UNFORTUNATELY, malicious actors in Pakistan’s digital sphere are attempting to undermine Pakistan-China friendship through disinformation campaigns circulating fabricated V-logs, commentaries, articles and podcasts. These narrative grenades, orchestrated by shadow networks, are launching asymmetric information attacks on CPEC, Pak-China diplomatic relations and the broader spectrum of economic cooperation, industrial collaboration and military coordination.
Definitely, such claims are baseless, decontextualized and fundamentally misrepresentative of the strategic partnership. This calls for a robust counter-narrative anchored in modern public diplomacy, strategic advocacy and International Relations (IR) discourse. Additionally, these critics cite data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), but SIPRI only measures arms transfers, not the full scope of defence cooperation. Joint exercises, training, intelligence sharing and technology co-development are not counted. SIPRI itself admits this limitation. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of sea power (1890) emphasized naval dominance as the key to national greatness. Pakistan’s naval modernization, supported by China, reflects this understanding.
The Type 054A/P frigates represent a significant leap in the Pakistan Navy’s blue-water war-fighting capacity, integrating multi-role mission profiles that include anti-surface warfare (ASuW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). These platforms have substantially elevated Pakistan’s expeditionary naval reach and sea-control capabilities. The Hangor-class submarines, equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP), deliver extended submerged endurance, enhanced stealth characteristics and a credible second-strike deterrence posture, critical components of Pakistan’s maritime strategic calculus.
Exercise Sea Guardian continues to sharpen bilateral interoperability and combined tactical proficiency, while the AMAN series of multinational exercises has positioned Pakistan as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). These engagements reflect a shared commitment to maritime domain awareness, freedom of navigation and regional stability. Such capability accretion and strategic convergence would not have been possible without the steadfast support and defence-industrial cooperation of China, a partnership that continues to underpin Pakistan’s naval modernization and maritime deterrence architecture.
Admiral Naveed Ashraf’s statement that Hangor-class submarines will play a “key role in deterrence and securing sea lines of communication” reflects sound maritime strategy for protecting Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), countering sea-denial threats and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean Region. Giulio Douhet’s theory of air power (1921) and John Warden’s Five Rings model (1988) inform Pakistan Air Force’s modernization. The qualitative edge provided by Chinese-origin platforms enhances deterrence stability in South Asia, a stabilizing factor that critics ignore.
Moreover Andrew Krepinevich’s concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (1993) provides an ideal opportunity for Pak-China cooperation, which must now extend to electromagnetic spectrum operations, satellite jamming and counter-space capabilities, robotic combat systems, AI-enabled decision support, cyber warfare, nuclear-powered drones and 6G communications. Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power (1990) emphasizes attraction over coercion. China’s approach to Pakistan exemplifies soft power: there is no political conditionality and unlike Western lenders, China does not impose governance or human rights conditions and respects sovereignty.
The “puppetry journalists” and “sponsored pseudo-intellectuals” indulging in these anti-Pak-China activities are being funded by external actors seeking to undermine Pak-China relations. Their narratives follow predictable patterns: emphasizing debt concerns, questioning project viability and alleging hidden agendas, all of which are refuted by empirical evidence. The “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” between Pakistan and China represents a unique diplomatic construct. This relationship embodies a “special and privileged” partnership, a category that transcends traditional alliance frameworks. The writer submits that Chinese loans constitute approximately 20–25% of Pakistan’s external debt, not the dominant share claimed. Interest rates are concessional (2–3%) compared to commercial lending (6–8%), while grace periods of 5–7 years and maturity periods of 20–25 years provide fiscal space.
The writer points out that agreements are publicly available on the CPEC Authority website and Ministry of Planning portals. Terms are negotiated, not imposed; Pakistan’s sovereignty is respected, while Joint Working Groups ensure Pakistani input into project design and implementation. Comparative analysis shows that CPEC terms are more favourable than Western alternatives, such as IMF conditionality. The writer suggests that policymakers should further expand CPEC beyond infrastructure to agriculture, technology and services; develop Special Economic Zones focused on export-oriented industries; promote joint ventures in renewable energy, electric vehicles and the digital economy; and enhance human capital development through educational exchanges and vocational training. In summary, the Pak-China relationship, anchored in CPEC and reinforced by comprehensive military cooperation, represents a strategic partnership that transcends simplistic economic or security calculations.
It embodies liberal institutionalism’s vision of a cooperative international order, realism’s recognition of power dynamics and security imperatives, constructivism’s emphasis on shared identity and norms, neo-functionalism’s logic of spillover and integration and defence economics’ principles of alliance efficiency and technology transfer. Mr Akram Naeem Bharoka and many others whose paid and sponsored V-logs, commentaries, articles and comments are characterized by misinterpretation, selective citation and borrowed wisdom fail to grasp these multidimensional realities. Their narratives serve not Pakistan’s interests but those of external actors seeking to drive a wedge between “iron brothers”.
The puppetry journalists, sponsored pseudo-intellectuals and retired bureaucrats who seek to undermine CPEC and Pak-China friendship will be remembered not as patriots but as useful idiots for forces that wish Pakistan ill. The consensus among the Pakistani people across all segments of society is clear: China is a trusted friend, CPEC is a transformative opportunity and the Pak-China partnership is vital, permanent, positive, productive and participatory. This is not mere rhetoric; it is the empirical reality confirmed by trade data showing China as Pakistan’s largest trading partner, investment data showing China as Pakistan’s largest source of FDI, public opinion surveys showing overwhelming support for Pak-China relations and, last but not least, strategic outcomes demonstrating enhanced security and development.
—The writer is President, the Centre for Knowledge and Public Policy, Regional Expert: China, CPEC, BRI & World Affairs.
