PAKISTAN’S canal-based irrigation system is among the oldest and largest integrated irrigation networks in the world. For centuries, the waters of the Indus Basin have sustained agriculture, supported livelihoods and shaped the economic foundations of the region. Today, however, growing uncertainty surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has raised serious concerns about Pakistan’s long-term water security.
The origins of Pakistan’s irrigation infrastructure predate the country’s creation. During the Mughal era, Emperor Shah Jahan commissioned the Upper Bari Doab Canal to bring water from the Ravi River to Lahore. Subsequent improvements under Maharaja Ranjit Singh and large-scale expansion during British rule transformed Punjab into one of the most productive agricultural regions of South Asia. By the time of Partition in 1947, an extensive network of canals and headworks irrigated vast tracts of fertile land.
Partition fundamentally altered this arrangement. Under the Radcliffe Award, several key headworks controlling canal waters were allocated to India despite serving agricultural lands that became part of Pakistan. The resulting division of water infrastructure exposed the newly established state to an immediate strategic vulnerability. This vulnerability became evident within months of independence when water supplies to certain Pakistani canals were interrupted, creating significant anxiety about the future of agriculture in the country. Temporary agreements helped avert a prolonged crisis, but the broader question of rights over shared rivers remained unresolved.
To address these concerns, Pakistan and India signed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 with the support of the World Bank. The treaty allocated the waters of the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—to Pakistan while granting India rights over the eastern rivers. Widely regarded as one of the most successful water-sharing agreements in modern history, the treaty survived wars, military crises and decades of political hostility. Yet the durability of the treaty has increasingly come under strain. Over the past several decades, Pakistan has expressed growing concern regarding India’s construction of dams, hydroelectric projects and storage facilities on rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty framework. Projects such as Baglihar and Kishanganga have remained sources of persistent disagreement between the two countries.
Pakistan’s concern is not merely about the volume of water but also about control. As the upper riparian state, India possesses the geographical advantage of being able to regulate, store, or alter the timing of water flows entering Pakistan. In an agricultural system heavily dependent upon predictable river flows, even temporary disruptions during sowing seasons can have significant consequences for crop production and rural livelihoods. From Pakistan’s perspective, the issue extends beyond engineering disputes. It touches upon broader principles of international water law, including equitable utilization and the obligation to avoid causing significant harm to co-riparian states. Pakistani policymakers and water experts have repeatedly argued that any action which undermines the reliability of downstream flows threatens the spirit upon which the treaty was founded.
The issue acquired greater significance following the deterioration of bilateral relations in recent years. Statements by Indian leaders emphasizing the maximization of India’s use of Indus waters have generated concern in Pakistan that water is increasingly being viewed through a strategic rather than cooperative lens. These concerns intensified after the Pahalgam incident of April 2025, following which India announced that it was placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. For Pakistan, this represented an unprecedented challenge to a treaty that had long been viewed as one of the few stable pillars of the bilateral relationship. More than a year later, uncertainty surrounding the future of the agreement continues to cast a shadow over regional water cooperation.
For Pakistan, the stakes are exceptionally high. Agriculture remains a vital sector of the economy, contributing to food security, employment, exports and rural development. Millions of people depend directly or indirectly upon the waters of the Indus Basin. Any sustained disruption in river flows would have consequences extending far beyond agriculture, affecting energy production, economic stability and social welfare. At the same time, Pakistan must acknowledge that external challenges are only part of the broader water-security equation. Rapid population growth, climate change, groundwater depletion, inefficient irrigation practices and inadequate storage capacity have all increased pressure on the country’s water resources. Addressing these domestic vulnerabilities is as important as responding to external threats.
Moving forward, Pakistan must pursue a dual-track strategy. Diplomatically, it should continue to engage international legal mechanisms, treaty institutions and multilateral forums to safeguard its rights under international law. Simultaneously, it must invest in modern water management systems, construct additional storage infrastructure, improve irrigation efficiency and promote conservation practices capable of reducing long-term vulnerability.
The Indus Basin is not merely a collection of rivers; it is the lifeline of Pakistan. For more than six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty helped prevent water disputes from escalating into larger conflicts. Preserving the principles of fairness, predictability and cooperation embodied in that agreement remains essential not only for Pakistan’s future but also for the stability of South Asia. As water scarcity becomes an increasingly defining challenge of the twenty-first century, the management of the Indus Basin will continue to shape the economic security, environmental sustainability and strategic landscape of the region.
— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
