THE proposed amendments to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, have sparked debate about administrative reforms, the possible rollback of the Thirteenth Amendment and fears of a change in AJK’s constitutional status. It is essential to distinguish verified facts from speculation and examine the issue in its historical, constitutional and political context. The constitutional position of AJK is inseparable from the Kashmir freedom movement and the unresolved future of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. On July 19, 1947, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference adopted a historic resolution favouring accession to Pakistan. On October 24, 1947, the Azad Government was established under Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan. Three days later, Indian troops landed in Srinagar. India subsequently referred the Kashmir question to the United Nations, whose resolutions addressed a free and impartial plebiscite to determine the State’s future.
The Karachi Agreement of April 1949, signed by representatives of Pakistan, the Azad Government and the Muslim Conference, defined responsibilities concerning the Kashmir dispute and negotiations with the United Nations. It was distinct from the military agreement of July 1949 establishing the ceasefire line. AJK’s constitutional arrangements subsequently evolved through successive presidential and parliamentary systems. The Presidential Act of 1970 introduced elections based on universal adult franchise. In 1974, the Interim Constitution Act replaced the presidential system with parliamentary government and established the AJK Council to exercise specified legislative and administrative responsibilities.
The framework underwent further changes, including political disruptions during martial law and the eventual restoration of elected government. The Thirteenth Amendment of 2018 significantly expanded the powers of AJK’s elected government and Assembly, removed the Council’s legislative authority and ended its role in presidential elections, substantially reducing it to an advisory institution. Consequently, any proposal to amend the existing framework must be assessed against its actual provisions and implications for elected institutions, public representation and the distribution of powers. Recent speculation has raised concerns about a possible change in AJK’s constitutional status. However, unverified reports cannot be treated as official decisions or an approved constitutional draft.
Prime Minister Barrister Syed Iftikhar Ali Gilani has rejected reports suggesting a change in AJK’s status, describing such claims as baseless and emphasising that constitutional amendments must follow the prescribed legislative process. Similarly, Chaudhry Tariq Farooq, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and Secretary General of PML-N in AJK, has rejected rumours concerning a change in the State’s status. Senator Rana Sanaullah, Adviser to Pakistan’s Prime Minister on Political Affairs, has discussed possible reforms aimed at improving AJK’s inclusion in national development, public services and financial arrangements. Such remarks, however, do not establish that an approved draft exists or that a decision has been taken to alter AJK’s status. Until an authenticated proposal becomes available, definitive conclusions about the nature and consequences of the amendments would be premature.
Constitutional reform is a legitimate feature of democratic governance. Improving administrative efficiency, clarifying institutional responsibilities and ensuring adequate financial resources deserve serious consideration. However, reforms concerning AJK must also be evaluated against the unresolved Kashmir question, relevant United Nations resolutions and the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination. The preamble to the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, recognises the relevance of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices to the final determination of the State’s future. Therefore, a clear distinction must be maintained between administrative adjustments and changes that could affect AJK’s fundamental constitutional identity.
PML-N legislators, Council members and party workers must exercise restraint until an authentic draft is available. Party discipline and constitutional scrutiny are not contradictory: concerns should be expressed through appropriate democratic forums and supported by verified information rather than speculation. Ultimately, policymakers and political leaders must recognise that Azad Jammu and Kashmir is neither a sovereign independent State nor a regular province of Pakistan. Its distinctive constitutional position reflects the unresolved Kashmir dispute, its historical and ideological relationship with Pakistan, its strategic geography and the aspirations underpinning the freedom movement. The Thirteenth Amendment’s financial gains and enhanced powers must be protected. At the same time, the AJK Council should neither become ineffective nor impose an unnecessary burden on the public exchequer. Its role should be reviewed and reformed, where necessary, to facilitate meaningful consultation and cooperation between the Federal Government and the AJK Government.
Equally, AJK must not be portrayed as a separate country in opposition to Pakistan. The priority should be to strengthen their historical, ideological and constitutional relationship while respecting AJK’s interim status and the democratic rights of its people. Article 257 of Pakistan’s Constitution provides the relevant guiding principle: when the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State will be determined in accordance with their wishes. Until that final decision, the democratic rights of AJK’s people, the authority of their elected institutions, their financial interests and their distinctive constitutional position must be safeguarded. Any forthcoming amendments to the AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974, or Pakistan’s Constitution should strengthen mutual trust, protect the interests of the people and preserve the principles of the Kashmir freedom movement. This approach best serves Pakistan’s national interests and the objective of a just and lasting settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir cause of self determination.
—The writer is a Supreme Court lawyer and former member & Chairman Standing Committee of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. Islamabad
