidated public expenditure, compared with approximately 10 per cent in 2005. Provincial governments frequently delay local elections, dissolve elected councils or retain control over their financial and administrative resources. Consequently, citizens remain dependent on provincial legislators even for basic municipal services. The demands for Hazara and South Punjab provinces must therefore be understood within this broader struggle for democratic decentralization. Hazara, with approximately 5.7 million residents, has repeatedly witnessed political resolutions supporting provincial status, including in 2014, 2018, 2020 and 2025. Similarly, South Punjab continues to demand greater administrative autonomy and equitable development. Their grievances cannot be addressed merely through symbolic announcements or temporary administrative arrangements. Constitutional restructuring requires transparent political negotiations, parliamentary consensus and the necessary constitutional majorities.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s governance crisis cannot be resolved by changing political faces while preserving the same concentration of power. A country of more than 241 million people cannot afford to remain governed through an outdated administrative arrangement that limits representation and protects established interests. New provinces and empowered local governments are not solutions in isolation, but essential components of a broader democratic transformation. Pakistan must move from family-controlled politics towards accountable institutions, from centralized authority towards meaningful devolution, and from elite privileges towards equal citizenship. The real question is not whether Pakistan can afford more provinces; it is whether it can continue to afford a system in which political power remains the inherited property of a privileged few.
—The writer is regular contributor.
